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ABSTRACT

REVOLUTIONS WITHOUT REVOLUTIONARIES?
SOCIAL MEDIA NETWORKS AND REGIME RESPONSE IN EGYPT

David Faris

Ian S. Lustick

Does the Internet change the balance of power between authoritarian regimes and
their domestic opponents? The results of this case study of Egyptian digital activism
suggest that the Internet has important effects on authoritarian politics, though not
necessarily the kind we have come to expect from popular accounts of online activism. In
this dissertation, I argue that what I call Social Media Networks can trigger informational
cascades through their interaction effects with independent media outlets and on-theground organizers. They do so primarily through the reduction of certain costs of
collective action, the transmission capabilities of certain elite nodes in social and online
networks, and through changing the diffusion dynamics of information across social
networks. An important secondary argument is that while states, including Egypt, have
become more adept at surveillance and filtering of online activities, SMNs make it
impossible for authoritarian countries to control their media environments in the way that
such regimes have typically done so in the past. Case studies of media events in Egypt
between 2006 and 2008 explain how SMNs undermine the process of authoritarian media
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control and why the independent press is critical for claims-making and the building of
shared meaning. However, the power of SMNs is not capable of challenging the
entrenched repressive capacity of determined states, nor can SMNs be substituted for the
difficult work of grassroots organizing. I arrive at this conclusion through a case study of
the April 6th Youth Movement, which staged nearly identical strikes on April 6th, 2008,
and April 6th, 2009, with divergent results. Therefore, the dissertation concludes that even
though SMNs may lead to richer information environments with increased capacity for
organizing, the technologies themselves are not determinative of political outcomes.
Finally, by studying the use of digital tools by Muslim Brothers and Baha’is, the
dissertation argues that SMNs can provide critical public space and create discursive
focal points for political and religious minorities.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cyberspace does not lie within your borders.
– John Perry Barlow
The discursive voices of the new media are fascinating, but their political importance
has yet to be demonstrated.
– Augustus Richard Norton
In February 2010, discussion of the upcoming presidential elections in Egypt
centered around the potential candidacy of Mohamed ElBaradei, the former head of the
International Atomic Energy Agency. ElBaradei, a Nobel Laureate who commanded
broad respect inside Egypt for his achievements, had been living abroad in Vienna for
decades. When ElBaradei’s flight arrived in Cairo on February 19th, hundreds of
supporters met him at the airport and greeted him like a savior. ElBaradei had caused a
stir earlier in the month when he hinted that he might run for president if the election
were to be genuinely democratic, rather than the farce that had taken place in 2005.
Observers, however, anticipated that power would be handed off from the ailing and
aging dictator Hosni Mubarak to his son and heir apparent Gamal, in another rigged
election. It was in this context that a group of young Egyptians started a “fan” page on the
social networking site Facebook dedicated to ElBaradei’s potential candidacy. Before
long this group had over 150,000 members (out of roughly 2 million Egyptians on
Facebook at the time). ElBaradei’s decision to participate or not participate in the election,
and the swift growth of his dedicated Facebook group, renewed debates inside and
outside the country about the effect of social networking sites like Facebook – and other
1

forms of “social media” like blogs, Twitter, and text-messaging – on politics in Egypt. In
other words observers were asking, yet again, a question to which scholars have sought
the answer for years: Is the Internet inherently a tool of democratization?
Unfortunately much of the research on the impact of the Internet in the Middle
East has been somewhat anecdotal. Driven by popular press coverage of the latest
application (like Twitter) or perceived success of online activism in places like Iran, our
understanding of the impact of these technologies seems to change with every new
protest or Facebook group. The goal therefore should not be to ask what the impact of
Mohamed ElBaradei’s Facebook group will be, but rather to generate robust theories that
can help us understand events as they happen and make probabilistic predictions about
the future. It is with that goal in mind that this dissertation seeks to explain the impact of
the Internet in authoritarian countries through a single case study of Egypt, and to answer
the following research questions: First, does the use of social media lead to more
collective action in authoritarian societies? Do social media generate media coverage of
sensitive events and issues in authoritarian societies? What is the effect of social media
on socially or politically marginalized groups in Egyptian society? And finally, why do
some states (like China) seem more successful at controlling the effects of social media
than others? These questions intersect with several distinct literatures in the field of
political science, which I will review below before proceeding to an outline of the case
selection, methodology, and chapter organization.

2

1.1 The Political Context of Social Media Networks in Egypt
In addition to addressing questions in the field about the Internet and politics, this
dissertation also engages with debates about the durability of authoritarianism. Given that
the Egyptian state has responded to the threat of online activism with the similar
strategies with which it has approached the control of the political sphere – Observers
seem to be in general agreement that the Egyptian political system is quite stable
(Carothers 2002; Kassem 2004; Lust-Okar 2005; Brownlee 2007; Bellin 2005; Cook
2007; Heydemann 2007). Dissenters from this consensus are few (see Alaasar 2009).
Brownlee (2007) argues that the single-party system in Egypt provides incentives for
individual elites to pursue opportunities with the NDP rather than joining the opposition,
thus providing for long-term systemic stability. Lust-Okar (2005) sees Egyptian domestic
stability as predicated on an ingenious divide-and-rule strategy which has kept the
opposition off-guard and at loggerheads. Like a number of other semi-authoritarian
regimes, Egypt allows a number of legal parties to operate and organize in the political
system. These parties include the reconstituted Wafd, and among their many privileges
are setting up and running their own newspapers. But one of the more popular
organizations, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood 1 -- is allowed to participate only
indirectly, and has not been recognized as a political party. In fact since the election of
Hamas in Palestine in 2006, the Brotherhood has been targeting aggressively by the
regime, believing that international events have granted the regime new license in
eliminating the group’s political influence. The crackdown on the Brotherhood included
the arrest and prosecution of dozens of senior members of the group’s leadership in 20071

Or Muslim Brothers, depending on the translation.
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2008. Overall, by allowing certain parties access to power and privilege, the regime has
driven a wedge between the opposition camps. As a result, just when the regime seemed
the weakest (in the mid-1990s) the legal opposition groups became less likely to push for
reforms in alliance with the excluded opposition (Lust-Okar, 2005, 147-148).
Kassem (2004) argues that the Egyptian regime is personal, and quite successful
at that. Bellin also views Middle East regimes, and Egypt in particular, as enjoying
“robust and tenacious” coercive apparatuses. Heydemann argues that authoritarian
regimes in the region, including Egypt, have survived and thrived by what he calls
“upgrading authoritarianism” – selectively creating openings in the electoral arena and
the economic sphere while pursuing closer relationships with foreign powers that share
their lack of interest in human rights and democracy (Heydemann 2007, 7). While ElGhobashy (2007) and Rutherford (2008) find some possibilities for change in the
increasing density of civil society and judicial oversight, respectively, neither sees
democratization as particularly likely. Hanna (2009) argues that the architecture of
electoral control erected by the Mubarak regime makes any challenge to Gamal’s
ascendancy, and any long-term change, difficult at best, while Cook (2009) argues that
“the underlying patterns and processes of Egyptian politics” will prevent further
liberalization. Regardless of where each particular author locates Egyptian authoritarian
stability, the regime enjoys as close to a consensus in political science circles as there is
in the discipline – façade democracy works for the Mubarak regime, the coercive
apparatus is strong, resilient, and co-opted, and there are no clear-and-present dangers to
its authority on the horizon. Most of all there seems to be wide agreement that the
4

mobilization capacity of the various opposition groups is very low, and thus a change of
regime or democratization is highly unlikely.
The biggest jolt to Egyptian authoritarianism in recent years was perhaps the
formation of Kefaya (The Egyptian Movement for Change), a broad-based coalition of
leftists, Islamists, and other opposition figures. Kefaya has always been difficult to
categorize, and very little has been published about the movement since its inception in
2004. As the anonymous blogger Baheyya writes, Kefaya:
fits none of the available models found in the (admittedly dessicated)
Egyptian political landscape. It’s not an “opposition party”, it’s not an NGO,
it’s not a professional association, it’s not a solidarity committee, it’s not a
party-in-waiting (like Wasat and Karama), and it’s not a grassroots initiative
(Baheyya 2005).
Shorbagy argues that this movement sprung out of the detritus of the legal-but-severelyrestricted political parties, on the one hand, and the illegal Muslim Brotherhood on the
other. Lacking an accepted, institutional voice, opposition politics in Egypt had come to a
standstill during the early years of the new century (Shorbagy 2007, 175). Kefaya, a word
with a unique meaning in the Egyptian context (it is colloquial for “Enough!”), included
figures from across the political spectrum, galvanized to prevent Mubarak from assuming
a fifth term as President of Egypt. This appeared to be the only focal point of agreement
in the group. As Baheyya writes, “The only consensus is that Mubarak must go;
everything else is up for debate” (Baheyya 2005). However, eventually this unwavering
opposition to the Mubarak regime began to appear in the popular mind as an absence of
any alternative, positive vision for the future (El-Amrani 2006). The emergence of
Kefaya, as well as the nascent and perceived opening in the political system following the
5

U.S.-led war against Iraq, appeared to combine for a combustible situation, one that was
ripe for organizing a counter-movement against the state. As leading blogger Issandr ElAmrani noted, in 2005 “there was so much happening and there was a lot of attention on
Egypt because President Bush had decided to highlight Egypt as a place to
democratize.” 2 And for a time it did appear as though Kefaya was galvanizing people in
a way that had not happened in a long time – their street protests were bold, and
undertaken without the regime’s permission, which in any case remains quite hard to
obtain (Shorbagy 2007, 190). However, these protests eventually become rote, and easy
enough for the regime to disrupt by banning them or interfering with them, and arresting
activists after the fact. El-Mahdi (2009) argues that while the Kefaya movement
eventually fizzled, it ignited dissent in other quarters of Egyptian public life, particularly
in the labor movement (1035).
1.2 The Egyptian Media Context
But Kefaya was not only important in and of itself – it also provided the
institutional foundation for a new means of expression in the country, the growth of
blogging as a tool for dissent and opposition. The appearance of blogs on the Egyptian
scene in 2004 coincided with a larger opening in the press environment, which meant that
opportunities for expression, oversight, and dissent multiplied almost overnight. For
years Egyptians had been subject to a moribund local print press, with the governmentrun dailies and their fawning coverage of the President more or less the only game in
town. While the state had legally licensed the opposition parties to run their own
newspapers, these organs were not trusted sources of news, since their affiliation with the
2

Interview with Issandr El-Amrani, Cairo Egypt. February 16th, 2008.
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state in the form of acquiescence to its rules made them suspect in the eyes of many. That
left Egyptians dependent on international press organs like Al-Jazeera – but regardless of
the undeniable impact of satellite TV, there was still a conspicuous missing link in the
press environment, since no one was on the ground honestly covering local Egyptian
political issues in a way that earned widespread public trust. This was all to change in
2004, when the independent (as opposed to “opposition”), privately-owned daily
newspaper Al-Masri Al-Youm was launched by Hisham Kassem. As we will see in
Chapter 3, the existence and growth of the independent press allowed a kind of nexus to
form between activist bloggers and human rights agitators – they fed into one another, in
the sense that bloggers link to and talk about the stories printed in the independent press,
while the journalists in the independent press often rely on bloggers as sources. Al-Masri
Al-Youm was a daily newspaper unlike anything that had been seen in Egypt in decades 3
– a privately-financed affair that was free to criticize the regime, make money, and
publish hard-hitting investigative journalism. It may be that the kind of criticism carried
in the pages of the newspaper emboldened bloggers to do the same on their new Web
sites. And crucially this new nexus of blogger-journalist-activist created new kinds of
networks – networks that the regime may never have seen before in this form.
The growth of communication on the Internet is also, not coincidentally, a major
concern of scholars. Each information revolution – be it print, film and television,
satellite broadcasting, radio, and now the Internet – has been met with both the great
hopes of revolutionaries and opposition leaders, and the realities of state hostility to free
3

This is not to suggest that there were not other newspapers prior to Al-Masry Al-Youm which carried
criticism of the regime, but these papers were linked to certain political parties and did not enjoy the kind
of readership and respect eventually garnered by Al-Masry Al-Youm.

7

expression. This has long been the case in Egypt, whose film censorship office once
employed the renowned novelist Naguib Mahfouz (Starkey 1998, 413). Egyptian film
long served as a political battleground for ideas that could not be expressed in the public
sphere. But in fact the censorship of films – particularly Western films – actually
stretches back to the period of de facto British rule (Vitalis 2000, 278). The prerevolutionary regime seemed in particular to fear films that depicted revolutions (Vitalis
2000, 279). The post-revolutionary regime’s belief that uncensored films present a
political and social threat to the regime’s continued hold on power can be seen even
today in the recent controversy over the film version of the best-selling novel The
Yacoubian Building, a book which unflinchingly depicts corruption, homosexuality,
torture, and other desultory features of Egyptian political and social life. Censors clipped
parts of the film. But that was not enough for more vociferous critics, who wanted the
movie banned altogether.
But greater things were expected from the print media and radio in the Middle
East and Egypt. Lerner chronicled the Nasser-era state’s takeover of print and broadcast
media almost immediately upon its assumption of power:
Nasser, then has converted his earlier view that Egyptian society
was not “ready” for mass participation into a more daring
hypothesis – that he can use the mass media to achive national
consensus without unduly raising public demands for full
participation. This feat hinges upon effective control of the media,
along with all other channels of access to the Egyptian mass (1958,
251).
Modernization theory’s expectation that rising literacy and increased access to media
would change entrenched “traditional” social attitudes is mirrored by the regime’s fear of
8

those attitude changes and its insistence on manipulating them. Part of this strategy was
the regime’s nationalization of newspapers in 1960, muzzling what had once been a
relatively free-wheeling discursive arena (Jankowski 139). Lerner argues that Egyptian
newspapers were brought under “central directive” long before that (1958, 254). While
the decades have eroded the state’s desire and capacity to thoroughly regulate the print
media, the atmosphere is still fairly well-regulated. As for radio, Lerner argues, though
that the Egyptian State Broadcasting’s (E.S.B.) Voice of the Arabs (Sowt al-Arab) may
have been instrumental in fomenting revolutionary Nasserist fervor across the region in
the late 1950s (1958, 255-258). But the regime’s desire and capacity to carry out state
censorship and official control over these relatively new (to Egypt) forms of mass
communication are the important factors.
One of the central conceits of modernization theory was the idea that the spread of
mass communication and the changes in attitudes might presage a greater role for
ordinary individuals in the political universe. Mass media and the rise of literacy had the
chance to make public opinion “a real factor instead of a fine phrase in the arena of world
politics” (Lerner 1958, 54). These hopes presage later enthusiasm about the Internet and
its potential to change entrenched attitudes about gender and politics. Lerner and other
advocates of democratization did not see, or did not want to see, that mass
communication could also be used by the defenders and articulators of tradition to
safeguard against more “cosmopolitan attitudes” brought by foreign media and economic
influence. This reality is especially stark today in Egypt, where for every secular,
cosmopolitan liberal blogging about government abuses, there are probably a dozen
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Islamists using the Internet, newspapers, DVD’s, cassette tapes and other media forms to
propagate ideas that Lerner and other modernization theorists would find “traditional.”
This reality underscores the idea that new technologies are value-neutral and can be used
by anyone to accomplish most any social goal.
1.3 The Internet and Activism in the Middle East
Recent scholarly work theorizes that the Internet and its associated tools and
applications might reduce the costs of collective action. Rheingold (2003) argued that the
coordinating capacity of tools like text-messaging might allow activists in authoritarian
countries to mobilize and avoid the repressive arm of the state. Shirky argues that what he
calls “social tools” spur group-formation and collective action by reducing the costs of
communication and removing “two old obstacles – locality of information, and barriers to
group reaction” (Shirky 2008, 153). Karpf (2009) argues that these mechanisms allow for
new and unexpected forms of political organization and contestation. A competing
tradition holds that states have largely been successful at shutting down online dissent
(Mozorov 2009; Deibert et. al. 2008; Zittrain 2008; Boas and Kalathil 2003). Others,
while recognizing the reduction in organizing costs and communication, argue that digital
technologies have little effect on the institutions of authoritarianism (Faris and Etling
2008). Still others, while recognizing the way that the Internet empowers non-state actors,
feel that regimes allow certain kinds of expression and deliberation online but refuse to
change underlying structures, or worse, use that information for repressive purposes
(Mozorov 2009b). Few studies, however, have investigated the effects of the Internet on
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collective action in the Middle East, a region which is often regarded in the discipline as
somehow exceptional.
Many scholars dismiss the Internet and Internet activism as chimerical and
unimportant in the Middle East, particularly with limited access for most of the region’s
citizens and restrictions on the availability of certain web sites. Lynch argues that limited
accessibility has hampered the ability of the Internet to affect public affairs in the Arab
world (2005 50). And contrary to expectations, dictators have managed to design
sophisticated systems of controls that serve to prevent the free flow of information
(Lynch 2005, 51). Given these limitations, researchers must ask whether the Internet and
the new political influence of blogs has any traction at all in these societies. But the fact
that states – particularly China – have responded so forcefully to the information
potential of the Internet indicates that at least one savvy regime perceives a genuine threat.
And while a very low percentage of the region’s inhabitants might own personal
computers with internet connections, the proliferation and low-cost of internet cafes in
major metropolitan centers means that even people of limited means can gain internet
access – and that news might be cheaper to obtain in cyberspace than in print. Along with
other forms of new media like satellite TV, it can be argued that the Internet helps
eradicate states’ “hegemonic control over the flow of information” (Hofheinz 2005, 78).
But regimes fear (and attempt to control) these other methods of mass
communication as well. What is unique about the Internet? Anderson argues,
In these respects, the Web is comparable in a contemporary
context to early printing presses in the world of the scriptorium: it
escapes the world of editors and arbiters of thought and
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interpretation by displaying the materials of interpretation and
providing alternative organizations for them (Anderson 2003 50).
Anderson was writing about Islam on the Web, but his comments could apply to any
political writing and organization on the Internet – overwhelmingly populated by blogs,
political organizations, or online magazines – in almost any context. The Internet allows
political commentary and organizing in real time and fosters the creation of online
communities and pressure organizations. Just as satellite television and call-in shows
have undermined state control over the media and democratized the regional discourse in
the Middle East, blogs 4 , chat rooms, and message boards have done the same -- and are
available to anyone who can afford the comparatively low cost of internet access. And
with the sheer number of blogs and web pages – as many as a million new web pages a
day (Dreyfus 2001, 8) – state censors will be perpetually challenged to keep up. Even in
states that can claim to have successfully filtered internet content, it would be impossible
for governments to fully censor all political blogging and content. That said, free
expression risks a serious response from the state. As Bucar and Fazaeli note in the
Iranian context, “When blogging is at its most politically powerful, it risks its greatest
punishment” (2009, 414).
Some scholars of the region have come to optimistic (in the sense that they
believe the Internet is altering the balance of power between states and oppositions)
conclusions about the potential impact of the Internet. In a statistical analysis, Best and
Wade (2005) argue that Internet penetration is associated with an identifiable increase in

4

A blog is a agent-created Web site in which authors post entries in a journal-like format that are displayed
with the most recent entry first. Blogs can be maintained by individuals, groups of individuals, or even
corporations, governments, and political campaigns (author’s definition).
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democracy across the world (21). The authors identify a number of what they call
“democratic regulators” that might allow the Internet to increase the level of democracy
in a given country. Encryption technology allows regime opponents to organize and
communicate in secrecy; the increasing cheapness of Internet access allows organizations
and dissidents to better communicate, inform, and organize; and the Internet’s
architecture disallows “governments such as the United States from implementing back
doors in the Internet to allow wiretapping” (Best and Wade 2005, 20). While they caution
that each of these possible benefits has an authoritarian analogue (filtration software,
political increases in the price of Internet access, etc.), they argue that overall the Internet
has been beneficial – although they specifically note that there has been no such positive
effect in the Middle East, perhaps because during the course of the study the region did
not become at all more democratic. Meier (2009) argues that in some contexts, the
Internet does seem to lead to more collective action outcomes – strikes, demonstrations,
and protests, but that this finding depends on the level of Internet penetration. In higherconnectivity societies, the Internet does indeed lead to more collective action. In lowerconnectivity societies, on the other hand, this does not appear to be the case.
Rahimi (2003) lists occasions where new media technologies have helped
undermine authoritarian regimes, including the use of email bulletins as resistance in
rural Zimbabwe (1). He also points to the most likely use of the Internet as a form of
resistance to authoritarian regimes – the exposure of corruption and abuses. His case
study of Iran indicates that while the state has struck back against Internet activists in the
context of a formerly-loose environment, it has been unable to shut down dissent entirely,
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making the Internet a new site of contestation over political issues that remain red-lined
offline. Similarly in Saudi Arabia, Teitelbaum (2003) argues that the Internet “creates a
more level playing field for the opposition” (237). He also notes that despite the Saudi
regime’s successful overall attempt to control Web content, the censoring of sites has
only led to dissent being transferred to other electronic arenas like email and chatting.
The rise of mobile technology since that time makes it increasingly likely that dissent
also takes place through SMS and other mobile technologies. He also notes the Internet’s
utility in crossing traditional social boundaries, like gender. Meanwhile, Wheeler argues
that the Internet could lead to incremental changes in authoritarian societies through
changes in democratic habits attained through interaction with other people, and through
the creation of a democratic public sphere (Wheeler 2006, 5). Because of these
interactions and the concomitant reshaping of individuals’ politics and beliefs, she
ultimately believes the state is “fighting a losing battle” (17).
Lynch describes the contours of the public sphere created out of such interactions:
The Arab public sphere can mobilize public outrage, pressure leaders to
act through ridicule or exposure, shape the strategic incentives for rational
politicians, and even incite street protests. But it cannot, in and of itself,
act (2005, 54).
Lynch is referring mainly to the international public sphere created by al-Jazeera and
other Arab satellite television networks. Television, as noted years ago by Neil Postman,
is a passive medium (Postman 1985). With the exception of the few individuals whose
calls are taken by talk show hosts, satellite television and the “new Arab public”
generated by it, are not interactive. If Postman is correct that television culture is an
inherent attack on print culture, then democratic enthusiasts should be happy to see the
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satellite television phenomenon accompanied now by an explosion in online writing and
activism. And therein lies perhaps the crucial difference between the new Arab public
and the new Arab cyberpublic – while the Internet may be available to far fewer citizens
than satellite TV, it is also by its nature a far more interactive medium. One of the central
features of most political blogs is the “comments” function, where readers respond to
posts – often acrimoniously – and help shape the scope and direction of the debate on
each site. Wheeler argues that such back-and-forth encounters, even in the context of
continued authoritarianism, can have positive feedback effects in terms of democratic
culture (Wheeler 2006a, 14).
The Internet is also said to facilitate organization on specific issues. This kind of
organization has been termed “Issue ad-hocracy” (Berman and Mulligan, 2003, 84).
Groups of disparate activists may form around narrow issues but develop into a larger
coalition based on shared interests – interests that they may not have been previously
aware of, and which were brought together by online activism. In other words, the
Internet is a tool that makes these kinds of meetings and happenstances possible – in part
because of its own unique technological characteristics, and in part because of the ways
states have been unable to entirely clamp down.
On the other hand regimes have also been quite successful in responding to the
threat of Internet activism – one need look no further than the Islamic Republic of Iran,
where the Green Revolution of 2009 has turned into a bloody stalemate that still favors
the repressive apparatus of the state (Morozov 2009). So while the Internet is
conceptualized in the popular imagination as a central hub that anyone can plug into, the
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reality is far different. In fact, contrary to expectations, ruling regimes have been able to
design sophisticated schemes to filter Internet content before it reaches end users –
including bloggers, activists, and their readers. While the Internet was designed to be a
medium that eluded centralized control – based on the military origins of the technology
– it has since evolved in ways that make such control possible. Boas (2005) details what
he refers to as the “architectural constraints” on Internet access constructed by China and
Saudi Arabia, as opposed to institutional constraints like law, social norms, and the
market. In contrast to institutional constraints, architectural constraints seek to actually
interpose the power of the state between Internet providers and their users. Zittrain (2008)
details the ways that software companies and states have designed hardware and
applications that make it easier for governments to censor and monitor their citizens.
While the Internet itself does not censor – as Boas writes, “the core of the network
performs simple data transfer functions that do not require knowledge of how the ends
are operating” – it is possible in some ways to intercept information. The Internet is
“much less a single network of individual users as it is a network connecting separate
computer networks” (Boas 2005). Since most individuals access the Internet through
service providers, states have managed to route all ISPs through a central state server
which can, with varying levels of effectiveness, intercept content deemed to be
objectionable by political or cultural authorities. For instance, Saudi Arabia’s 1.46
million Internet users can sign up with different providers, but all providers access the
Internet through the same centralized state portal. Control of the vastly larger number of
users in China is more complicated, but operates on the same general principle. These
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techniques have allowed China and Saudi Arabia to establish what Boas calls “effective”
control – not perfect by any means and capable of being thwarted by savvy and
determined users, but enough to satisfy the “social, economic, and political goals” of the
regime (Boas 2005).
The Open Net Initiative, which monitors the extent of government filtering of the
Internet globally, argues that there are still no formal attempts to filter or block Web sites
in Egypt (2009). Boas and Kalathil note that Egypt, in contrast to Saudi Arabia, has no
formal mechanism to control or filter Internet content (Boas and Kalathil 122). What
Egypt does do quite effectively is harass and repress bloggers and other practitioners of
online media. In fact all three of the journalists in prison at the time of this writing are
bloggers, and the regime arrested more than 100 bloggers in 2008 alone (Open Net
Initiative). Still, the lack of architectural control mechanisms means that individuals have
still been willing to engage in activism online, and in many cases seem willing to suffer
prison time. Thus if Web activists could have an effect on authoritarian structures, we
should be able to see this effect in Egypt, which has a liberal Internet structure. The
Egyptian government, as of the publication of that research, still appeared to view the
commercial and administrative potential of the Internet as greater than the potential for
political unrest and opposition coordination.
Perhaps no country in the region has seen a bigger impact from blogging and
other forms of Internet activism than Egypt. Even beyond their domestic influence,
Egyptian bloggers -- particularly those writing in English -- have become important parts
of the discourse in the West, and may have an influence beyond domestic affairs. Many
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activists choose to remain pseudonymous because of security concerns in the repressive
atmosphere of contemporary Egypt. But their ability to coordinate demonstrations and
garner international attention to their causes has not escaped the notice of outside
observers (Levinson 2005; Shapiro 2009; Faris 2008). The country’s bloggers and
Facebook activists have been the focus of numerous journalistic accounts, but as of yet
have not been the subject of a systematic scholarly study. This dissertation seeks to fill
that lacuna.
1.4 Methodology and Case Selection
The dissertation employs a single-case study design and focuses on political
events in Egypt between 2005 and April 2009. This time period was chosen because it
coincides with the decision of the Egyptian regime to hold multi-candidate presidential
elections and thus was a time of increased expectations about levels of political openness.
Given the difficulty in obtaining quantitative data about the use of social media networks,
and the particular difficulty of conducting social network analysis in authoritarian
countries where respondents are likely to be unwilling to provide data about their social
networks, this study employs a qualitative research design. Open-ended interviews were
conducted with dozens of prominent bloggers, journalists, human rights activists, and
others in Cairo, Egypt on a number of field visits between October 2007 and June 2009.
In addition to those interviews, I used the American University in Cairo’s print media
database, the Middle East Monitor, to conduct both qualitative and basic quantitative
research in the Egyptian print media. On several occasions, I was able to conduct
participant observation with the activists I was studying, most notably on April 6th, 2008,
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during general strike organized via Facebook group. On other occasions I was privy to
meetings and conferences organized by online activists, and invited to share in their
conclusions. Finally, I conducted process tracing through reading individual blogs and
the Web sites of electronic media organizations.
The selection of individual cases for study in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 was also driven
in part by circumstance. When I arrived in Cairo in August 2007, the project primarily
envisioned this as a study of the Egyptian blogosphere, based on observations I made in
the summer of 2006 while visiting Zamalek, the posh neighborhood on the Nile in central
Cairo. During the course of my first set of interviews with bloggers, beginning in October
2007, I kept hearing again and again that I needed to check out other new technologies
that were being put to use by Egyptian activists, notably Twitter and the social
networking site Facebook. Twitter at the time was a complete novelty to me, and it
wouldn’t be until the spring of 2009 that global audiences saw this application – which
allows users to send short, 140-character messages to one another – used in an
authoritarian country for activism. The ideas that came out of these interviews, in a
follow-the-evidence fashion, now form of the core of my qualitative analysis, and
changed the focus of this project from blogs to the larger world of networked social
media. Those insights quite literally would not have been possible without the initial
conversations with activists on the ground.
Many of the cases investigated in this study were uncovered via the interview
process, by asking activists to explain the impact of social media technologies, and
asking them to cite specific cases where they believed the technology had an impact. This
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process was in many ways haphazard, and open to the charge of selection on the
dependent variable. However, in each case, I was able to investigate the record of the
public sphere to test whether events were really being driven by the technologies, or by
other factors. This rigorous process led me to reject the perceived importance of digital
media in certain cases, particularly in the April 6th Movement, which forms the core of
Chapter 4.
Of course, some of these research choices were made by necessity rather than
choice. The reality is that a number of prominent bloggers were not willing to speak with
me – whether because of interview fatigue or because of fear of my motives. In fact it
took months to win any credibility at all in the tight social world of the elite, and it was
only after repeated calls, emails, and meetings that I was able to gain the trust of anyone
at all. Furthermore, more quantitative investigations of social networks were simply not
possible in Egypt, nor was an analysis of link structure between blogs, since Egyptian
blogs are often structured very differently from their American counterparts. What this
means ultimately is that this is less a quantitative study, and more of an attempt to build
theory about the effects of digital activism in authoritarian countries.
I chose to undertake a single case study analysis for a number of reasons. First, in
Egypt alone, the rate of internet usage skyrocketed during the past decade (Wheeler 2006,
5). Wheeler notes that in all likelihood there are more users than estimated because of the
widespread availability of internet cafes (Wheeler 2006b, 34-35). And as will be
demonstrated below, Egypt may be unique in the region in terms of how much influence
blogs have had on events and public discourse – and this may have something to do with
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the absence of overt filtering or censorship. In this way Egypt can be thought of as a
critical case for the idea that the Internet has placed new tools and resources in the hands
of the political opposition. In other words, if the tools do not have an effect in a relatively
open authoritarian environment such as Egypt, we can be fairly certain that they will be
of little use in stricter environments like Syria.
Additionally, Egypt looks like a strong comparison case to other authoritarian
regimes and their regulation of the Internet. The response of authoritarian regimes to the
Internet appears to run the gamut from total exclusion of most individuals from the Web
(i.e. Burma) to the liberal encouragement of e-commerce and other online activities (as in
the U.A.E.). Perhaps the best-known case of Internet regulation is in China, whose
architecture of online censorship is discussed in more detail below. The relevant point is
that the Chinese regime has cracked down hard on what it perceives to be online
organizing by its chief opposition groups – notably the Falun Gong, whose e-activities
have been almost totally curtailed by state strength (Kalathil and Boas 2003, 28-31). And
why have Chinse attempts been so successful (MacKinnon 2008)? In contrast, the
Egyptian regime appears to have gone after only a handful of prominent Islamist and
secular Web activists, and only then when these figures transgressed very clear red lines
of Egyptian politics. Why have Chinese and Egyptian authorities constructed different
architectures of control, and why do they appear to perceive the threat posed by Web
activism differently?
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1.5 Outline of the Dissertation
The primary contention of this dissertation is that what I call Social Media
Networks (SMNs) can trigger informational cascades through their interaction effects
with independent media outlets and on-the-ground organizers. They do so primarily
through the reduction of certain costs of collective action, the transmission capabilities of
certain elite nodes in social and online networks, and through changing the diffusion
dynamics of information across social networks. An important secondary argument is that
while states, including Egypt, have become more adept at surveillance and filtering,
SMNs make it impossible for authoritarian countries to control their media environments
in the way that such regimes have typically done so in the past. However, the power of
SMNs is not capable of challenging the entrenched repressive capacity of determined
states, nor can SMNs be substituted for the difficult work of grassroots organizing.
Chapter Two, Social Media Networks, Media Events, and Collective Action in
Authoritarian Regimes, provides the theoretical core of the dissertation, and introduces its
key terms. In Chapter Two, I explain how advances in our understandings of networks, as
well as research into the link structure of the Internet, helps us explain how information
can be diffused more quickly across Social Media Networks, whether through blogs, text
messages, social networking sites, or microblogging services, and how certain key nodes
in networks are responsible for distributing information and influencing other members
of their social networks. The chapter also argues that these diffusion dynamics can be
instigators of “informational cascades,” or sudden and widespread shifts in preferences,
attitudes or behaviors. These informational cascades can do two things – first they can
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make it difficult for regimes to maintain their control of information hegemony, and
second, they can lead to the organization of collective action, by lower the “revolutionary
thresholds” of individuals embedded in social networks.
Chapter Three, Agenda-Setters: Torture, Rights and Social Media Networks in
Egypt, evaluates four case studies of blog-driven or blog-enhanced media events in Egypt
to test the theories about media events and information control in Chapter Two. These
three events are: 1) the sexual harassment scandal of October 2006; the torture scandal of
January 2007; the Sudanese refugee crisis of 2006; and the Al-Qursaya Island takeover
attempt of 2007-8. The chapter demonstrates the critical agenda-setting or story-breaking
power of Social Media Networks – particularly in comparison to the absence of media
coverage of similar events in the past – and casts substantial doubt on the null hypothesis,
that SMNs have no substantial impact on authoritarian politics. Chapter Three further
argues that in a country like Egypt, where few are connected to the Internet, it is the
presence of a robust independent media that ultimately is responsible for transmitting
claims out of Social Media Networks and into the broader public sphere. It thus revises
our understanding of the causal pathways between the Internet and social or political
change in authoritarian countries.
Chapter 4, New Tools, Old Rules: Social Media Networks and Collective Action in
Egypt, evaluates case studies of social-media-driven mobilization to test competing
hypotheses about the effects of SMNs on collective action. The two case studies are the
April 6th, 2008 general strike, and the April 6th 2009 General Strike. The two events, with
similar organizers, goals, and execution, are strikingly close to a natural experiment. The
23

chapter theorizes the April 6th General Strike as an informational cascade and tests this
theory against other possible explanations of the day’s events. The chapter also tests
theories of regime response to these activities and answers questions about their
effectiveness. The chapter argues that while the April 6th 2008 General Strike constituted
an informational cascade, its organizers misunderstood its relationship to the on-theground organizing done by the labor movement. This misunderstanding attributed more
causality to SMNs than was warranted, and led to the failure of the follow-up strike. Thus
the chapter casts substantial doubt on the hypothesis that SMNs are direct causal factors
of revolutionary moments.
However, even though they might not have a direct revolutionary impact, it is
possible that SMNs can have additional impact on Egyptian politics and the Egyptian
public sphere by creating and sustaining public spheres or “counter-publics” for
marginalized groups like women, religious minorities, and sexual minorities. Chapter
Five, (Amplified) Voices for the Voiceless: Social Media Networks and Marginalized
Groups in Egypt, evaluates the use of the Internet by Baha’is and Muslim Brothers. It
explains the function of Social Media Networks for these two groups, one socially and
the other politically subordinated. The chapter uses evidence of blog-driven media
coverage of to evaluate competing hypotheses about the effect of social media. The
chapter finds that while blogs and other forms of electronic media increased coverage of
issues for both groups, this effect can largely be explained by the writing of the same
group of elite blogger-journalists who helped drive coverage of the issues in Chapter 3.
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Chapter Six, Cascades, Colors, and Contingencies: Social Media Networks and
Authoritarianism in Global Perspective, evaluates the SMN model tested in chapters 3 to
5 against outside-sample cases. It does so through a series of case studies of that evaluate
the use of the Internet in crisis mobilizations, in Ukraine, during the Orange Revolution
of 2004, in Moldova, during the so-called Twitter Revolution of 2009, in Kenya, during
the 2007-2008 election crisis, and in Iran, during the Green Revolution of 2009-2010.
The chapter seeks further to explain the role of the media environment in these cases.
Chapter 6 confirms the findings of earlier chapters that SMNs contribute to informational
cascades, that independent media outlets are critical transmission belts for claims made
through SMNs, and that the outcomes of the crises in question depend not on the
properties of SMNs, but rather on local and international features of institutional politics
in each case.
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Chapter 2
Social Media Networks, Media Events, and Collective Action
in Authoritarian Regimes

In any case, there is an irremovable political obstacle to becoming sufficiently
knowledgeable: vulnerable regimes can block the production and dissemination of
information potentially harmful to their own survival.
-Timur Kuran

2.0 Introduction
The study of social media is becoming a subject of increasing importance for
political science. Scholars are beginning to take seriously the claims that social media
might lead to more collective action outcomes, and to consider the kinds of tools that may
contribute to those outcomes. The study of networks is a critical variable for
understanding the potential power of social media. The discovery of new laws governing
networks in a number of different realms has led a small number of political scientists to
investigate the relevance of network theories for their own areas of expertise. Some
scholars have used advances in network theory to shed light on the mobilizing capacity of
terrorist groups (Matthew and Shambaugh 2005), while others have used networks to
enhance our understanding of globalization processes (Freyburg-Inan 2006). Slaughter
(2009) uses networks to test theories about America’s possible decline as a major power.
The concept of the power law (defined below) has been used to analyze the frequency
and severity of wars in the international system (Cederman 2003). And Elhafnawy argues
that the existence of scale-free networks in complex societies poses important problems
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for the pursuit of security (Elhafnawy 2004). The relevance of certain properties of social
media has been used to look at intelligence gathering and sharing (Ackerman et. al.,
2007). Pedahzur and Perlinger (2006) use social network analysis to examine the
resilience of Palestinian terror networks, and notably argue that “hubs” are critical for
terror operations and that these networks indeed are scale-free and function according to
power laws. In this chapter, I explain how these network theories, and the Social Media
Networks that operate by their laws, must cause us to revise our understanding of
collective action outcomes, media events, and informational cascades.
2.1 Networks and Web 2.0
A flurry of scientific research in recent years has pointed to the importance of new
discoveries about networks. Most importantly, this research emphasizes the idea that not
all nodes or actors in a network are identical, and that certain kinds of nodes assume far
greater importance in their networks than do others. A network, according to Watts, is
merely anything that is connected to any other thing. Or as he puts it, a network is “a
collection of objects connected to each other in some fashion” (2003, 27). Some networks
are random, in that most nodes have about as many links as any other node – many
scholars point to the U.S. highway network as typical of this kind of network. No node in
the highway network is substantially more important than any other, and even the most
well-connected stretch of road has a limited number of links. Most U.S. cities have a few
connections to the interstate highway system, but none have dozens, and none have zero.
Such randomness is how most scientists looked at networks until relatively recently.
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But some networks operate according to different principles, what are called
“power laws” – the idea that certain nodes in these networks have virtually no limit on
their potential size or scale. 5 The discovery of what this study will call power law
networks was made when scholars tried to “map” the Internet and found that while there
are millions of Web pages, only a few have more than a handful of links to other pages,
while a select few have thousands and thousands. According to Watts, what distinguishes
such a network from most of these ordinary networks is that they operate according to a
power law: “most nodes will be relatively poorly connected, while a select minority of
hubs will be very highly connected” (2003, 107). (I don’t think this is a clear or complete
enough explication of this concept which you will invoke so often) And these wellconnected hubs operate according to the principle of the rich getting richer – they tend to
attract more connections because they are already well-connected, transforming them
from ordinary nodes into super-connected hubs. This is called the principle of preferential
attachment- a principle that applies so long as the network is growing. As Barabasi puts it,
when new nodes enter a network, they are much more likely to link to the existing nodes
with greater numbers of links (Barabasi 2003, 86). New nodes in an existing network
have great difficulty attracting link. Investigators intrigued by the results of the Internet
mapping quickly discovered that power laws apply to diverse phenomena ranging from
the spread of disease to the composition of terrorist networks.

5

The unfortunate and misleading term “scale-free” has been applied to networks that exhibit these
characteristics. The term is misleading because such networks certainly do have a scale, just one that differs
from other kinds of networks.
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Figure 2.1: Power law distribution versus a random distribution 6

What interests us here is not just the idea of networks themselves, but rather how
the tools of Web 2.0 enhance those networks and are enhanced by them. To answer this
question we must first arrive at an agreed-upon understanding of what Web 2.0 actually
is, how it differs from Web 1.0, and the kinds of services, tools, opportunities and
drawbacks it offers to users. The Web has evolved over the past decade in ways that are
theoretically meaningful. A definition is hard to come by, but O’Reilly argues that some
of the critical components of Web 2.0 are participation (as opposed to simply publishing),
“radical trust,” in the form of Wikis like Wikipedia, “radical decentralization,” and
“tagging, not taxonomy,” in the form of the kind of user-generated sorting and rating that
takes place on certain Web sites (O’Reilly 2005). The typical transformation from Web
1.0 to Web 2.0 can illustrated by the move from “dumping” offline, print content onto the
Internet, to the creation of online-only sites that utilize the new cooperative and
collaborative capabilities of the technology itself. O’Reilly points to the Web 1.0 site for
6
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the Encyclopedia Brittanica, to the Web 2.0 site Wikipedia, where user-editors both
create, edit, and police the content.
The rise of Web 2.0 has given rise to the creation of what some scholars have
called “social media,” what Shirky refers to as “social tools” and what I will refer to as
Social Media Networks (SMNs). Social Media Networks encompass Weblogs (i.e. blogs),
Social Networking Sites like Facebook, Niche-networking sites like LinkedIn (for
professional networking), crowdsourcing content like Digg 7 (a site that allows users to
rank and control media content), text-messaging services (by which mobile phone users
can send written messages to one another), micromedia services like Twitter (a many-tomany communications service that allows users to send messages to each other or post
them to blogs), picture-sharing services such as Flickr (which allows users to mark or
“tag” their photos and self-organize the content), and event-planning sites like Meet-Up.
Much of what these services do is allow people to share information and to form groups,
at a very low cost, with a very large number people, and to do so interactively. Power
laws have also been applied to the study of blogs in addition to commercial Web sites
(Shirky 2008; Karpf 2008; Drezner 2007). Unsurprisingly, most of the blog traffic in the
world is directed to a relatively small number of sites, whereas most blogs, like most
Web sites, get zero to a handful of hits 8 per day. The reality that blogospheres are
governed by power laws helps explain the popularity of certain blogs and bloggers
against others, and generate hypotheses about why certain events and stories receive
coverage and others do not. Power laws should also lead us to be cautious about
7

The term “crowdsourcing content” is borrowed from Brian Solis and his graphical illustration of the
social media world “The Conversation Prism”.
8
“Hits” refers to the number of unique visitors to any given Web page.
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assuming that, to paraphrase Hindman (2008), to speak in cyberspace is the same as
being heard. The reality is that not everyone has an equal voice on the Internet, and that
Web 2.0 technologies have the effect of amplifying those inequalities.
In the political realm, information is of far-reaching importance, and therefore, the speed
and means by which information travels must be of equal importance. As Castells et. al.
note, “Control of information and communication has been a major source of power
throughout history” (2007, 209). This is particularly true of authoritarian systems, in
which certain kinds of information – if shared by all citizens – might be damaging to the
long-term viability of the system. SMNs perform a number of information functions that
make them desirable for dissidents in authoritarian systems. First, they facilitate “manyto-many” communication and allow individuals to share information instantly with large
numbers of people – news of an arrest, the dates and times of a demonstration, the
impending arrival of security forces. This is increasingly true in the age of the “mobile
web”- when accessing the always-on Internet from mobile phones becomes at least as
prevalent as doing so from a laptop or computer terminal. Second, they make it difficult
for regimes to cover up news stories or events that are deemed threatening to government
control. Third, they dramatically reduce the amount of time it takes for information to
travel – both because of the nature of the technology itself and because of social media’s
ability to enhance standard social networks – while simultaneously increasing the
geographic and spatial reach of that information. To explain the impact of social media,
we must first understand how networks function and how the new networks being
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constructed and used are altering the social and political topology in societies that are
adopting these technologies.
2.2 SMNs and Media Events
SMNs cause us to revise our understanding of the relationship of press freedom to
authoritarianism in the developing world. By empowering non-professional actors and
placing the tools of documentation and truth-telling into the hands of ordinary citizens,
SMNs create linked activists who can contest the narrative-crafting and informationcontrolling capabilities of authoritarian regimes. In so doing they render questionable
understandings in the literature about press freedom and its relationship to
authoritarianism. For instance, non-partial rankings of press freedoms in the developing
world may need to be updated to take into account the effects of SMNs and the feedback
loop with the press that generates coverage for issues that may have been previously
ignored in the official press
Farrell and Drezner claim that the effectiveness of blogs as sources of news and
information is due to their consumption by political and journalistic elites. They write (in
the American context), “There is strong evidence that media elites – editors, publishers,
reporters, and columnists –consumed political blogs” (Farrell and Drezner 2008, 23).
There is no particular reason to imagine that this isn’t also true in authoritarian societies
with relatively free presses. In such societies, the universe of prominent bloggers is quite
small, limited both by the network structure of the internet (Shirky 2008) and by the stilllimited Internet access for many ordinary citizens in less-wealthy parts of the nondemocratic world. But this tiny elite of bloggers and journalists is able to have outsize
32

influence on public affairs, due to their interconnectedness with journalists As Ajemian
notes, “…the value of blogs as a form of new media is that they allow for individual grass
roots political journalism and facilitate the creation of a counter-public sphere of
discourse that has the potential to penetrate mainstream media” (Ajemian 2008). SMNs
governed by power laws serve to create or amplify the social connections between
journalists and elite bloggers, making it far more likely that certain bloggers will receive
press attention, or that their work will be picked up or “borrowed” by reporters.
SMNs have a number of structural advantages over the traditional media that
make them quite different in their capabilities, and in some cases, able to report on
subjects that other media outlets in authoritarian societies won’t write or report about.
First, SMNs have the advantage of instantaneity, in the sense that blogs can be updated
instantly, either directly through laptops, or indirectly through SMS, Twitter, Jaiku and
other manifestations of the Mobile Web. Maratea argues that the “speed of transmission”
available to bloggers and Web activists is more important than the lowering of cost
barriers for entry into the media universe (2008, 144). The fact that such individuals can
make their claims without editors or interference from corporate entities makes it possible
for them to reach diverse audiences instantly and to influence public discussion and
debate. It also, of course, increases the amount of information available and thus
concomitantly may decrease trust in its veracity (Garrett 2009). For instance, mobile
activists can update their colleagues and readers directly via a Twitter post about an arrest
or demonstration, well before editors and writers at even the fastest newspapers can put
stories online.
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A long body of literature points to the importance of a free press to democracy
(Woodly 2008, 110) and the reverse side of that democratic coin is the importance of
maintaining information and discursive control in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian
governments. It is therefore not surprising that regime type plays an important role in the
extent to which the Internet has penetrated a given society (Milner 2006). While semiauthoritarian countries may have some elements of a free press, those outlets are unlikely
to have complete freedom of movement in the information market. It is therefore widely
hoped that “new media” – from satellite TV to the Internet -- may provide an alternative
source of information under such conditions, that might lead to more democratic
outcomes or allow for more political space in the MENA region (Fandy 1999; Winston
2003; Lynch 2006; Wheeler 2006; Schliefer 2006; Sreberny 2001; Rahimi 2003;
Hofheinz 2005 ) 9 .
What is less studied is that SMNs have a serious effect on the effectiveness of
these alternative media outlets and the scope of their reach as well as the interplay
between new media sources and professionals working in more traditional media. And by
producing quicker informational cascades, SMNs may accelerate the transformation of
certain kinds of discourses in the traditional media – they facilitate a process by which, as
Somer writes, “previously taboo terms and concepts are openly expressed” (2005, 606).
By serving as first-movers and accelerating the spread of certain memes, concepts, and
ideas, social media pave the way for the adoption of these discourses in the traditional
media – and this might be particularly true for journalists who adhere to regime9

I want to be clear that I am not attributing to any of these authors uncritical claims about the
democratizing potential of new media; rather they have all wrestled with the question and argued that there
is at least such potential.
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sanctioned forms of discourse without having a firm conviction in favor of the
government’s position. Such individuals are particularly susceptible to the opinions of
others (i.e. bloggers, journalists, and contacts maintained through social media) (Somer
2005, 609).
2.3 SMNs, Collective Action, and Informational Cascades
Power law networks force us to revise our understanding of collective action
problems in social movements and revolutions. Networks interface with collective action
problems by making communication, symbol-sharing, organization, and trust-building
simpler and more efficient. SMNs directly impact three of the four pillars of social
movement theory – by making organizing cheaper and faster, they affect the calculus of
standard theories of resource mobilization. By affecting the spread of memes and
symbols, SMNs make it easier to arrive at shared understandings of meanings. SMNs
generate competing hypotheses about the generation and dissemination of frames. And by
enlarging social networks and increasing the relevance of weak ties, networks might
force a reevaluation of the processes behind the formation of relative deprivation
grievances.
SMNs reduce the costs of organizing collective action. Shirky writes about how
social media can both create new networks and strengthen existing ones – both at lower
costs than in the past (2008). The standard model of organization involves a headquarters,
an elite structure of salary-drawing leaders, and may include the costs of holding realworld meetings and conventions, as well as the price of producing and disseminating
literature in the pertinent media environment. However, SMNs allow groups to form,
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communicate, and “meet” virtually for free, after the costs of internet access and in some
cases, the cost of maintaining a highly-trafficked web site are factored in.
Sunstein writes about the relevance of social media for communication practices
in the business community, arguing that they effectively streamline a number of
processes that once cost organizations a great deal of money. For instance, contrast the
model of advocacy presented by Amnesty International – which maintains a paid staff in
a certain number of cities worldwide, and has a substantial budget, with an organization
like Global Voices, which operates for a fraction of that cost yet maintains reporters and
staff in countries from Morocco to India. While Amnesty International is still the more
prominent organization, the success of Global Voices – listed by the blog-ranking tool
Technorati as one of the Top 100 blogs in the world 10 – in a very short time period
should provide evidence of the efficacy of their organizing model. If the costs of both
organization and participation are much lower, then it would follow that participation is
more likely by rational actors seeking to maximize their utility. Just as individual are
unlikely to participate in a collective endeavor whose benefits they can draw for free,
organizers are unlikely to opt for models of organization that can be replicated and even
improved upon for much less money.
Collective action theory also operates on standard assumptions about individual
behavior. Specifically, it assumed that individuals will not take the considerable risks of
revolutionary or oppositional behavior if the benefits do not outweigh the costs. Of
course, costs and benefits must be conceptualized loosely, as more than simply economic

10

Zuckerman, Ethan. “Success. Success? Success.” …My Heart’s in Accra. January 24th, 2008.
http://www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2008/01/24/success-success-success/

36

benefits for individuals. Perhaps the most important difference between pure rational
actor theory and the way real-life collective action takes place involves the role of social
ties (Gould 1993, 182). Gould argues that in dense networks (like those in SMNs) the
contributions of less central actors have a positive overall effect on the contributions of
others (193). Furthermore, as a number of authors have noted, different individuals have
different thresholds of participation in mass political action. Moreover, they appear to
have incentives, under certain circumstances, for fully or partially falsifying their public
preferences. (Kuran 1989). Since much of this literature concerns itself with the fall of
communist regimes, this preference falsification involves the penalties for expressing
one’s true feelings about a government or an opposition in contexts that involve serious
personal risks for political action. As Kuran notes, theories of collective action are very
good at predicting the non-occurrence of revolutions, but leave us in search of theories of
how, why, and where they do occur (1995). If individuals always have incentives to freeride on the revolutionary action of others, how then do revolutions, or even mass political
mobilizations, take place?
Networks facilitate the exchange of private information, which in turn makes
political or informational cascades more likely – situations in which there is a widespread
and sudden change in collective attitudes, beliefs, or behavior. SMNs also make it much
less likely that hostile regimes can control the information environment to such an extent
that this private information remains obscured or intercepted. As noted in the previous
section, extensive SMN ties between activists and journalists assures that the stories
documented and amplified by SMNs also make it to more mainstream press outlets.
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Under certain circumstances, the cascades triggered by this SMN activity might lead to
rapid and spontaneous collective action of the sort that generates large protest movements
and in some circumstances brings down governments. Cascades can also, of course, work
in the opposite direction, suddenly dismantling or crippling a protest or social movement
(D’Anieri 2006, 334).
The work on cascades originally grew out of frustration with theories of crowd
behavior which imputed irrationality to participants in crowd behavior (Berk 1972, 355).
The crucial stepping-off point between theories of crowd irrationality and models that
depend on rational individual decision-making is the idea that actors make decision based
in part on the behavior and decision-making of others (Berk 1972, 363). They do so in an
environment of “incomplete and unreliable information,” a point that will be elaborated
on in further detail below (369). Berk also notes that collective decision-making calls for
extensive communication between individuals. Later work, stemming from the research
of Schelling (1978), finds political cascade models using the idea of thresholds and focal
points to suggest that certain social phenomena become widespread after reaching a socalled “tipping point” that leads more and more actors to change their behavior. Tipping
models have been used to analyze everything from the dynamics of white flight and
changes in discourse to the spread of new fashion trends. As Somer writes, “cascades
explain how bandwagon effects and the strength of numbers can facilitate the occurrence
of rapid changes in individual beliefs, expressions, and behavior during collective
actions” (Somer 2005, 593). The theory operates largely at the level of the individual, and

38

assumes that actors are sensitive to the costs and benefits of participating in protests or
rebellions (D’Anieri 2006, 333).
It also assumes that actors’ thresholds are affected directly by the number of other
people that they see participating in the activity (Granovetter 1978). As Granovetter
writes, “The cost to an individual of joining a riot declines as riot size increases, since the
probability of being apprehended is smaller the larger the number involved” (1422). He
posits that all people have “thresholds” according to which individuals will participate in
a collective action, and that these thresholds are in some part dependent on the total
number of other visible individuals participating in that action. Thresholds apply not only
to collective action, but also to fads and trends, and are analyzed with diffusion models.
As Barabasi notes, “Acknowledging our differences, diffusion models assign a threshold
to each individual, quantifying the likelihood that he or she will adopt a given
innovation” (2002, 131). Those thresholds are also context-specific, in that an individual
does not have some value assigned to “demonstrating,” but rather adjusts his or her
threshold according to the situation (Granovetter 1978 1436). I posit here that Social
Media Networks, by affecting the speed and scope of diffusion, are likely to powerfully
alter the “situations” of individuals, thereby, changing the speed and likelihood that
thresholds will be met.
Individuals are also dependent on pre-existing preferences that establish those
thresholds to begin with. The more individuals join the protest, the more likely it is that
individuals with higher thresholds for participating will in fact do so. This makes each
individual decision contingent (Granovetter 1978, 1434). The tipping point then, is that
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moment when the protest or activity becomes self-reinforcing, and increases without
further direct organization or action by the leadership. This is because the action or trend
will at this point be adopted by individuals who don’t much care one way or the other but
who generally prefer to be on the right side of things. For instance, many people aren’t
particularly interested in what happens on the runways of Milan and Paris, but they will
adopt a trend, like argyle sweaters, so they don’t appear to be out of step with
contemporary fashions. It is similar to the idea of network effects, which stipulate that a
technology becomes more useful the more people who adopt it (Lessig 2008, 153-154).
Ultimately this leaves only the small minority which is ideologically opposed to the
movement.
Work on cascades was given new life by the unexpected events that caused and
followed the breakup of the Soviet Union. It is widely-acknowledged that almost no one
saw the breakup of the USSR coming far in advance. As Kuran argues, “The evidence is
overwhelming that virtually no one expected communism to collapse rapidly, with little
bloodshed, and throughout Eastern Europe before the end of the 1980s” (Kuran 1995,
1528). The sudden collapse of governments considered durable took the social science
universe by total surprise. Similarly, few observers predicted or understood the swift
breakup, along ethnic lines, of states like Yugoslavia. The descent of the Balkans into
ethnic violence and genocide horrified journalists, social scientists, and policymakers
alike, who were left to rely on theories of “primordial” or “ancient” hatreds put forth by
popular writers (Somer 2001, 135).
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It made seemingly very little sense for countries with thriving, multi-ethnic cities
and traditions to suddenly implode and polarize along ethnic lines. However, using
cascade models may help us understand the nature and causes of such a sudden and
drastic shift. Somer argues that because of preexisting uncertainties about the extent of
ethnic tolerance, observers may have underestimated the amount of ethnic polarization
already present in the former Yugoslavia, and thus a small shift in the amount of
publicly-expressed divisiveness led to a drastic shift in support for the leaders and
strategies of polarization. Specifically, Yugoslav society may have polarized privately
during the 1980s without a general understanding of this polarization, making the
collapse of the state and the bloody wars of succession far more surprising than they
should have been had private preferences been known and available, both for observers
and for the individual agents themselves (Somer 2001, 142). The usefulness of these
cascade models for understanding sudden, unexpected, and seemingly unpredictable
shifts in collective behavior has obvious relevance for students and scholars of the
Middle East, a discipline which has long been accused of making inaccurate predictions
about collective outcomes, or of not having foreseen the changes that have taken place
(i.e. Kramer 2001).
Lustick and Miodownik have defined a cascade as “a radiating pattern of
transformation in behavior across a large population involving an accelerating change in
available information about the future condition of the population” (2006, 3). The term is
generally credited to Bikhchandani et. al., who defined informational cascades as taking
place when “…it is optimal for an individual, having observed the actions of those ahead
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of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding individual without regard to his own
information” (Bikhchandani et. al. 1992, 994). Their model is sequential in the sense that
every decision maker can see the decisions of all those who precede them (Bikhchandani
et. al. 1992, 996). Their model, however, makes the problematic assumption that the
ordering of individuals is “exogenous and known to all” (998) – i.e that everyone is
aware of who the first-movers are and act sequentially, basing their own decisions on
those of the first-movers and their followers. Firms and individuals react to the prior
decisions of others, even when their own private information might lead them to do
otherwise.
For Kuran, this concept of preference falsification is critical to his theory of how
the events in Eastern Europe unfolded in the last days of communism. The reason that
few observers and academics successfully predicted the fall of communism has a great
deal to do with the fact that until the very latest hour, many individuals either falsified
their preferences for revolution, or maintained their support for the status quo. As Kuran
notes, the trouble was “imperfect observability” (Kuran 1991, 47). He defines preference
falsification as “Insofar as his two preference differ – that is, the preference he expresses
in public diverges from that he holds in private – the individual is engaged in preference
falsification” (1991, 17). 11 Kuran’s model gives individuals thresholds based on their
available information about others. The size of the opposition affects an individual’s
payoff structure for supporting anti-government forces (1991, 18). Kuran defines an
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Somer cautions that under conditions of widespread preference falsification, individuals are unlikely to
really believe they hear in public (Somer 2005, 608). However, this leaves the problem of how these
individuals, even if they sense the hypocrisy of publicly-expressed beliefs, are to ascertain the true level of
support for their private positions.
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individual’s “revolutionary threshold” as the point at which the payoffs to joining the
opposition outweigh the psychological costs of maintaining public support for a regime
that the individual privately opposes (1991, 19). He also emphasizes that very small
changes in individual support for the regime can cause a cascade effect, as more and
more individuals’ revolutionary thresholds are crossed. Exogenous shocks, such as an
external patron declaring its intention not to use force to prop up the status quo, can effect
these thresholds, insofar as they affect payoff matrices for supporting the opposition, or
by reducing the potential costs of revolutionary action. But as he notes, “neither private
preferences nor the corresponding thresholds are common knowledge” (Kuran 1991,
20). 12 He notes that this makes it possible to arrive at the very brink of revolution without
anyone knowing that the abyss is a mere step away.
In most of these models, too, the concept of private information is critical.
Opposition to a particular regime or to particular policies of that regime may be
widespread, but due to the possibility and cost of repression, that information is held and
kept privately. Kuran argues that the costs of protest go down as the number of
participants in widespread political action goes up. These kinds of analyses assume that
changes in the percentage of the population supporting mass action will change the
preferences of individual actors (Moore 1995, 446). The problem, then, for mobilization
becomes twofold – one is how to properly gauge and interpret the private information of
potential revolutionaries. The second is how to ensure that information, once transmitted
“publicly” reaches its intended audiences of both the regime and fellow potential
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One could add that “revolutionary thresholds,” inasmuch as they exist in the real world, may not be
known to the individual in question either.
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revolutionaries. Lustick and Miowdownik (2006) argue that standard rational choice
assumptions about private and public information falsely assume that individuals have
perfect information about the behavior of others. The authors argue:
They assume that individuals do not receive information about their world from
some subset of the population with whom they interact or in whom they place
particular trust. Instead, individuals are modeled as learning about the state of the
population as a whole by viewing the entire population or by making inferences
from a random sample of it (Lustick and Miowdownik 2006, 6).
Instead, they argue that individuals are greatly influenced by their
“neighborhoods” – i.e. that subset of the population with whom they associate and have
more information than they do about the general population. Schelling referred to these
neighborhoods as “zones of knowledge,” whereas Lustick and Miodownik refer to the
concept as “spatiality.” Somer refers to them as “private zones of trust” in which
individuals are comfortable expressing beliefs about the political system that they would
not express in public (2005, 608). They point to research that suggests “tipping” is “more
rapid and more common when the local neighborhood of each agent is larger” (Lustick
and Miodownik 2006, 20). They note that focusing on spatiality in fact makes tipping
substantially less likely, and that “an important determinant of their rate of occurrence is
the size of the spatially defined neighborhood” (2006, 26). They argue that this finding
accounts, in some part, for excessive expectations of collective action in certain contexts.
If true, then private information stands in the way of collective action, and that things that
serve to decrease the amount of privately-held information in tightly-controlled political
environments would lead to a greater likelihood of a cascade.
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For Kuran, the low likelihood of informational cascades ever happening makes
the business of predicting (as opposed to understanding) revolutions a fruitless process.
To him, acknowledging human inability to predict the time and place of successful
rebellion against authoritarian governance is not to be confused with abandoning the
social-scientific endeavor. “…accepting the limits of what we can expect from science is
not an admission of defeat” (Kuran 1991, 47). Kuran notes particularly the difficulty of
obtaining accurate information about private preferences in non-democratic societies –
during the 1980s, it was virtually impossible to undertake sophisticated opinion research
in communist regimes, and even when research was undertaken, there was no way to
really know if the information was accurate or if respondents were falsifying their
responses because of potential state reprisals (Kuran 1995, 1538-39). Furthermore, as
Kuran himself notes, it is imperative for the regime itself to maintain its control over the
flow of information – for according to his model, once it becomes common knowledge
that the vast majority of citizens opposes the government, it is much more likely that
individuals will be willing to take part in protest activity.
In that sense it is not just about private information, but also about the perceived
likelihood of revolutionary success. Individual assessments of this calculus are thus very
dependent on individual cognitive processes. As Sunstein and Kuran note, human
judgments about probability depend on what they call the availability heuristic – the
human tendency to make assessments based on “the ease with which we can think of
relevant examples” (Sunstein and Kuran 1999, 685). They argue that these perceptions
are often not empirically useful or correct – i.e. making judgments about the kinds of
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conditions that lead to revolution based only one case that an individual is intimately
familiar with. The availability heuristic sometimes causes the spread of misinformation,
leading to the adoption of suboptimal responses by public officials, as in the case of the
panic over the contamination of Love Canal – a perceived public health threat that was
never proven as such (Sunstein and Kuran 1999, 691-697). As the authors note, far from
being irrational, the use of the availability heuristic may in many cases be the best option
for individuals operating in the real world, in which there are real obstacles to becoming
the perfectly-informed actors of pure rational choice theory (Sunstein and Kuran 1999,
690). For our purposes, however, it should be sufficient to note the authors’ larger point:
that the availability of information leads actors to revise their own judgments about
things that are considered normatively accepted, and gives them clues about the
preferences and interests of others (767). The role of social media in making information
like this more readily available should lead us to think more about the conditions under
which cascades take place. It also challenges the notion, advanced by Shirky, that social
media merely helps brings together people who already share preferences, rather than
changing preferences themselves (2008, 288).
Sunstein writes about the information-aggregating potential of digital and social
media. In Sunstein’s analysis, what prevents groups from properly aggregating
information is that certain members of the group will choose not to share their privatelyheld information ----- whether preferences or critical information or simply new ideas –
for fear of ridicule or because of a willingness to go along with the group. Sunstein calls
these wells of private information “hidden profiles” (2006, 81) and defines them as “the
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accurate understandings that groups could attain but do not.” Groups arrive at suboptimal decisions for a variety of reasons, among them the “common knowledge effect,”
by which information shared by all group members takes on a much larger significance
than private information held by some or one member of the group (2006, 82). He also
argues that lower-status members of groups are more likely to keep their hidden profiles
hidden, and to be ignored even if they do speak up. According to Sunstein, and pace
Bakhchandani et al., this actually makes cascades more likely since individuals in groups
are liable to disregard their own private information and go along with the group.
SMNs have the effect of aggregating this dispersed, private information and
revealing hidden profiles, either through the SMNs themselves, or by transmission from
SMN activists to journalists. SMNs by their nature require users to share as much of their
private information, political leanings, and activities as possible, and require deliberate
action to make any of this activity private. What is new about SMNs is that by default the
actions of individual users are made public to that individual’s entire network by
automatically updating. Blog postings are, by their very nature, public. Twitter posts,
while not available to all in quite the same way as a blog, are also public for an
individual’s entire network. On Facebook, for instance, any change in an individual’s
“status” (a short, updateable, two-line note that appears under your profile) can be seen
by the dozens, hundreds, or thousands of other people in that network. So if Facebook
had been around in 1989 Leipzig, the message “Hans is heading to the square to
demonstrate” would have been instantly transmitted to anyone in his network. While it is
unlikely that Hans’ close friends would have been particularly surprised by this decision
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– since actors tend to inform those closest to them of their political preferences – it may
have been news to the weaker ties in his social network: distant cousins, acquaintances
from work, old college buddies – the people commonly referred to as “friends-in-law”.
According to Gould, if Hans is a marginal actor – i.e. a non-connector – the marginal
value of his contribution to the collective action might be very high (Gould 1993, 194).
These are precisely the kinds of ties that SMNs tend to “activate” in the sense that in the
real world, such individuals are unlikely to interact or to exchange information on
anything remotely approaching a regular basis. Of course, governments may use this
practice as well, but because of the Friend of a Friend (FoF) nature of these sites, those
messages are unlikely to be effective in reaching or changing the preferences of distant
social clusters – in other words, there is a reputational component to SMNs that will be
difficult for governments to fully overcome.
SMNs create large, dense networks that effectively collapse the distinction
between strong and weak ties. SMNs transmit information that was formerly “private” –
i.e. known only to a small subset of their larger social network, and make that
information “public” in the sense of transmitting it to the entirety of that network (or at
least the percentage of the network engaged in social media). For social scientists, a peek
at this kind of data might allow for more informed classifications of regime popularity
and legitimacy under conditions of incomplete or suppressed information – certainly an
improvement over the kinds of information that scholars once used to judge the
popularity of authoritarian regimes. As Kuran notes, in the 1980s, observers could only
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compare official, falsified data with the observations of travelers and dissidents (Kuran
1995, 1538-1541).
This discussion of public and private preferences points to a problem, first, with
the traditional schema of “public” and “private” information. While information
transmitted in this way may be known to an individual’s entire network, it is still not
necessarily “public” in the way that Lohmann and Kuran would define it – i.e. available
as random, public information to any member of the general population. So perhaps the
critical distinction is not between public and private, but between networked and unnetworked information. What matters is not whether information is, strictly speaking,
available to anyone, but rather whether preferences are open and well-known in
individual neighborhoods. And there can be little doubt that SMNs increase the volume
and accuracy of information in an individual’s network – even if it’s also true that the
amount of information available may be cognitively overwhelming. If only a small
amount of formerly private information is transmitted, processed, and understood, it
could drastically alter trajectories.
However, making more private information available to social circles does not
necessarily mean that this information will reach beyond an individual’s narrow network.
However, SMNs are likely to facilitate the transfer of information across social circles,
reducing the “small worlds” problem. Most people are familiar with the idea of “six
degrees of separation,” in which you can connect anyone in six steps or less to any other
person.” Barabasi locates the first written instance of this phenomenon in an obscure
Hungarian short-story writer named Frigyes Karinthy, who speculated that there were no
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more than five degrees separating any two people in the world (Barabasi 2003, 36). But
most academic investigations refer back to the experiments of the controversial social
scientist Stanley Milgram, who wanted to see if randomly-selected individuals could
forward a letter to certain “target” individuals, and to count the number of intermediaries
needed to get the letters across the country.
Although the study itself seems beset with difficulties in retrospect (see Watts),
Milgram found that the median number of stops made by the letters on the way to their
targets was 5.5. If there are so few degrees separating any two individuals, then we
indeed live in what can be termed a “small world.” Other discoveries include the idea
that people tend to sort themselves into social “clusters,” with small groups of wellconnected people clustered around common interests or locales. Instead of all people
having an equal number of social connections, in actual social networks, small clusters
are connected by a few people with a high number of connections – what Gladwell called
“connectors” (Gladwell 2002) and what others term “influencers”. Furthermore, weak
ties – i.e. acquaintances – are just as important as strong ties in bridging these clusters
(Watts 1999, 15). This is because even a single connection bridging two distinct social
groups has the effect of “shrinking mathematical worlds” (Freyberg-Inan 2006). It is
worth quoting Barabasi in full here to get a full understanding of the importance of these
links:
The surprising finding of Watts and Strogatz is that even a few extra links are
sufficient to drastically decrease the average separation between the nodes.
These few links will not significantly change the clustering coefficient. Yet
thanks to the long bridges they form, often connecting nodes on the opposite
side of the circle, the separation between all nodes spectacularly collapses
(Barabasi 2003, 53).
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The implications of this “spectacular collapse” of social distance are only now
becoming widely-understood. But if true, then social networking tools may help solve
one of the conundrums of small-world social reality – the limited cognitive ability of
most people to sustain more than a few hundred connections at a time. In some ways,
Facebook turns all of its users into connectors – people with dozens of instantaneous
social connections that span social clusters and build bridges between distinct social
groups. Not only does Facebook collapse social distance within clusters, it collapses
social distance between them.
SMNs like Facebook thus might have an important role to play in amplifying weak
ties, making them transparent and usable, and simplifying the process of activating them.
Expanding on Gould’s conclusions about the role of social ties in collective action, SMNs
empower peripheral actors in very dense networks, whose contributions become more
valuable. SMNs help build what Shirky calls “bridging capital” between diverse groups
of people who might otherwise not think to work together for a common cause. Therefore,
again, theories that operate on assumptions of randomness might be of less use in coming
to a true understanding of the dynamics of informational cascades. Cascades take place in
Small Worlds and so studies that start from an assumption of social randomness are at a
serious disadvantage.
Assuming that individuals base their preferences not on a random subset of the
population, but on their local neighborhoods, any change in the ratio of private-to-public
information about those neighborhoods would have a corresponding effect on preferences
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and revolutionary thresholds. SMNs reduce the amount of truly private information for
individuals in any network – leaving only falsified public information (saying on your
information page, for instance, that your political views are “very liberal” when in fact
they are the opposite). Concomitantly, any increase in the amount of public information
decreases what Sunstein calls “hidden profiles,” and may lead to more optimal outcomes
in cases of group action or deliberation. Users of these media forms tend to make this
information public without a great deal of discomfort about the potential ramifications. In
revolutionary or potentially revolutionary situations, then, the amount of what Sunstein
calls “dispersed” information is greatly reduced. This makes it easier to organize, all
things being equal, and makes it more likely that collective actions can be successfully
organized. D’Anieri (2006) notes that later protest movements in Serbia and Ukraine
were successful, whereas earlier movements, undertaken under similar circumstances,
were not. He allows that the later movements were “clearly stronger, more organized, and
better funded, than their predecessors” and avoids a discussion of why this might be at
the level of group organizing, arguing that it was pre-existing divisions at the elite level
that explain the divergent outcomes (347-348).
2.4 Network Effects and Authoritarian Responses
Authoritarian states are likely to recognize the threat posed by SMNs and to
respond accordingly. The properties of SMNs, however, are likely to mediate the
effectiveness of authoritarian response. SMNs are not invulnerable to destruction, but
they do present unique challenges to anyone seeking to undermine them. As Matthew and
Shambaugh (2005) argue, such “networks are easy to access but difficult to destroy”
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(618). For activists seeking to oppose the state, the networking capabilities of SMNs
make it both more difficult to take out hubs, and lessen the consequences of doing so. A
large number of nodes need to be removed from the system before the network itself will
cease to operate properly. To put it more directly, while the state can conceivably shut
down any one human rights organization, it cannot erase the accumulated experiences,
knowledge, and wisdom of its members, which exists independently of their physical
headquarters and is situated in a larger, denser (online) network. On the other hand, it is
exceedingly easy for the state to reach out and use repression on individual members of
the network. The way that many prominent activists in authoritarian societies are linked
to transnational activist networks also makes it costlier for regimes to systematically
engage in this kind of repression.
However, a focus on the individual neglects more systemic variables that might
affect a state’s effectiveness in combating SMNs. First, the more powerful authoritarian
states are moving toward a strategy of stripping SMNs of their power, by partnering with
corporations to make “non-generative” and “tethered” technologies (Zittrain 2008).
Tethered technologies reserve to the corporation, and thus the state, the ability to
remotely track, alter, or destroy the devices upon which all SMN activity so critically
defends. Powerful authoritarian states can also force SMN companies, like Google,
Facebook, or Youtube, to capitulate to authoritarian demands – whether that is filtration,
blocking individual users, or altering software to suit local repressive needs.
Authoritarian states that nevertheless possess functioning parliaments, quasiindependent press outlets, active parties, and at least mildly competitive elections are
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most vulnerable to pressure from IT-based dissidence at moments of extreme tension and
crisis. This conclusion is drawn from the lessons of the various “color revolutions” of the
past six years. In Serbia, Lebanon, Georgia, and Ukraine crucial regime turning points
revolved around elections and electoral competition in longstanding, authoritarian
regimes. Mass mobilization in these situations was aided significantly by widespread IT
usage, particularly mobile. SMN technologies like Twitter and SMS are tools that make
these kinds of meetings and networks possible, in part because of their own unique
technological characteristics and in part because states have been unable to entirely clamp
down on users’ activities. We should expect authoritarian regimes to engage in
increasingly sophisticated attempts to control the use of SMNs, and for those responses to
vary by regime. Strict authoritarian regimes are more likely to engage in strict control of
the Internet’s architecture – filtering, censoring, and surveillance, whereas semiauthoritarian regimes are likely to allow for greater debate but then respond to actual
provocations with traditional repression.
2.5 Hypotheses
If the expectations and theories outlined in this chapter are correct, they lead to a
series of hypotheses about the relationship between Social Media Networks and media
events and political mobilization. The first and most obvious is that, ceteris paribus, an
increase in the density of usership of SMNs should lead to an increase in group formation
and political mobilization in any given society. Specifically, we should expect that under
similar structural conditions, mobilization should be expected and observed whereas in
the absence of social media, mobilization did not occur. We should expect to see, at the
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least, attempts to mobilize what Olson called “the forgotten groups” – groups that in the
past may have remained unformed. These are groups that may share common interests
but that previously lacked the capacity to organize themselves into politically relevant
entities. Of course this causes something of a methodological conundrum, since there is
no way to establish cause-and-effect for absent social phenomena. Absence of evidence is
not evidence of absence.
Some scholarly work contradicts this hypothesis. While Calfano and Sahliyeh
(2008) found that increased access to the Internet has not led to increased political
freedoms in the Middle East, a simple tally of internet connections does not lend insight
into the full spectrum of applications and services offered by Web 2.0, many of which are
specifically geared toward organization and mobilization. Since the MENA region has
been late to adopt the Internet generally, it should also be expected that the region will
lag behind other parts of the world in the pace of its adoption of social media. Therefore a
more comprehensive approach would take into account not only internet connections, but
also cell phone users, members of SNS’s and so forth. Comparative, global statistical
analysis is badly needed for political scientists to properly understand the role of social
media in political change – and more importantly we need to leave behind the monolithic
conception of “the Internet” as an explanatory variable, and come to more nuanced
understandings of what takes place online, who is doing it, for what purposes, and to
what effect.
Secondly, if SMNs facilitate the movement of information, it follows that we
should expect semi-authoritarian regimes (which operate under some constraints) to have
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an increasingly difficult time managing the information environment (as opposed to strict
authoritarian regimes, as noted above). SMNs turn individuals into reporters,
photojournalists, and documentary filmmakers, requiring nothing more than a standard
cellular telephone. The topology of such networks suggests that the work of individuals is
likely to be found, cited, or borrowed by traditional media sources, and thereby will be
disseminated to the mass of un-networked individuals in societies with relatively free
press environments. Therefore, the more SMNs, the more likely it is that government will
be unable to quash stories that it finds threatening. On the other hand, in societies with
little to no press freedom, SMNs are unlikely to be nearly as effective. This can be
directly measured by the appearance of stories in the independent press as compared to
the traditional press, in paired comparisons with previous instances of similar events and
coverage. As manifestations of this prediction, we should expect to see similar news
events receive disproportionately greater coverage in networked societies as opposed to
un-networked societies. For the purposes of this project, the coverage and outcomes of
labor demonstrations (increased ancillary activity in addition to on-the-ground labor
mobilization), sexual harassment movements (increased NGO and street mobilization),
and torture incidents (increased NGO activity, mobilization, and at least cosmetic
changes in regime torture policy) should be considerably different between the pre-social
media and post-social media age. Inasmuch as collective action is driven by events and
grievances, this element alone should lead to greater organization around certain key
issues, as will be seen most clearly with respect to the prior three issues in Egyptian
politics.
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These phenomena of SMN-driven coverage in the press and SMN-driven
collective action are mutually reinforcing. SMNs may generate press coverage, the
existence of which enriches the information environment, and in tandem with SMNs lead
to informational cascades. Therefore our final hypothesis is that increased usership and
density of SMNs should more easily trigger information cascades in authoritarian
regimes.
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Chapter 3
Agenda-Setters:
Torture, Rights and Social Media Networks in Egypt
“The internet means geography isn’t so important, so if you an find the 1,000 or 5,000 or
50,000 people out there who want to make a certain kind of change and can connect them
and show them a path, they want to follow you.”
-Seth Godin
“Beyond their momentous effects, protest waves are intrinsically fascinating. The
phenomena of ordinary people struggling to preserve their honour and dignity,
organising to make forceful demands on those who control their fates and livelihoods,
activating their citizenship, this is an awesome thing to behold.”
-Baheyya

3.0 Introduction
Until very recently, conversations about the impact of the Internet in Egypt (and
most parts of the Middle East) proceeded from a caveat: the limited access of most
Egyptians to the Internet stands in the way of any real impact. Not only that, but even
cursory observation makes it clear that most Egyptians still get their news and
information from print media and satellite television. The primacy of more traditional
media forms is true not just in Egypt, but comparatively as well (Woodly 2007, 109).
With these largely-uncontested caveats, the study of new media in the Middle East has
been considered marginal in comparison with longstanding institutional, economic, and
social realities. While there may be widespread admiration for the work and courage of
SMN activists, enthusiasm about their impact has been largely limited to popular
accounts (see The Nation 2007; Shapiro 2009) rather than academic inquiry. Even those
studies that postulate a link between New Media and outcomes typically fail to identify
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causal mechanisms. However, outright dismissal of New Media fails to explain the way
that Social Media Networks have generated coverage of previously taboo subjects, from
sexual harassment to the Baha’i faith. Skeptics are right to insist on the primacy of
traditional forms of media, but miss the SMN-enhanced social connections between
journalists and activists.
As argued in chapter 2, one of the ways that SMNs generate traditional press
coverage is through electronically-enhanced social networks. SMNs have the effect of
extending an individual’s social “neighborhood” by transforming weak into strong ties,
and non-existent ties into weak ones. Journalists in general tend to be better-connected
than the average individual, and in Egypt, prominent SMN activists are either former
journalists (Wael Abbas, Nora Younis) or double as either print or electronic activists
(Hossam El-Hamalawy). The ties between this small set of individuals and the large
number of traditional journalists in Egypt means that the work of SMN activists has a
significant chance of getting picked up by the press and written about or broadcasted.
This does not necessarily mean that SMN activists will be credited for their work, as
much as their work may convince traditional journalists that a particular issue or event
should be covered. In the American context, Drezner demonstrated that journalists
regularly read a small number of blogs, giving those bloggers an immense amount of
influence and credibility. Egyptian journalists also routinely mention the same small
number of bloggers as influential, particularly in the issue-areas of most interest to this
project (human rights activism).
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Skeptics also point to the limited utility and results of SMN activism in the
Middle East as evidence of their essential irrelevance. Region-wide, no regime has been
replaced by activism or organizing from the Internet, nor do any observers believe that
the entrenched political and military power of authoritarian states in the region has been
seriously threatened by SMN activists, with the exception being the events since June
2009 in Iran. The failure of SMN activism to effect these kinds of attention-grabbing
changes seems particularly acute in comparison to the widely-acknowledged role that
such technologies have played in regime changes in the Philippines, Ukraine, and
Georgia.
However, the efficacy of those technologies in other contexts was demonstrated
during times of serious regime-level crises, in two cases over fraudulent elections, and
the other over corruption. SMNs are unlikely to provoke this kind of crisis as much as
they are likely to be well-positioned to contribute to them. Furthermore, expecting
SMNs to cause macro-level change in stable authoritarian regimes may be asking more
than the technologies by themselves can deliver; a focus on the state level also misses the
most important effects of SMN activism. Theorizing from the failure of SMN-led
organizing or protest leads to conclusions of inefficacy, under circumstances in which
few political or social forces have successfully mobilized for macro-change across the
region. Success under such conditions needs to be defined much more narrowly. This
chapter argues that SMNs have had a very clear, if politically limited, impact on several
issue-areas in Egyptian politics, under conditions in which the opposition is fragmented.
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As Mosahel argues, “Mubarak’s opposition hums with disparate voices….” Often
the failure of opposition forces to come together provides ample evidence for theorists
who argue for the efficacy of Mubarak’s divide-and-rule strategy. Unsurprisingly, these
successes all fall under the umbrella of issues on which the opposition forces in Egyptian
politics have found broad agreement. Rutherford (2008) argues that a “convergence of
political alternatives” has taken place, in which Islamist and secular opponents of the
regime agree on a small set of substantive human rights and rule-of-law reforms. It is
SMN activism that focuses on this narrow area of convergence that is likely to be
successful, and has been successful in the past.
This chapter will trace the emergence of the relationship between blogs and other
forms of electronic media, on one hand, and the traditional Egyptian print media, on the
other. In particular, it will be argued here that SMNs, by breaking some major stories,
and reporting in unique ways on others, have contributed to an overall climate in which
the Egyptian regime is unable to control public discourse and enforce its dictates without
opposition. The paper will outline the structural differences between SMNs and the
Egyptian press environment, and argue that while SMNs add essential elements to public
discourse, they are still very dependent on the existence of the independent press to
publicize their findings and to create an environment in which the general public has
access to the discourse of the blogosphere and the issues raised by Web activists. The
methodology will compare these cases of SMN-driven coverage against past coverage or
non-coverage of similar events in the Egyptian political system, to determine the impact
of both SMNs and the emergence of independent press outlets in 2003-2005.
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3.1 The Birth and Maturation of Egyptian Blogging
Boas and Kalathil note that Egypt, in contrast to Saudi Arabia, has no formal
mechanism to control or filter Internet content (Boas and Kalathil 122). The Egyptian
government, as of the publication of this research, appeared to view the commercial and
administrative potential of the Internet as greater than the potential for political unrest
and opposition coordination, although a branch of the police now known as the “Internet
Police” was formed in 2004 (Eid 2004). 13 With the inauguration of the National Project
for Technology Renaissance in 1999, the regime set itself on a course of using
information technology and the Internet as a way to streamline and improve government
efficiency, as well as to attract international capital (Wheeler 2003, 631). Thus the regime,
having committed itself to the positive externalities of e-commerce and e-government, set
itself on a course in which it would be very difficult to substantially filter the Internet.
It was in that free-flowing context that one of the first “blogs” in Egypt was formed,
Cairo Live. It began operating in 1995. At the time, Internet subscribership was miniscule
in Egypt, and most Web content was in English. Cairo Live’s owner was Tarek Atia, who
says that he was “blogging before blogging was invented.” 14 Cairo Live began as a news
aggregation service, which summarized articles, and featured an interface similar to The
Drudge Report. Atia, presaging much of the rationale for later bloggers, argued that
The key function is to reengineer or reestablish news priorities. It’s basically
a window for readers to see that the news priorities that traditional news
authorities present to them is not the paradigm that they have to function on.
13

Informally, accessing the Internet has become more difficult and more expensive between the summer of
2008 and the summer of 2009. Internet cafes that formerly offered free Internet access had locked down
their service through Mobinil, and required registration through a cell phone. This practice was clearly
intended to introduce an element of surveillance to what had been relatively open access practices in Egypt.
14
Interview with Tarek Atia, Cairo, Egypt. February 6th, 2008.
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It’s an attempt to explain to people that politics should never only be limited
to this concept of foreign policy or domestic policy. Politics is much wider
than that, it’s the stuff of everyday life. Our newspapers and our traditional
media have limited what people think is newsworthy.
Thus Egyptian blogs provide an alternative to official discourses. Many bloggers
consider themselves guardians of a kind of objectivity that they do not find in any of the
newspapers or other media outlets in Egypt. However, with the exception of Cairo Live,
this activity had to wait for the emergence of more sophisticated publishing platforms –
as well as the right political moment. In the meantime, chat rooms, Yahoo groups, and
email listservs played important roles in the development of the Egyptian public sphere,
particularly with respect to Egyptian reactions to the second Palestinian Intifada. These
now-outdated forms of discourse emerged in Egypt around the turn of the century. As
Hossam El-Hamalawy notes, “I was being spammed left and right by people who have
the boycott lists, updates about the Intifada, pictures of the dead, pictures of the atrocities
– these were being emailed, and yahoo groups 15 were like the hip thing back then.” In the
early part of the decade, Blogger – one of the world’s foremost blogging platforms –
began offering service in Arabic, and the Egyptian blogging scene grew more vibrant.
There was also a deep and intimate connection between the emerging blogosphere and
the nascent protest movement that emerged in Egypt after the beginning of the Iraq War.
The movement was known as Kefaya (literally: Enough!) and was conceptualized as a
broad-based protest and political movement opposing corruption and the continuation of
the authoritarian regime of Hosni Mubarak.

15

Interview with Hossam El-Hamalawy, Cairo Egypt, May 27th, 2009.
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As Radsch writes, “A natural symbiosis between Egypt’s early core bloggers and
the emerging protest movement helped popularize the Egyptian blogosphere as a site of
protest as Kefaya grew in popularity during 2005” (Radsch 2008). Radsch terms this
period “the experimentation phase.” As more and more politically-interested individuals
formed their own blogs over this period, they made the platform of blogging itself
increasingly relevant to Egyptian internet users, since according to Metcalfe’s law, the
value of a communications network increases the more people use it. The most prominent
Egyptian bloggers of this period still blogged in English – sites like The Arabist, as well
as the still-anonymous Baheyya, the Sandmonkey, Big Pharaoh, and others. Some of
these bloggers were notable for their pro-Western positions, which together with their
choice of language, placed them well outside of the political mainstream in Egypt and led
some to dismiss blogging as the niche tool of an Americanized elite. This early period
was also when the relationship between bloggers and journalists – before the maturation
of the independent press – was most toxic. As Wael Abbas says, “The relationship
between the blogs and the newspapers was not really good from the beginning. As I told
you we had like exclusive material and exclusive footage, in the beginning they used to
steal it without even crediting us…but it gradually grew into a cooperation between
newspapers and blogs.”
As noted in Chapter 2, strong evidence from other contexts indicates that journalists
read and borrow stories from bloggers (Farrell and Drezner 2008). Every journalist I
interviewed in Cairo mentioned at least a handful of blogs that they read on a regular
basis – typically this includes Wael Abbas’s influential blog, as well as people like Malek
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Mustafa, Hossam El-Hamalawy (who writes about labor issues and human rights) and
Nora Younis. In fact the universe of prominent bloggers is quite small, limited both by
the network structure of the internet (Faris 2008; Shirky 2008) and by the still-limited
Internet access for most Egyptians. But this tiny elite of bloggers and journalists is able to
have outsize influence on public affairs, due to their interconnectedness with journalists –
in fact many prominent Egyptian bloggers are or were journalists to begin with. As
Ajemian notes, “…the value of blogs as a form of new media is that they allow for
individual grass roots political journalism and facilitate the creation of a counter-public
sphere of discourse that has the potential to penetrate mainstream media” (Ajemian 2008).
Digital media serve to amplify the social connections between journalists and elite
bloggers, making it far more likely that certain bloggers will receive press attention, or
that their work will be picked up or “borrowed” by reporters.
Observers are split about the relationship between bloggers and the press. “My own
theory is that bloggers want to replace old media,” says Atia. “Any new media wants to
become old media.” 16 As even the activists themselves acknowledge, there is an element
of competition and jealousy between members of the traditional media and the
“blogosphere,” with each side asserting its primacy and in many cases questioning the
authenticity and legitimacy of the other. However, this competition does not negate the
idea that the electronic media – spearheaded by SMN Activists who have their feet both
in citizen journalism and activism – have taken their place in the Egyptian media and
discursive environments and have irrevocably altered both. In some cases Egyptian SMN
Activists see themselves as the only unrestrained and reliable sources of political
16

Interview with Tarek Atia, Cairo, Egypt. February 6th, 2008.
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information, while the journalists view the bloggers as sensationalist and unprofessional.
These repeated accusations are leveled, but at the same time most participants in this
discourse understand that they are situated in a particular media environment and that
they are each playing distinctive and important roles.
What SMNs accomplish in Egyptian politics is to expand the public sphere to
accommodate new “claims-makers.” As Maratea (2008) argues, the traditional press
serves a “gatekeeping function” which serves to restrict access to the media and to
control the content of what reaches the mass public (140). Citizens have traditionally had
very little control over or input into the content of mass media, serving largely as
recipients of information and consumers of entertainment and news (Maratea 2008, 141).
However, the rise of digital media has created an environment in which individuals have
the opportunity to interrogate the social and political worlds, and to influence the content
of news coverage (Delli Carpini 2004). There is also, undeniably, an aspect of the
Internet that has consolidated the interests of commerce (Pajnik 2005), but the reality of
commercial domination of the Internet does not exclude the potential for the promotion
of alternative discourses. As Maratea writes, “…the Web makes it feasible for average
citizens to disseminate their own commentaries on mainstream media coverage, political
events, or any other issue of relevance” (2008, 142).
3.2 SMNs and the Egyptian Press Environment
In Egypt, while there are certainly strains and invective between these two groups,
the relationship is actually much more complicated and cooperative than one might be led
to believe. Egypt’s press environment can best be described as somewhat free. Rugh
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recently classified Egypt’s press environment as “transitional,” by which he means “these
systems were quite complex, containing strong elements of government control and
influence, alongside elements of freedom and diversity” (Rugh 2007, 9). Rugh argues
that while journalists have much more freedom than in the past in such countries (he
includes Tunisia, Jordan and Algeria in the category) the government still retains certain
privileges, and that there are “red lines” that journalists dare not cross. In a practical
sense, this means what appears to be a lively press environment, with copious criticisms
of regime practices and policies – even in the government-owned papers – but with a
great deal of self-censorship occurring still. In Egypt, the process of obtaining a license to
publish a newspaper is a daunting obstacle to any entity or individual who wishes to
pursue one. Black (2008, 11) details the ordeal that awaiting the would-be publishers of
El-Badeel in 2007, who were forced to wait months upon months for their license.
There are, generally, five kinds of newspapers in Egypt: the government owned
dailies, the opposition dailies, the party newspapers, the regional papers, and newspapers
published from abroad (Salih 2007, 13-15). The most-read and most important
government papers are the dailies Al-Akhbar, Al-Ahram, and Al-Gumhuriya, while other
government-aligned newspapers of note include Rose Al-Yusef. These papers, while not
averse to carrying criticism of the government at times, generally toe the editorial line of
the ruling National Democratic Party, and are known for ignoring stories that are
unfavorable to the regime, or at least initiating coverage much later than other media. It is
generally agreed that the Egyptian press environment was energized with the founding of
the daily opposition paper Al-Masry Al-Youm in 2004, as well as the re-issuing of Al67

Dustur, first as a weekly, and then in 2007 as a daily. Their publication followed changes
in the press laws that ended the government’s monopoly on news information inside
Egypt.
Today these two newspapers are by far the most important and influential
opposition newspapers in Egypt, trailed in importance and circulation by the liberal
opposition daily El-Badeel 17 and a handful of others. These opposition papers are willing
to carry frank and often direct criticism of the Mubarak regime, and have tended to cover
stories that the government papers won’t touch. The existence of this independent press
calls into question the routine lumping of Arab media systems together under the
umbrella of unfree, and ignores the values that Arab journalists may share (Iskander
2007). As such they tend to carry a certain legitimacy not possessed by the government
dailies, even while they seem to have a reputation for sensationalism that was only
further reinforced in the summer of 2007 when Al-Dustur in particular headlined
concerns about the health of President Mubarak and relayed rumors of his death. AlDustur Editor-in-Chief Ibrahim Eissa paid a steep price for these decisions, after being
sentenced to six months in prison with hard labor. 18 In this environment it cannot be
argued that blogs and new media are the only available forms of dissent available to
Egyptians – one need only turn to the op-ed page of any major or minor opposition or
party paper to see direct criticism of the state – although of course there are red lines,
such as calling for regime change or insulting the president or his family, which are not
always observed online.
17

El-Badeel has ceased its daily edition as of May 2009.
“Egypt editor sentenced to six months, free on bond.” Reuters, March 26th,
2008. http://africa.reuters.com/top/news/usnBAN635621.html. Accessed April 8th, 2008.
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Instantaneous communication, as noted in Chapter 2, is very important in Egypt.
Such was the case this past year, when an imprisoned American journalist used Twitter to
get himself out of jail after covering a labor demonstration (Simon 2008). One major
newspaper editor admitted that on the day of the events in question, he turned not to AlAhram or even his own paper, but rather to the blogs, for information about what was
happening and where. He argues,
I’ve been working on Sunday until the late evening for the first edition or the
second edition, so this was my day off, so I’ve taken Monday a vacation. When I
wake up in the morning I didn’t turn on my TV or wandering around the papers,
I’ve just opened the blogs and Haraka Masria site, and opened my email there is a
very famous mailing group called al-Mahroosa, and I found many, many news
entries for my knowledge. I want to know what’s happening all night, and this is
the first source I visited to know what’s happening at night.19
This was due both to the reliability of the bloggers in question – earned the hard way over
a period of years – and to the structural advantages enjoyed by blogs and mobile media.
As noted in Chapter 2, (some) SMN platforms offer the possibility of remaining
pseudonymous to their writers and activists, particularly in a state whose security services
do not appear to be terribly sophisticated technologically. The roster of pseudonymous
Egyptian bloggers is long, from the caustic right-wing Sandmonkey to the reflective
Baheyya, and the critical Zeinobia, but the fact remains that the medium gives these
writers the option to remain anonymous to the security services. 20 The Egyptian
government has recently deployed new identity-tracking software in Internet cafes, but
with constantly-evolving and freely-available masking software it is unlikely that the
state will be able to clamp down on the kind of activity it would like to see stopped. And
19

Interview with Ehab El-Zalaky, Cairo Egypt. April 8th, 2008.
At least in the case of the Sandmonkey, the author eventually came to feel that the security forces did
indeed know who he was.
20

69

as Shapiro notes, activists are increasingly migrating to sites that are dual-purpose, like
Facebook – commercial in purpose, but used cleverly by regime opponents to advance
their claims (Shapiro 2008). The regime, in turn, has grown increasingly successful
infiltrating those sites and forcing activists to move to still other applications, as we will
see in Chapter 4.
SMN activists are willing to violate the red lines of the Egyptian media
environment and to take quite unusual risks of punishment, arrest, imprisonment, or
worse, therefore allowing them to report on issues and events that might go unreported in
the state-aligned, opposition, or party presses. It is not that bloggers have never been
arrested – on the contrary nearly every activist can tell stories of harassment, intimidation,
arrest, and in some cases even torture – but rather that few have been sentenced, and even
fewer have stopped writing and organizing due to these efforts, and thus many bloggers
express a willingness to risk arrest for the sake of truth-telling and dissent. The fact that
these individuals do not have to report to editors or institutions who might be wary of
having their entire operations shut down by the state only makes it more likely that SMN
activists will cross these boundaries and not ordinary journalists. This absence of
institutional oversight and control – something that has been criticized by observers 21
actually means that the element of caution present in established relations between the
regime and the opposition press is completely absent in the blogosphere. Bloggers report
to no one but themselves and their readers, and they express their commitment to taking
this responsibility quite seriously. As Mina Zakry of the Arab Network For Human
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See for example the comments of Abdullah Schleiffer at the December, 17th, 2007 BBC Free To Speak
debate held in Cairo, Egypt.
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Rights Information (and the blog Egypt Watchman) told me, “Through my blog I was
defending freedom of expression, freedom of religion, practicing political and social
criticism.” 22 Another activist for the Muslim Brotherhood, who infiltrated the show-trials
of the organization’s senior leadership, remarked that “Of course I am afraid, but I don’t
care, because it’s my life in this country. I have been arrested two times.” 23 This lack of
reticence about the repercussions of activism is widespread in the small blogging and
human rights community.
The content provided by SMNs increasingly resembles traditional reporting in
terms of its emphasis on communicating hard news, often about arrests, reports of torture,
violations of human rights, and other reports of abuses by the regime. In fact these citizen
journalists function effectively as their own news agencies, and have developed a
following that makes them more – or at least just as – respected and trusted than the
traditional “blogger” who is not out on the street. The influence of bloggers on the public
sphere takes place through social network connections between bloggers and journalists –
connections that are strengthened (or created) by the capability of SMNs to bridge social
clusters. Even when claims advanced in the blogosphere are not immediately picked up
by journalists who may have other stories to cover, they provide what Maratea calls “a
database of available claims” that can be drawn upon during lulls in news coverage
(Maratea 2008, 156).
In many ways, the development of citizen journalism has led to a bifurcation of
Egyptian blogging, one path leading to Wael Abbas and his style of first-hand reporting,

22
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Interview with Mina Zakry, Cairo, Egypt, March 27th, 2008.
Interview with Ahmed Abdel Fattah, Cairo, Egypt, December 10th, 2007.
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photography, video-taking, Twittering, and commentary, and the other to what most
people imagine when they think of a blog – an often acerbic, individualistic take on the
news and other people’s writing – the style pioneered in Egypt by the Sandmonkey. And
as Hossam El-Hamalawy caustically notes of that blog, “He represents himself and like
ten other people in the whole republic.” 24 And while both have their utility and their role
in the Egyptian media environment, it is becoming increasingly clear that the individuals
who have the most influence are those who practice the former – those who perform all
of the functions of traditional journalist but who are willing to cross lines and violate
taboos that professional Egyptian journalists are (typically) unwilling to do.
Generally, the impact of blogs on the media in Egypt can be broken down into
four categories. The first is breaking stories, when SMN activists either report original
information not carried anywhere else in the news universe, or when an activist is
actually present to provide the first-hand reporting. The second is documenting stories,
when a SMN activist is present to provide unique textual, photographic, or video
evidence of stories that were already present or would have been reported on in any case.
The third is transmission, when SMN activists post or share videos, stories, or photos of
something that has already happened, via a third party. Finally, there is red-lining, the
practice of SMN activists crossing traditional media boundaries in a case or cases in
which traditional media practitioners are unwilling or unable to say or print certain things.
The remainder of this chapter will detail one instance of each of these phenomena, which
challenge the null hypothesis in different ways.
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3.3 Breaking Stories: Sexual Harassment in Downtown Cairo
In the spring of 2005, Egyptian blogs began to attract international attention, as they
served as a platform for coordinated protests against a proposed Constitutional
amendment (Radsch 2008). However, perhaps the defining moment of Egyptian blogging
took place in October of 2006, during the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Fitr. Downtown
Cairo witnessed a string of mob-like sexual assaults on women – assaults that initially
went unreported in the Egyptian press. By coincidence, two of Egypt’s more well-known
SMN activists, Wael Abbas and Malek Mustafa, happened to be on the scene at the time.
A clearly horrified Malek (who blogs as Malcolm-X), detailed the assaults in all their
grotesque gratuity on his blog. Amira al-Husseini of Global Voices provided this
translation of Malek’s initial report:
We saw a large number of men whistling and running in the direction of Adly
Street. We went with them to see what was happening. I was surprised to see a
girl in her early 20s falling on the ground and a mob of men gathering around
her, feeling up her body and tearing her clothes off her. I didn't understand or
rather I couldn't comprehend what was happening. The girl got up and ran into
a restaurant and hid inside. Some boys surrounded the restaurant and wouldn't
leave until one of them shouted that there was another one coming. All of them
ran towards Talaat Street again and there I saw a girl who was completely
surrounded by a mob of hundreds of men trying to touch her body and take off
her clothes. This girl was rescued by a taxi driver, who pulled her into his taxi.
But the boys would not allow the taxi through and formed a circle around the
car,” he said. 25
Despite the presence of bloggers and the pictures and videos circulating on the
Internet, the press remained completely silent for days. However, the first penetration
of the official silence came via a report on Dream TV on October 28th, with talk show
host Mona El Shazly and other reporters confirming the allegations with other
25
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witnesses and shopkeepers (Al-Malky 2007). Then with a series of press articles, the
official silence began to crack. The first paper to run a report was Al-Fagr, by the
journalist Wael Abdel Fattah. Other outlets of the independent press soon followed
suit, including Al-Masry Al-Youm and the still-weekly Al-Dustur. The November 1st
issue of Al-Dustur, “borrowing” pictures straight from Abbas’s blog, ran no less than
8 articles directly or indirectly addressing the incident. 26 Articles and criticism
followed in all the major independent and party newspapers, eventually trickling into
the official press. The regime denied that anything untoward happened downtown,
while the official press was largely silent. Typically when that silence was broken, it
initially took the form of attacking Abbas himself, a pattern that would become sadly
familiar in the years to come. 27 However, the protests, coordinated by bloggers such as
The Sandmonkey, forced a debate that eventually reached even the government press.
Activists called for the resignation of Interior Minister Habib El-Adly, which of course
did not happen. However, the more details leaked out about the case, the more it
appeared that sexual harassment on Eid enjoyed the official or unofficial support of
elements of the regime, particularly security forces who either participated in the
assaults or tolerated them. 28
With both video and photos, taken on cell phones, the event was difficult, if not
impossible, to credibly deny. What made the story even more poignant were the firsthand accounts from women that day, some of whom were apparently inspired to begin
26
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blogging by what happened that day. The short-lived blog Wounded Female From Cairo
provided the following account:
We, girls, had our butts, breasts, and every inch of our bodies grabbed. I
end up slipping into a car that was parking on the road side when I tried
to catch one of the [profanity omitted] who insisted and never gave up
on grabbing my butt. So, I end up with a deep cut in my right hand
palm and another one on my thumb of the same hand as I slipped into
the car's headlight that broke and cut my hand. 6 stitches on my hand
palm cut and 3 on my thumb--still my anger is pretty fresh in the deep
inside of me that makes want me to put all Egyptian men on fire right
now for what they have caused...Don't you have sisters who can also
face the same thing as we did? 29
The story was another instance of SMN’s providing undeniable evidence of a
social or political trend that many people may have preferred to ignore. Blog entries like
Wounded Girl From Cairo also provided indispensible platforms for the coordinated
protests that followed (including protests on November 9th and November 14th, 2006), a
subject that will be returned to in Chapter 4. While of course many Egyptians were aware
of the prevalence of sexual harassment, most were untouched by it or had never
witnessed it first-hand. The videos and pictures that made it out of the Eid harassment
story forced individuals to confront the reality of sexual harassment, much like the torture
scandal in 2007 – also propelled into the press from the blogosphere – forced Egyptians
to confront another unpleasant aspect of their government. While the two incidents may
not have led to a regime change or substantial legal revisions, they did change the context
of the relationship between the regime and its people.
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Several factors propelled the sexual harassment story out of the blogosphere and
into the mainstream discourse. First, the assaults exposed the prominence of sexual
harassment in Egypt, and deeply embarrassed the regime. Second the assaults appeared to
dovetail with two major social problems in Egypt – the continuing delay in the age of
marriage and the mounting sexual frustration of the country’s young men (and women,
although of course discourse focused on the former). Third, elements of the emerging
SMN sphere contributed to the viral effectiveness of the story, such as the existence of
digital videos which could be passed around through email and hyperlinks, and the
ubiquity of pictures and first-hand accounts that the regime was unable to quash despite a
total press blackout for the first week following the events. In short, blogs, mobile videos
and the Internet made possible a staying power for this story that, while not impossible in
the past, would have been phenomenally unlikely. Finally, the story was almost instantly
picked up by international observers and organizations like Global Voices, which
provided further extensive coverage and amplification of the events, and drove the
shaming of the Egyptian government for its total inaction, particularly when it appeared
that sexual harassment might interfere with the booming Egyptian tourism industry. This
was a story that the activists refused to allow to die.
Crucially, however, the online writing and dissent moved into the real-world, with
protests that were organized in part by the Sandmonkey. 30 And when the independent
press started covering the story, they did so with vigor, forcing the government finally to
acknowledge that something was at stake. That press attention culminated in a series of
protests and a still-ongoing campaign against sexual harassment, spread across the
30
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blogosphere and a number of human rights organizations. Blogs had officially become a
force to be reckoned with. Wael Abbas, who witnessed the events and wrote about them
on his blog, argues,
Now with flocks of young people harassing and molesting girls, in groups, in a
religious feast, in downtown cairo, or in the absence of the police or the police were
there but didn’t interfere, it brought to light the issue of sexual harassment in
general in workplaces and families, and it made it to be discussed in TV talk shows,
even in the official newspapers they couldn’t ignore it. The only thing that pissed
them off was that we exposed that the police were negligent for what was going
on. 31
The jump to international outlets was an acute embarrassment for the Egyptian
government and society, which relies so heavily on tourist receipts – not from the United
States, but from elsewhere in the West and the Middle East. For Egypt to develop a
reputation as a place that is unsafe for women to travel would be devastating for the
tourism industry. Still the state-run press dismissed the story, smeared the people
propagating it, and denied any official culpability. As Ehab El-Zalaky, Deputy Editor of
Al-Masry Al-Youm in 2008, says:
it was a big shock for the whole society for that matter. You know that it
happens Eid al-Fitr after the holy month of Ramadan ...so it was an explosive
story for the blogs for two or three days, the first things came after that period of
silence, it was being circulated as a story, and many were talking about what was
happening, people in all of Egypt were talking about it, and there was pure
silence from the mainstream media, and there was a statement from the interior
ministry that no such thing happened at all. The first thing was published in AlAhram and denied what happened, and talking about things on their sites from
their imaginations, some of the independent newspapers started to write about
the issue, at the same time – blogs were trying to back each other, so some of the
blogs published some blurry pictures taken with mobile phones, so it wasn’t
very clear what was happening, after about a week, one of the Egyptians who
was living in the States sent Wael Abbas a video shot taken a year before that,
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which detailed another mass sexual harassment in Cairo streets, he take the shots
and took it back to the States and never thought about publishing it.32
El-Zalaky’s last point makes it clear that this sexual harassment during Eid was
not something new in 2006, but rather something that had happened in the past but that
remained an undocumented rumor. 33 The tools of SMN’s made it possible for distant
contacts to pass videos through enhanced social networks, and the credibility of the
bloggers in the streets allowed them to establish the veracity of the events in question.
The way that the story went from rumor to full-blown media event in a matter of days
calls to mind the kind of informational cascades discussed in Chapter 2. And the way it
called attention to previously subordinated events recalls both El-Zalaky’s claim that
blogs provide “a voice for the voiceless” and serves as evidence for the efficacy of
SMN’s breaking news.
The linkages between SMN activists and independent journalists continued to
give the story increasingly wide play. Al-Dustur ran a series of hard-hitting articles that
December, not just about that particular incident, but about sexual harassment in general.
The number of articles about sexual harassment in the Egyptian press– hardly a new issue
in Egyptian politics – jumped from 33 stories in 2004 to 173 in 2006 and 171 in 2007.
Other Arab print outlets picked up on the story, as did regional papers and outlets like AlJazeera. The Egyptian Center For Women’s Rights launched a campaign against
harassment in Egypt that continues to this day, in coordination with grassroots
organizations like The Street Is Ours. The point is not that harassment has been
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eliminated, for such a deeply-rooted phenomenon is difficult to change in such a short
period of time, and after all women are harassed not just in Egypt but all over the West
and elsewhere in the Global North. The point is that a cross-political coalition was forged,
with the work of SMN activists, to contest the issue of sexual harassment in Egypt. In
fact, Eid harassment has continued. In the Fall of 2008, there was a very similar incident
that took place downtown – however in contrast to the 2006 incident, when security
services did finally arrive, the harassers were arrested. As the Egyptian Center For
Women’s Rights argues, while it is unfortunate that such incidents still take place, a
climate in which the perpetrators are punished does at least represent progress. 34 As
Gamal Eid notes, “There are some official coalitions between some groups, but when
these cases are finished, every group will be on its own.” 35 El-Zalaky believes that this
was the moment that bloggers gained domestic credibility: “This is one of the major hits
and major turns of the blogs to be known by ordinary people and I think after this
incident blogs gained a huge amount of credibility.” 36
3.4 Documenting: Sudanese Refugees and the State
Even before the widely-reported genocide in Darfur, Cairo has played host to
thousands upon thousands of Sudanese refugees fleeing the country’s endemic violence,
particularly the civil war between the north and the south. The refugees themselves are in
a particularly precarious position in Egyptian society, since many do not speak Arabic,
cannot work, are very poor to begin with, and must contend with endemic racism. Overall
34
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there are upwards of 1 million refugees in Cairo. The Egyptian and Sudanese
governments signed an agreement in 2004, guaranteeing Sudanese refugees the right to
live, work, own property, move about freely, but critics argued that the agreement was
never implemented and that life for the refugees was very difficult in Cairo. 37 Most
refugees sought resettlement in a third country, not wanting to stay in Egypt where their
plight was grim, but not wanting to return to the endemic violence of their homeland. The
UNHCR had offered voluntary repatriation for the refugees on a case-by-case basis, but
the threat of mass deportation loomed and in any case Sudan itself remained manifestly
unsafe in many places. The Egyptian government, already strapped trying to provide for
its swelling population, had been very reluctant to grant asylum to the refugees, believing
it might lead to more refugees, more asylum applications, and more responsibility that the
government did not seek or want.
On September 29th, 2005, hundreds of asylum-seeking Sudanese refugees began a
months-long sit-in at Midan Mustapha Mahmoud, near the Cairo offices of the UNHCR 38 .
Both the Egyptian government and the UNHCR maintained that the refugees were
economic migrants that would not have been in any immediate danger if they were to
return to Sudan. Whatever the merits of this claim, the refugees, all in danger of
deportation, staged the sit-in to draw attention to their plight. The only attention they
drew, however, was from residents and merchants who considered their day-and-night
presence to be a nuisance. As the months dragged on, it became increasingly clear that
the regime was likely to break up the sit-in by force.
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On New Year’s Eve, the journalist and blogger Noura Younis was near
Mohandisin, an upscale neighborhood near downtown Cairo. Younis had been on her
way home when a friend told her that “the police presence in Mohandisin is incredible.”
She quickly made her way to the square, and when she arrived, public buses were being
prepared to take the refugees to an undisclosed location. Younis had her camera with her,
but her battery was low, so she began to document what was going on with her cell
camera and SMS messages. Younis was apopolectic. “I realize that I’m there to
document, nobody can stop this at the moment what we can do is not let them get away
with it. I was so angry. I was freaking out and I was crying.” 39
Younis snuck into an adjacent building and camped out on the 10th floor, where
she had an unimpeded view of the goings-on. What she saw was appalling: police had
turned water cannons on the astonished and terrified refugees, herding them toward the
buses. The security forces deployed force against the refugees, beating many of them, and
it was clear even to Younis from her 10th-story vantage point that a number of people
were going to lose their lives. December 2005 was pre-Twitter, but Younis sent texts
from her cell phone, took pictures with the phone’s camera, and her heretofore largelyunknown site later became a clearinghouse for information about the incident. Younis
was unquestionably the first journalist on the scene, and the government press barely
mentioned the incident at all. Her account of the evening’s events – which turned into a
massacre – was widely linked, reported, and cited by media organizations as a definitive
version of the evening’s events came together. Below is an abridged version of her
account, as much an indictment of the racism of the Egyptian observers as it is of the
39
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police themselves. She called her account “Ashamed to be an Egyptian,” and it detailed
the confrontation between the police and the refugees in painstaking detail; Younis even
followed the refugees after they were taken away in buses to a detention facility in
Dahshur.
Younis’ presence at the atrocity allowed for coverage by blogs, independent
media, and non-Egyptian international press outlets. In fact, the account was cited as
evidence for where the refugees were taken. As Ehab Zelaky argues, “No one wrote and
took pictures of what happened like Nora Younis.” 40 As Younis herself notes,
My coverage of the Sudanese refugees, it got covered by the independent media
and the blogs. People translated it into I don’t know how many languages, it was
weird, people were picking it up translating it, and I was getting comments from
different places, but the mainstream media did not cover my coverage. The
mainstream media commented on the human rights report, there was no report
that was issued that did not make reference. 41
The regime and its press allies predictably tried to pin the blame on the refugees
themselves. Notably, the refugees (who were Christian) were said to have been drinking,
attacking the police, having sex in public. 42 There was little to no evidence that any of
this was actually true, but the rumors were calculated to diminish any potential public
sympathy for the refugees themselves. The tourism ministry claimed, absurdly, that the
refugees were tourists. 43
Word leaked out that the surviving refugees were to be deported, which generated
a firestorm of criticism in the Egyptian press, and attracted the attention of legal forces
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who sought to prevent the deportation. Younis’s story ignited a debate in the press about
the refugees themselves, their treatment, and the issue of racism in Egyptian society. It is
important, of course, that Younis was on the scene that evening. Without the
documentation from her cell phone, press outlets would have had no credible source,
aside from eyewitness reports (of which there were many) for the stories that later ran
about the massacre.
Coverage of refugee issues did not change much after the massacre, going from
15 articles between 1998 and December 29th 2005 44 to 21 between December 29th 2005
and January 1st 2007. So the immediate upshot appears to be that the Egyptian
government relented on its plans to deport 654 refugees from Mustapha Mahmoud. In the
aftermath of the incident, the regime had announced plans to deport the refugees.
However, in the wake of a series of protests, as well as intense international press
attention (which appeared to be more effective than anything that appeared in the
Egyptian press) 45 the government relented and agreed to review the status of the refugees.
While of course no direct cause and effect can be ascertained here, it would something of
a coincidence that the regime agreed to review longstanding plans for the refugees –
plans that had been hatched before the massacre in the Midan – just as activists mobilized
protests, rights organizations organized on behalf of the refugees, and the regime was
receiving negative press attention, both at home and internationally. The regime also saw
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nascent cooperation between liberal and Islamist opposition forces, as the action was
widely condemned, and the refugees were supported by the Brotherhood bloc in
parliament. This perhaps was what frightened the regime most of all. It was perhaps a
minor concern for the regime, but a concern nonetheless.
3.5 Transmission: Torture and the Fate of Emad El-Kebir
In January of 2006, a 21-year-old microbus driver named Emad El-Kabir was
arrested for attempting to break up a police assault on his cousin. The allegations against
El-Kabir, even if true, were relatively minor. However, during his detention, he was
subjected to torture by the interrogating police officers, who beat and raped him. El-Kabir
himself was nearly powerless to do anything about his brutal treatment by the police;
while he could file a complaint, torture is widespread in Egypt, something that most
individuals realize is taking place, but that until 2007 received little press attention.
However, by 2006 the Mobile Web had arrived in Egypt, and one of the officers engaged
in the practice of taping El-Kabir’s torture with his cell phone, and then passing the video
around to others.
The video, taken in January 2006, apparently passed around Cairo social networks
for nearly a year before it arrived in the hands of bloggers like Demagh MAK and Wael
Abbas. The video itself is graphic and devastating, as El-Kabir pleads with his captors,
whimpering “Ma‘lish ya basha! (Forget about it, Pasha!)”. The naked El-Kabir is
savagely sodomized with a nightstick – the video was so graphic that Youtube, where it
was eventually posted as well, briefly suspended the account of Wael Abbas, who had
posted it. Social Media Networks have the ability to accelerate the transmission of
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information – including messages, videos, and frames – out of target networks, and this
appears to be what eventually happened in this case as well. The officers who were
supposed to share the video instead forwarded it along to someone – it is not clear who –
who then passed the video on to the blogger Wael Abbas. Abbas posted the torture video
to his blog in December 2006, and generated interest on the part of traditional media
practitioners – while torture is widely-acknowledged, it is rarely discussed, and even
more rarely documented so graphically.
El-Kabir himself apparently played no role in the dissemination of the video; in
fact, when Abbas published the video on his blog, no one even knew who the victim
actually was. As Abbas says, “I didn’t know who he was and where, and what were the
circumstances and when, and so an independent investigative journalist was able to find
the microbus driver and interview him.” 46 The journalist, Wael Abdel Fattah was from
the independent newspaper El-Fagr 47 , further underscoring the importance of
cooperation between SMN activists and traditional media practitioners 48 . Other media
outlets quickly piled on the case, with Al-Masry Al-Youm claiming to publish the first
photo of an officer responsible for the torture of El-Kabir. 49 Al-Masry Al-Youm credited
El-Fagr for breaking the story in its first piece on El-Kabir. 50 The publication of the story
in different independent press outlets (none of which had anywhere near the circulation
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of government dailies at the time) contributed to a kind of critical mass. Columnists
denounced the torture and wrote about the venality of the practice, while newspapers
covered the case in-depth as it made its way through the court system. El-Kabir’s torture
and the subsequent focus on torture as a practice constituted a kind of informational
cascade. El-Kabir himself put himself at great risk when he decided to step forward and
push for the prosecution of the officers themselves.
Perhaps more offensive to public sensibilities than the initial, undeniable torture
was the fact that El-Kabir was subsequently sentenced to three months in prison for
“resisting the authorities.” 51 The re-arrest of El-Kabir signaled to observers that the
authorities were unrepentant and bent on maintaining total hegemony. However, because
the case had broken in the media, the regime was no longer able to keep the story hidden,
and unable to convince anyone that El-Kabir had resisted the authorities, not with such
graphic evidence on display for everyone to see. The idea that torture is widespread in
Egypt became unremarkable, and press outlets became increasingly outspoken critics of
Egyptian torture practices – with some even denouncing Mubarak himself in addition to
El-Adly. Addressing Mubarak directly, Magdi Al-Gallad wrote in Al-Masry Al-Youm,
“There is something terribly wrong, your Excellency, in the philosophy and ideology of
the law enforcement agencies in Egypt” (Al-Galad 2007). Mohamed Baghdadi wrote that
the videos were not evidence of the reality of corruption, since “everything is corrupt.” 52
Al-Masry Al-Youm, in particular, provided ongoing coverage of torture in Egypt,
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documenting torture complaints 53 , publishing op-eds, and following the El-Kabir case as
it progressed. The paper also went into unusual, and gory, detail about conditions inside
the stations. 54 The independent press also provided close coverage of other torture and
abuse scandals, such as the slapping of a man named Ahmed Gad and the abuse of a
female murder suspect who was interrogated while suspended from a stick, like a spitfire
grill.
The El-Kabir case wound its way through the Egyptian court system, finally resulting in
sentences for the officers on November 6th, 2007 55 . While the sentences were light
considering the overwhelming evidence in the case, it was a small victory for human
rights activists. The years since 2007 have seen the solidification of a de facto alliance
against torture 56 Ultimately the significance of the El-Kabir case goes far beyond the
prosecution of three individual police officers, though that in and of itself was an
accomplishment for the opposition. Abbas and his fellow bloggers succeeded in making
torture a serious issue in the Egyptian public sphere, and the controversy appears to have
ignited a kind of coalition against torture – a coalition that reaches beyond traditional
political left-right boundaries and encompasses everyone that is interested in seeing more
serious implementation of the rule of law. Actors appear to recognize their mutual
interest in seeing practices of torture abolished or abated, and are acting rationally in that
self-interest. The Egyptian Human Rights Organization, for instance, is supported by the
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Muslim Brotherhood faction in parliament, and together they publicly oppose the
practices of the Mubarak regime with regards to torture – uniting under the guise of
international legal conventions (Abdel Halim 2009). This not only suggests an emerging
coalition, but also points to the power of international rights activism. Rights activist
organizations who had long written about and documented torture in Egypt also noted the
importance of the El-Kabir case. 57
3.6 Red-lining: The Case of Al-Qursaya
In late 2007, one of the biggest political controversies in Egypt involved a tiny
island on the Nile in Cairo called Al-Qursaya. Home to some 5,000, largely impoverished
Cairenes 58 , the island was suddenly inundated with the regime’s armed forces in the
Spring of 2007. The exact purpose of the takeover was the subject of intense speculation,
but the effort was eerily similar to another attempted regime takeover of Al-Qursaya and
another Nile Island, that of Gold Island (Jazirat Al-Dhahab) in 2001. The most common,
and plausible, explanation was that developers wanted to get their hands on the island,
and that the Egyptian army was financially implicated in the takeover. Even with the
independent press involved in the fight, however, it seemed like a David vs. Goliath
situation. The army is a red line in Egyptian politics and journalism, and any public
discussion of the armed forces is forbidden. No matter the outcry, in all likelihood the
army would be able to do as it pleased to the island, regardless of the wishes of its
marginalized residents. However, within a year the regime’s plans for Al-Qursaya would
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be in tatters, defeated in two courts – the Egyptian legal system and in the court of public
opinion.
The Al-Qursaya Island case presents a different kind of challenge to entrenched
power. Unlike the sexual harassment and torture cases, the Al-Qursaya Island incident
does not appear to have begun on the Internet or in the blogosphere, instead breaking
initially in the independent press. The general outlines of the Al-Qursaya case remain
somewhat murky despite considerable press attention to the subject. This murkiness is
rooted in the involvement of the Egyptian army in the proceedings, meaning that ordinary
press outlets writing in Arabic have been incapable of telling the true story of what went
on between September of 2007 and the Spring of 2008. It is also true that officials
involved in the takeover of Qursaya adamantly deny the idea that residents were to be
evicted so that the Qursaya could be turned into some sort of neoliberal tourist paradise.
However, because the government made a similar attempt on another Nile island earlier
in the decade, the regime’s credibility on this issue was low to begin with. The murkiness
surrounding the takeover of Qursaya is given emphatic life in the signs posted all over the
island after the army’s arrival, announcing that Qursaya “….belongs to the army. No
photography.” 59
The island of Al-Qursaya itself is a small outgrowth in the middle of the Nile,
home to a population of fisherman and other hardscrabble Egyptians, and a place that has
so far resisted the Westernized development that now characterizes other parts of Cairo.
There had been rumors about the impending takeover in the Egyptian press as far back as
the previous spring, but nothing concrete emerged until the army arrived, treating the
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island and its citizens like occupied territory. However, many of the residents have
ownership deeds on their houses that in some cases go back 150 years, giving the lie to
regime propaganda that the residents are squatters impeding the development of the
Egyptian economy and tourism.
Almost immediately the independent press pounced on the story and began
muckraking, turning Al-Qursaya into a virtual cause célèbre for the country’s opposition.
In June 2007, stories began to appear in independent press outlets like Al-Dustur warning
that a vast crime was about to be committed against the indigent inhabitants of the island.
At the time the story fed into a general press atmosphere of contempt for the Mubarak
regime’s lawless venality, and the press used its more sensational style to play up the
story for its hungry audiences. Coming immediately on the heels of months worth of
rumors about Mubarak’s death, the trial of prominent editors, and a burgeoning economic
crisis, the Al-Qursaya Island takeover represented to many the total venality of the
Mubarak regime and its contempt for ordinary citizens.
One blogger who wrote about Al-Qursaya was former physician Mina Zakry. As
he tells the story, “The government with some businessmen wanted to take over. Armed
forces from the army went down to the island and intimidated the people, pushing them
to sell the land, or even to just evacuate it.” 60 Zakry acknowledges that newspapers were
covering the story, but insists that they were unable to tell the entire tale. In the carefullyhoned tradition of self-censorship, the news stories would write clear around the issue of
an army takeover. As Zakry argues, “They [print reporters] would even say something
like “a dominant body” or a “high entity” – the law prevents anything.” This impression
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is widespread, as is the idea that outside of Al-Dustur and Al-Masry Al-Youm, no one
wanted to touch this story. On November 13th, 2007, weeks prior to Zakry’s story, The
Sandmonkey asked himself why the media wasn’t reporting on the island takeover. His
answer was “Because critisizing [sic] the army in any way can land you for at least year
in jail. Plus, whatchu gonna do? Call them thieves? Can't really steal what you already
own, and they own all of our asses.” 61 The AFP story that Sandmonkey links to makes
this same point – “Emergency laws in place for decades mean that any Egyptian will
think twice about reporting on military activity, and the few media references to what is
happening on the island studiously avoid mentioning the army.” 62
Research confirms the allegation that even the independent press was unwilling to
print the truth about the island’s takeover. Typical of this reticence is Fahmy Howeidi’s
December 27th Al-Dustur op-ed “Ghazwat Al-Qursaya.” In his acerbic piece, in which he
criticizes the island’s takeover and lauds the efforts of the islanders, he refers to the
perpetrators as “armed soldiers.” While this may seem like a hair-splitting difference, it is
in fact a deliberate semantic choice to avoid fingering the Army. This is in spite of the
well-known fact that reporters were well aware of exactly who it was that was sending
forces into the island and causing trouble between the regime and its residents. Howeidi
even went to the trouble of writing a follow-up column for Al-Dustur, “Hidden Realities
of Al-Qursaya” in which he writes about “armed forces” being behind the takeover, but
refuses pointedly to direct attention to the Army. Some realities in Egypt must remain
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hidden. This was a pattern followed by nearly all other reporters and columnists at the
time.
According to Zakry, an Al-Masry Al-Youm reporter dropped the Al-Qursaya
Island file into his lap one day, claiming that the newspaper couldn’t print the truth about
what was really going on. Zakry, understanding the risks involved in telling the truth,
decided to proceed anyway. 63 On December 3rd, 2007, Zakry published a story on his
blog about the army takeover of Al-Qursaya. The entry was entitled “Video: The army
conquers Al-Qursaya Island.” 64 The entry contains an embedded video that depicts the
unmistakable signs of the Egyptian armed forces (al-quwat al-musaliha). Soldiers on a
boat are captured on video by an intrepid cameraman, and those soldiers, as the
commentary indicates, are clearly not from other organs of the Egyptian security
apparatus. 65
In the entry, Zakry claims that other than one story in El-Badeel (at the time a
new paper with an extraordinarily limited circulation) he was the only person willing to
go on record with the Army allegations. To his surprise he was not arrested – suggesting
that perhaps the crossing of so-called “red lines” is possible in Egypt’s new press
environment, through a process of challenge-and-response. It is also possible that he got
away with it because no one connected to the regime actually noticed. But perhaps once a
new red line has been violated, other journalists and bloggers look to the transgressor to
see whether he or she is punished. SMN activists are taking the lead in this process.
Zakry’s story was one small piece of a very large campaign on behalf of Al-Qursaya’s
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residents, which unfolded over the course of the year. In November of 2008, the regime
was finally defeated in court, and the army takeover was halted (Abdel Hamid and elKarnashawi, 2008). While it is still possible that the army will resume its plans for the
island once the furor has passed, activists can legitimately claim this as a substantial
victory for the residents.
In addition to Zakry’s reporting, digital media gave activists and citizens other
tools for pooling their resources. The reporting on Al-Qursaya falls under the umbrella of
awareness-raising. As Fenton writes,
The internet has become home to mediated activity that seeks to raise
people’s awareness, to give a voice to those who do not have one, to
offer social empowerment, to allow disparate people and causes to form
alliances, and ultimately to be used as a tool for social change (Fenton
2008, 233).
Dozens of other bloggers took up the cause. The blogger Ahmed Al-Hiwari wrote a post,
typical of the blogging response to the crisis, on December 3rd, 2007 entitled “Al-Qursaya:
Island of Fear.” 66 The article, which clearly editorialized against the takeover, featured
original reporting and gave first-hand insight into the lives of the islanders. This period of
early December was one of great import for electronic resistance to the takeover; the
prominent left-wing blogger Hossam El-Hamalawy, co-founder of the influential
English-language blog The Arabist, made a number of posts on the issue. On December
4th, for instance, he posted three videos of the island, one depicting islanders resisting the
armed forced, and another a documentary by the filmmaker Mohamed Abla. 67
Hamalawy’s story (and another story that same day on the main Arabist page by Issandr
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El-Amrani) was the catalyst for a Global Voices story on December 5th, which placed the
island takeover in the context of increasing regime incursions into civil society.
The photo-sharing site Flickr, for instance, was used to coordinate the upload of
photographs of the island and its people. Bloggers reported the times and dates of
demonstrations, and contributed to an environment in which the Al-Qursaya takeover was
becoming a PR nightmare for the Mubarak regime. Facebook also became a site of
dissent and resistance, presaging the site’s role in the April 6th, 2008 general strike that
brought widespread notoriety to the social networking site. Shortly after the publication
of Zakry’s story – which was widely linked in the small Egyptian blogging community –
a group was formed called “Anqidhu ahali jazirat al-Qursaya” (Save the People of AlQursaya Island). It quickly boasted hundreds of members, and its wall featured links to
outside stories and the times and dates of demonstrations.68 In November 2007, over 600
people gathered for a press conference to promote a documentary about the residents
(Singer 2007). Prominent human rights lawyers – including Amir Salim, who represented
jailed opposition leader Ayman Nour – filed a case on behalf of the residents 69 , drawing
on a 2001 Prime Ministerial decrees which allowed the residents of nearby Gold Island to
stay in their homes. Egyptian celebrities got into the act, staging a protest on New Year’s
Day to draw attention to the plight of the islanders. The pace of press coverage picked up,

Facebook. (Save the People of
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and the government press was forced to provide some grudging coverage. Protests were
arranged, including one at the journalists’ syndicate downtown (Carr 2008).
Ultimately, the government – which had been stonewalling the press for months –
was forced to admit that it had drafted plans for the island. On January 4th, Al-Dustur
columnist Ibrahim Monsour reported that the government had admitted that it had
planned to turn the island into a tourist resort (Monsour 2008). Simply getting the
government to admit to this can be considered a minor triumph, considering the murky
relationship between the executive and the Army. The fact that residents ultimately
triumphed is remarkable. Zakry’s account also coincided with an increase in the density
of coverage of the Al-Qursaya case. Between May 2007 and December 3rd, 2007, 85
stories appeared in the Egyptian print media on the crisis – mostly in the independent
newspapers Al-Masry Al-Youm, Al-Dustur, and El-Badeel. 70 Except for a handful of
stories, the state-controlled press largely ignored the story or printed accounts of
ministerial defenses of government conduct. 71 Between December 3rd, 2007, and
December 1st, 2008, however, that number jumped to 194 stories. While the majority of
these stories appeared in the independent press, the official press was forced to confront
the issue as well, with substantive articles describing the conflict appearing in Rose AlYusef, Al-Ahram, Al-Gumhuriya, and others.
The relevant comparison for the Al-Qursaya takeover is not difficult to discern –
the regime has in fact made multiple attempt to seize the island, as well as others on the
Nile. A similar attempt failed in 2001, when the government was once again opposed in
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court (Fayza 2001). However, the specifics of that case are difficult to come by – since
not a single article was published in the Egyptian or Arabic press about the case. 72 Since
the government did not successfully take over the island in 2001, we can assume that
press attention and digital media are not the only causal variable at work here – clearly
the government does not control the judicial system to the extent that some observers
imagine (Rutherford 2008). However, the outcry caused by the 2007 edition of the case
was far and away more extensive than anything that occurred in 2001; however further
research is needed to ascertain the relevant details and players of the earlier case, since
there is no extant press record. The evidence of a similar attempt in 1998 puts Al-Qursaya
in the same category as Qurna, a settlement in Luxor that the government tried for 50
years to clear of residents – finally succeeding in 1997. In other words, the Nile islands
around Cairo are clearly coveted by the regime or elements in the regime, and activists
and residents should expect repeated and continual attempts to push them out in the name
of progress or tourism.
3.7 Conclusions
In evaluating the evidence presented in the above cases, several hypotheses from
Chapter 2 are supported. The first is that Social Media Networks transmit information
through critical nodes. When looking at the Sudanese refugee case, it is striking that Nora
Younis is herself a journalist and has extensive contacts in the Egyptian press community,
making her not just a credible source, but a node in the broader SMN in which she is
situated. Her contacts allowed both for her presence that day, which was anything but
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serendipitous – it was rather orchestrated via a text-messaging network in which activists
who knew her and knew of her interest in such matters were able to “activate” her and get
her quickly to the scene, and for the seemingly instantaneous way in which the
information she gathered made its way to the press outlets. While any ordinary Egyptian
with a cell phone could have taken pictures and posted them to a blog, it was Younis – a
highly-connected, and highly-read journalist-blogger – who was able to turn that
hypermedia footage into more than an interesting entry on a little-known web outlet.
The same connection can be made with the sexual harassment and torture cases –
in both cases information was first provided by a former journalist whose blogging and
SMN activism was trusted and credible. Younis is trained as a journalist, and her
presence on the scene mitigated the concerns expressed by a number of professional
journalists that bloggers don’t know what they’re doing, are willing to report rumor as
fact, or who can’t or won’t actually get out in the street, do interviews, and perform the
difficult work of a paid journalist. As Al-Ahram journalist Amira Howeidy noted about
another blogger, Hossam El-Hamalawy, “First of all, I know Hossam personally, I think
that’s an important factor, I know he is an honest person, and he’s connected in his field,
and he’s into labor activism and he’s a socialist and so on and he’s very devoted to his
cause, when there are events related to these issues, I find him credible.” 73 It is this
sentiment that drives the credibility of certain bloggers for journalists in the field. This is
the difference between a dead end in cyberspace and a SMN with capabilities – with
power. It is not the power to put an end to refugee crises, racism, or the lawlessness of
authoritarian regimes, but the power to set the agenda of public debate.
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Corroborative evidence is also found for the hypothesis that authoritarian regimes
will have increasing difficulty controlling the media environment. The El-Kabir case
points clearly to a shift in public discourse, and the willingness of Egyptian journalists to
write about torture in the wake of the case. No one has argued that torture became more
widespread between 2007 and 2009 - if anything police might have become somewhat
more reluctant to torture given the consequences for the officers caught torturing ElKabir. This does not mean, by any stretch of the imagination, that torture has been
eradicated or that it is no longer a problem. It does, however, mean that it no longer takes
place under a shroud of secrecy. The success of the El-Kabir story the and widespread
use of cell phone cameras to document police abuse outside of police stations means that
the watchers are being watched by the citizenry, and that individuals are increasingly
emboldened to document cases of police abuse. This is particularly surprising given that
a general scholarly consensus has emerged, arguing that Mubarak’s regime has become
emboldened to commit renewed human rights violations with the retreat of the Bush
Administration’s mid-decade democracy promotion initiatives.
A close reading of the Al-Qursaya case offers further understanding of how
SMNs function in Egypt. First, not all cases of blogging’s relevance involve breaking
stories that would otherwise have gone unreported. This can be seen especially in the
case of the recent Israeli invasion of Gaza. Blogs, of course, did not “break” this story,
but along with other forms of digital media, they greatly amplified the activist response.
Second, it is clear that the Mubarak regime cares about and is sensitive to its press
reputation and the international repercussions of its actions. The regime appears to be
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most vulnerable on populist issues – salaries, working conditions, the plight of the poor –
and on human rights issues that are capable of drawing the broad-based support of
Islamists, leftists, and liberals – issues like sexual harassment, torture, and due process.
This is not to say that activists have the upper hand, but rather that everyone involved
would benefit from knowing which issues they are likely to be able to successfully
promote within the system. Aside from a handful of developers and whoever was going
to benefit directly from the conversion of Al-Qursaya into some kind of magical tourist
paradise, few would publicly argue for the dispossession of some of Cairo’s poorest
citizens.
This discussion of the cases should not lead us to believe that digital media
necessarily have a democratizing effect in authoritarian countries. The quantitative
evidence linking the Internet with democratization is spotty at best (Wheeler 2006;
Calfano and Sahliyeh 2008; Hofheinz 2005). Rather, under certain circumstances, digital
media can serve as tools in the repertoire of dissidents. They also create alternative public
spheres -- what some have theorized as counter-publics (Asen and Brouwer, 2001). These
alternative public spheres function through the empowerment of individuals whose ability
to express themselves and participate in politics is severely limited in other ways. As AlSaggaf writes, “The Internet not only allows people to discuss and debate issues of
utmost importance to them, it also makes them authors of media content rather than a
passive audience” (2006, 312). Regardless of whether such places qualify as
Habermasian public spheres in the strict sense, they certainly operate as focal points of
dissent and allow individuals – particularly those from repressed minorities like Baha’is,
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Coptic Christians, or others – to articulate their needs, desires, and dreams. In the
uncoordinated chaos of the Internet, these focal points allow for the production of
commentary and agreed-upon narrative frames and calls to action.
Wael Abbas, the internationally-recognized Egyptian blogger and citizen
journalist, told me that “We are recording history so that in the future no one will dare to
lie about it.” Abbas says that Egyptian media (and Arab media generally) have a long
tradition of deceiving citizens about the true nature of news events and social and
political developments. He cites the Egyptian media’s cover-up of the country’s
devastating loss to Israel in the 1967 War – the way that press organs cooperated with the
Nasser regime to downplay the Air Force and Army’s terrible losses. While it cannot be
said that regimes have lost all control over information-control, one of the lessons of the
cases presented above is that SMNs greatly complicate the efforts of authoritarian
regimes to craft and control narratives about politics. The four cases presented above,
while not indicative of large-scale social or political change in Egypt, are illustrative of
the new media environment in which authoritarian regimes must operate. They highlight
the effects of cooperation between embattled reporters at independent media outlets and
their digital media critics. Finally, it suggests that tactical victories are within reach of
determined and digitally-mediated activists, under the right circumstances.
However, these battles are not simply one-off struggles, in which SMN activists
sometimes win, and sometimes lose, nor is it simply another tale of regimes allowing for
“safety valves” for the harmless release of pressure. The growth of SMN activism is an
expression of dissatisfaction with the structural alignment of political forces in Egypt,
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and the way that big decisions – economic, social, political – have been made without the
input of actors outside of the NDP or the military. As Castells argues,
sociopolitical forms and processes are built upon cultural materials and… these
materials are either unilaterally produced by political institutions as an
expression of domination or, alternatively, are coproduced within the public
sphere by individuals, interest groups, civic associations of various kinds (the
civil society), and the state (2008).
SMN activism contributes to a public sphere in which politics is co-produced by other
actors with the state, particularly independent journalists and human rights organizations.
While the state may still be the dominant actor in Egyptian politics, SMNs make it
possible for other actors to contest that domination and occasionally to subvert it. The
role of the public sphere in these developments– in theoretical terms – will be addressed
in Chapter 5.
The importance of the independent press holds not just for the advancing of
claims, breaking of stories, or introduction of marginalized actors into the public sphere,
but also for the mobilization of collective action. The question of whether or not SMNs
facilitate the organization and execution of collective action in authoritarian contexts is
the subject that this dissertation now turns to in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4
New Tools, Old Rules:
Social Media Networks and Collective Action in Egypt

4.0 Introduction
Since their development in the early part of this century, activists all over the
world have seized on the tools of Social Media Networks as they organize opposition to
authoritarian regimes and practices. From the text-messaging armada that descended on
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in the Philippines in 2001 to text-messaging protestors
and electronic journalists in the Orange Revolution, and now today to Iranian protestors
Twittering the news of mass protests, arrests, and intimidation, activists have proven that
under the right circumstances, SMN activism can be powerful and effective. However,
scholars have yet to identify the kinds of circumstances under which SMNs can be
effective, and why. This chapter, through the evaluation of case studies in Egypt, seeks to
explain the circumstances under which SMN activism can successfully mobilize
collective action in authoritarian contexts, and the circumstances under which such
mobilization is likely to lead to political change. One does not necessarily lead to the
other. In so doing, the chapter contributes a critical piece of theory-building as scholars
seek to understand the impact of technological proliferation in the developing world. The
chapter evaluates competing hypotheses about the mobilization and collective action
potential of SMNs under conditions of authoritarianism. The null hypothesis is that,
especially in low-connectivity societies like Egypt, SMNs have little to no role to play in
102

mobilizing dissent, because so few individuals have Internet access and because Social
Movements are built and sustained by persistent frames, concrete demands, and
organizational ties within communities. This hypothesis would expect that thriving social
movements like the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian labor movement will have a
much greater role to play in the Egyptian collective action environment. The alternative
hypothesis advanced here is that SMNs reduce the costs of collective action, and thus
should lead to more protests, demonstrations, and strikes, the standard manifestations of
dissent in authoritarian societies. Consistent with Lust-Okar’s expectations that included
groups are less likely to involve themselves in protest and dissent activities, it also seems
a reasonable expectation that excluded groups like the Muslim Brotherhood will invest
more heavily in the tactical tools of SMNs.
Mona El-Ghobashy (2008) poses a critical question for scholars of Egypt: if
authoritarianism has in fact deepened and stabilized in Egypt through the institutional
choices of the regime, or become “durable” in the popular language, as many scholars
argue (Brownlee 2007, 4; Albrecht 2005, 378; Kassem 2006, 188) why has there been a
massive increase in the number of civil society organizations, and an organized effort on
the part of the judiciary to exert its power vis-à-vis the regime? Her answer involves the
internationalization of Egyptian politics, in the form of routine connections between
international NGOs and governments and domestic Egyptian actors, as well as the
“mobilization of the constitution,” by which opposition forces, including the judiciary
and ordinary citizens, seek the enforcement of the actual laws on the books in the country
as opposed to more arbitrary forms of state power. Ghobashy, however, whose argument
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will be explored in more depth below, fails to conceptualize or seek to explain precisely
what has enabled those international connections or the increased ability and willingness
of civil society forces to agitate on behalf of constitutional issues in Egypt. In this chapter,
in addition to testing hypotheses about the causes and consequences of new information
technologies and their relationship to collective action, I will seek to fill the gap in ElGhobashy’s argument by arguing for the critical role of Social Media Networks in
internationalization and mobilization in Egypt – even while remaining sanguine about the
potential of these technologies for truly large-scale mobilization. As we will see with the
Judges Club ferment, the April 6th movement and the reaction to the Israeli invasion of
Gaza, SMNs are the missing variable in recent accounts of Egyptian civil society, and
understanding how they operate, as well as their possibilities and limitations, is critical to
a proper understanding of contemporary politics in Egypt. In so doing, I hope to explain
the salience of SMNs in Egypt, and to situate the changes that have taken place in
Egyptian politics within a larger narrative of authoritarian persistence.
This chapter will proceed by first looking at the collective action environment in
Egypt and the ways that SMNs have changed the incentives and possibilities for
organizers. It then proceeds to explain the contribution of SMNs to four discrete events:
the struggle over judicial independence in 2005-2007, the April 6th 2008 General Strike,
the 2009 General Strike, and the protests against Israeli invasion of Gaza in 2008-2009.
4.1: Mobilizing Protest in Egypt
In Khaled Al Khamissi’s non-fiction pop sensation Taxi, the author relates a
conversation with a cab driver ridiculing the size a demonstration on the streets of Cairo
104

by the opposition group Kefaya . “In the old days,” says the driver, “we used to go out on
the streets with 50,000 people, with 100,000. But now there’s nothing that matters” (Al
Khamissi 2008, 24-25). The driver located what he called “the beginning of the end” with
the bread riots that rattled the Sadat regime in January 1977. The regime quashed that
proto-revolution, “And since then the government has planted in us a fear of hunger….
They planted hunger in the belly of every Egyptian, a terror that made everyone look out
for himself or say ‘Why should I make it my problem?’” Al Khamissi, clearly rattled by
the driver, who was able to recall the exact dates of the demonstrations in 1977, wonders
what “the end” actually is.
Perhaps the end was the decades-long interregnum in street protests in Egypt, a
pause that seemingly came to a close with the Second Intifada and the demonstration
wave that has swept Egypt since 2003. But it is certainly true that no one has mustered
the kind of street demonstrations that might truly threaten the regime of Hosni Mubarak
and the system of emergency law that still governs Egypt – and that most demonstrations
in Cairo and its environs consist of more riot police and plainclothes police (the dreaded
bultagiyya) than actual demonstrators. El Khamissi’s driver puts his finger on precisely
the collective action problem that plagues any attempt to spur change from below in
Egypt – the question of why anyone should make anything their problem.
Figure 1 indicate that protests in Egypt have increased in number since the 1990s, with a
peak in 2005.
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Figure 4.1: Protests in Egypt, 1994 - 2007 74
_________________________________________________
Egy 1994 1
Egy 1995 1
Egy 1996 2
Egy 1997 2
Egy 1998 2
Egy 1999 0
Egy 2000 4
Egy 2001 4
Egy 2002 1
Egy 2003 4
Egy 2004 0
Egy 2005 9
Egy 2006 0
Egy 2007 4
__________________________________________________
The growth of opposition activities had a number of discrete causes, from the
widening gap between rich and poor and neoliberal economic policies that were seen to
disadvantage industrial laborers in Egypt. Declining wages for industrial wages were one
of the primary consequences of the neoliberal economic program undertaken by the
Mubarak regime (Mitchell 2002, 286). The Egyptian government was also under
pressure, since the attacks of 9/11 to open up its political system, as the Bush
Administration adopted the position, at least publically, that terrorism was intricately tied
to the absence of social and political freedoms in the Middle East. In the midst of this
pressure, the Mubarak government allowed the flourishing of new and independent press
outlets (see Chapter 3), and held multi-candidate (if far from free) Presidential elections
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in 2006. The announcement of those elections came in 2005, which coincides with the
largest recorded number of yearly protests. The role of SMNs in mobilizing
demonstrations during this time period is well-known and has been written about at
length (Al-Malky 2007), but it is worth exploring how exactly it worked and why it
represented such a change.
Organizing a demonstration in the 1990s, prior to SMNs, was a painstaking affair
fraught with very real peril for both organizers and participants. Permits had to be
obtained, leaflets printed, and a location agreed-upon far in advance. Such high-profile
and easily-detectable efforts made demonstrations easy for the regime to see coming in
advance. Hossam El-Hamalawy elaborates:
in order to organize a demonstration in the 1990s there was so much secrecy, you
can’t talk over the phone, you would meet people you would chat, and how would
you publish for a demonstration, you had to print out something. 75
During this time period, as well, the regime held what amounted to a news monopoly on
information and events in Egypt. As El-Hamalawy argues, if someone showed up at a
demonstration in the 1990s with a camera, demonstrators would turn away and hide their
faces, since they could be fairly certain that the journalist was from one of the 3 major
government dailies, Al-Akhbar, Al-Gumhuriya, and Al-Ahram. Reporters from those
newspapers were believed to feed information and pictures directly to the security
services, making it very dangerous to have your picture taken at any kind of
demonstration. Beatings, arrests, and other forms of rights abuse all took place with little
scrutiny from the press or international observers. The costs of organizing this kind of
collective action, then, were exceptionally high, and the odds of those protests, even if the
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organizers pulled them off, being reported inside or outside of Egypt were low. A
confluence of circumstances – largely related to relative calm in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and strong domestic economic growth rates – combined to make protest a
relatively rare thing in the 1990s. Protest waves clearly depend as much on external and
internal circumstances as they do on the means that demonstrators might deploy to
execute their plans. However, the advent of satellite television in the 1990s introduced a
competing news source into the Egyptian news environment (Lynch 2006; Sakr 2002),
even if that source was typically focused more on international relations and Arab-Israeli
conflict stories than it was on local Egyptian stories. Hossam El-Hamalawy explains:
The outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada [in 2000] this marked the beginning of
internet activism, that took the form of email lists, yahoo chat groups. I was being
spammed left and right by those who have the boycott lists of updates about the
Intifada, pictures of the dead, pictures of the atrocities. These were being emailed,
and yahoo groups were like the hip thing back then.
The primary function of SMNs during this time period was coordination and
information-transmission. Bloggers posted, texted, and emailed the times and dates of
demonstrations or other actions, and SMN technologies like SMS messages were used to
find agreed-upon places for demonstrations, to adjust those locales on the spot, and to
communicate information about the results and any arrests. As Hossam El-Hamalawy
says
With the crackdown on the judges movement, I was mailing continuous updates,
at the same time I had 50 plus numbers on my mobile that I had in a group, that I
used to text updates, we would be running around in downtown, and seeing
people kidnapped, and sending SMS and then running home, uploading emails
and photos, and Issandr would post the pictures. 76
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SMNs like blogs, especially during this time period, also played a role in transmitting
information to outsiders, and challenging the boundaries of public discourse. SMNs were
important sources of information transmission and dissent during the class over judicial
rights in 2005-2007. The struggle over judicial reform and the role played by SMNs
helped set the political context in which the April 6th Movement – which forms the core
of this chapter – developed. Understanding how that first struggle played out is critical to
understanding where and how the April 6th Movement succeeded and failed.
4.2 The Judges Club and the Protest Wave of 2005
The Egyptian judiciary has been engaged in a struggle with the regime at least
since the Second World War (Wolff 2009). The struggle has primarily centered around
the function of the judiciary as a check on the power of the executive. Since Nasser, the
executive has tried repeatedly to undermine the capacity of the judiciary for independent
action. Thus do the members of the judiciary become “a favoured class in Egyptian
society” (Wolff 2009, 103). Sadat’s initial draft of the Supreme Constitutional Court law
in 1977 would have left the organization toothless and subordinate to the regime
(Rutherford 2008, 45). Opposition from prominent judges led the Sadat regime to agree
to a far more invasive and powerful SCC than it had originally been conceptualized And
because of that power, the SCC has again and again challenged the arbitrary power of the
state, such as in 1985, when it ruled against Sadat and his attempts to use the emergency
law to amend the Law on Personal Status (Rutherford 2008, 54). Rutherford concludes,
“The SCC and the administrative courts have accumulated a large body of rulings that
seek to limit state power and render it more accountable to the law” (2008, 52).
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Especially since Hosni Mubarak took over after Sadat’s assassination in 1981, the
judiciary has struggled repeatedly to carve out victories vis-à-vis the state – for the right
to form democratic syndicates and political parties, property rights, and freedoms of
speech, in particular. The longstanding involvement of the courts in questions of multiparty politics in Egypt stretched across a number of national elections. And when,
seemingly under pressure from the United States to democratize, the regime announced it
would hold not just parliamentary elections, but a multi-candidate election for the
presidency, the stage was set for different political forces to The 2005 presidential and
parliamentary elections were thus set up as the perfect opportunity for a very public
struggle between the regime, which wanted to rig the elections for the NDP, and the
judiciary, which was constitutionally tasked with overseeing the fairness and legality of
the elections themselves. The looming battle pitched the rhetoric of democracy and
pluralism against the continued reality of the Mubarak regime using the threat of
“terrorism” and the Muslim Brotherhood to continue the state of emergency that has been
in place since 1981. 77 But compared to the decades-long struggle between the regime and
judiciary, rather than just against the exigencies of the moment in 2005, it was clear that
both sides saw the elections as a pivotal battle. Truly free and fair elections could
potentially threaten the core of Egyptian authoritarianism.
The elections themselves split the Judges Club, between those who believed they
should take no part in what would likely be fraudulent elections, and those who argued
that they should exercise their power, even taking into consideration the institutional
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limits placed on judicial freedom. After the elections, Mahmoud Mekki and Hisham
Bastawisi, vice presidents of the Court of Cassation, very publicly declared the
parliamentary elections rigged and presented evidence of their claims, igniting what
Wolff calls “a huge civil society movement” (2009, 105). The judges themselves were
arrested, along with hundreds of activists and leaders from the Muslim Brotherhood and
Kefaya. The streets of Cairo became sites of contestation between these opposition forces,
who sought transparent and fair elections, and forces of the regime, which hoped to quash
them. The outcome of these struggles was and is unclear. Most observers agree that there
has been a retrenchment in political rights since the heyday of the Kefaya movement in
the mid-2000s. And it is certainly true that the regime won an important victory when the
judiciary was essentially stripped of its election-overseeing component in 2007, as article
88 of the constitution was amended to create an electoral commission to oversee future
elections. (Wolff 2009, 105). The regime’s victory highlights the important difference
between successful mobilization and successful political change.
On May 25th, 2006, The Arabist, at the time one of the leading English-language
blogs in the Middle East, published what it called a “recap” of the demonstrations
planned for that day. The author (Issandr El-Amrani) wrote that he was just “passing
along the info”. The post contained the times, places, and messages of the day’s various
protests, which were not just in solidarity with the Judges’ Club, but also included an
anniversary demonstration for Black Friday, May 25th, 2005, in which female journalists
were assaulted by the security services. 78 The Arabist itself had long served as a depot for
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information, pictures and analysis about the demonstrations that were taking place in
Cairo against the usurpation of the judiciary’s power. These posts often included links to
Flickr accounts, where amateur photographers gathered documentary evidence of the
day’s events, building shared meaning through exchanging and linking to pictures. This
lent the blogs themselves both a pre-and-post demonstration utility – before the
demonstrations, they served to provide information to the select minority of Egyptians
who got information like this online, and after the demonstrations, they constructed and
deconstructed the demonstrations themselves, calling for more action, criticizing the
treatment of the demonstrators, and attempting to bolster the movement. Many posts,
such as the one that appeared on The Arabist on May 18th, 2006, depicted police brutality,
particularly by the so-called bultagiyya, the plainclothes police often hired by the regime
to break up demonstrations. 79 Demonstrations themselves took place over a long period
of many months, leading up to the passage of the constitutional amendments in 2007.
The struggles of the Judge’s Club are arguably representative of the kind of
democratization that is taking place in Egypt, in spite of the fact that in many respects,
authoritarianism has worsened in recent years. El Ghobashy calls this “mobilizing the
constitution” – i.e. framing and organizing contention around the actual written document
of the 1971 constitution, and challenging the state on the basis of its legal precepts (ElGhobashy 2008, 9). It would not be the first time that “flawed constitutions” were used to
bring about democratic reform – as El-Ghobashy notes, the same strategy was used in
Poland. Many constitutions, even in authoritarian countries, promise rights that are not
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delivered upon in real life. In Egypt, it was the ferment created by the announcement of
multi-candidate presidential elections in 2005 that made this strategy the default mode of
the Judges Club and the various NGOs organizing in support of them.
Once again, though, independent media and its relationship to SMNs played an
important role in the mobilization process. With only the state press on the scene, it’s
unlikely that the kind of debate about the elections that occurred would ever have taken
place. And the blogs would have had no one to link to. As Issandr El-Amrani put it,
The 24-hour cycle in Egypt in terms of breaking news, didn’t really exist [in
2005]. The official press is often vague about what’s happening, it didn’t have a
lot of serious competition. That changed in 2004 with the new independent dailies
that came out…it really created a wonky discussion about what was taking place
in the political arena. It’s not that it didn’t exist before, it didn’t get updated at a
daily pace. It forced the issue of election fraud on the agenda, election fraud is
nothing new, it’s just that there are these outlets available and the right political
atmosphere. 80
As the protest movement continued its actions in 2005-2007, blogs became sites of
discussion and documentation – of the demonstrations themselves, and also of arrests.
Leading Arabic-language blogger Amr Gharbeia, on October 26th, 2006, wrote about
central security forces surrounding the Judges Club, and about the arrests of fellow
bloggers – in real time. “Central security forces are surrounding the Judges Club,” he
wrote, while also posting the names of arrested activists and bloggers. 81 Wael Abbas, on
his blog Misr Digital, posted a detailed description of the protest events planned for May
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25th, 2006, both in Egypt, and abroad. 82 The posting of times and dates of protests was
common during this period, particularly since the movement to oppose the constitutional
amendments was led by Kefaya, which had and still has a strong Web presence.
Sympathetic activists in the blogging community helped spread the word about these
protests. One such blog was “Manal and Alaa’s bit bucket,” one of the oldest and more
well-known Egyptian political blogs, which was published sometimes in English and
sometimes in Arabic. A typical post would list the time, date, and place of an upcoming
demonstration, along with the organizers. They also included short descriptions of the
events’ raison d’etre, such as the demonstration in Midan Tahrir on March 15th, 2007,
which saw the constitutional amendments as designed to “continue dictatorial rule and
eliminate judicial supervision of elections.” 83
The protests continued through March of 2007, including demonstrations
generally neglected by the international press on university campuses across Egypt. One
such demonstration on March 25th, 2007 drew thousands of protestors across Egypt, not
just in Cairo but in universities across the country, including in secondary cities like
Tanta. 84 Still, constitutional amendments were passed over the objections of this
movement. The Judges Club and their political allies lacked the grassroots organizing
capabilities that might have put more people in the streets, while international pressure on
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the regime proved incapable of changing its course. And while SMNs contributed to
coordination and globalization, they were not the fundamental driving course of the
events of 2005 -2007. However, the political context created by the struggles of 2005 –
2007 helps us understand the environment in which later organizing took place. To assess
the impact of SMNs on collective action in Egypt, we must look at the April 6th Youth
Movement, and the strikes organized on April 6th, 2008, May 4th, 2008, and April 6th,
2009 – strikes that were organized in large part online and whose success or failure can
tell us much about the conditions under which SMN-driven collective action might
succeed or fail. In terms of theory testing, these strikes were conducted by the same
group of activists, under virtually identical political conditions, with widely divergent
results. More than the Judges Club organizing, the April 6th Movement is a kind of
natural experiment, so rarely possible in comparative politics – an experiment which will
assess the possibilities and limitations of mobilization conducted through Social Media
Networks.
4.3 Informational Cascades and the April 6th Movement
On the morning of April 6th, 2008, a small group of Egyptian bloggers and
activists made their way from one internet café to another, updating web sites and Twitter
feeds dedicated to the day’s tumultuous events in Cairo and other cities. They generously
allowed me to spend the day with them, to see what they were up to and how they were
using the tools of Web 2.0 to facilitate political protest and social action in Egypt. The
afternoon took me from the overpriced coffee joints of Mohandisin and Zamalek to the
Judges’ Syndicate, where a protest was the focus of several blocks full of plainclothes
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police, riot police, participants, and gawkers both Egyptian and foreign. The young men
and women spent their time in the cafes aggregating reports from other activists about
arrests and protests, and while they of course were doing everything they could to avoid
being arrested, the general attitude seemed to be one of acceptance of that risk. They
were, of course, doing all of these things at the same time, often talking on the phone,
updating a Web site, and speaking with one another, engaging in what has been dubbed
“continuous partial attention.” As one of the organizers and writers told me, “With the
Internet you can get online anytime, wherever, so like now we are publishing all the same
news the same minute. If someone got caught now, arrested now, we can write about it
now, rather than the old style.” 85 By the old style, of course, this young blogger meant
the traditional media, which has a built-in time-lag between an event and the delivery of
news about that event, a delay that has been eclipsed by Social Media Networks.
Some of this activity appeared to be facilitated by the Internet. SMNs have little
to nothing to do with broadcast news media, the traditional focus of academics studying
Arab media, almost to the exclusion of all else (Armbrust 2007, 531). The day’s events
also had little to do with the kind of blogging we have come to associate with the form –
the airing of opinion and analysis by non-professionals, or angry people in their pajamas
railing against the media or political forces. These were blogger-activists, or “citizen
journalists” in the new lingo of the field. The reason that April 6th, 2009 received so
much domestic and international attention was because of the actions taken by a Ghad
party functionary named Esraa Abdel Fattah, who formed a “group” on the popular
Social Networking Site Facebook. She and her fellow activists turned April 6th from a
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localized labor protest into an international event. The Facebook activists, as they came
to be called, triggered an informational cascade, as outlined in Chapter 2.
Abdel Fattah started the Facebook group in mid-March of 2008. The group was
devoted to striking with the textile workers of Mahalla al-Kubra, in the Delta. The
workers of Mahalla had chosen April 6th as the day to go on strike to protest declining
wages and rising prices, and together with other creeping developments in the Egyptian
economy and political system, the strike had the potential to develop into something
much larger than an isolated labor protest. For months prices of basic commodities had
been rising in Egypt at the same time that official figures on the economy continued to
look rosy, and the regime didn’t seem terribly interested in helping ordinary people out of
trouble. Inflation was rampant, and yet the state still seemed determined to forge ahead
with its program of neoliberal privatization (Beinin 2008). In addition, the government’s
heavy-handed campaign against top leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood was reaching a
crescendo in advance of the state’s attempts to rig local elections on April 9th
(McDonough 2008), and the state was still feeling the fallout of its failed attempts to take
over the Nile island of Qursaya (see Chapter 3). Finally, dissatisfaction with the state’s
position vis-à-vis the besieged residents of the Gaza Strip was serving to further
delegitimize the state. The original impetus for the strike lay with the besieged Mahalla
textile workers, but it was only with the bridging and amplifying capabilities of SMNs
that a textile strike turned into a national event…
Within two weeks of forming the group, Esraa’s Facebook organization had
70,000 members, quite astounding given that only approximately 790,140 Egyptians are
117

even members of Facebook to begin with. 86 The idea was for the 70,000 plus group
members to stay home on the day of the strike, April 6th, and it soon took on a life of its
own. In the heavily policed state of Egypt, organizing demonstrations is technically
illegal, and calling for a general strike particularly so. This does not, of course, prevent
them from happening regularly, but demonstrations are generally small affairs, thought of
by many as the domain of liberal and left-wing activists surrounded by blocks full of
black-clad riot police and plainclothes police. Certainly no one could have expected a 27year-old human resources coordinator to serve as the catalyst for an event that would grip
the national consciousness for the better part of a week (Mukkaled 2008). It perhaps
seemed even less likely that Facebook – an online social networking scheme hatched by
Harvard undergraduates just a few years ago, associated largely with American college
students, would be the chosen platform for this massive action. But when examined
against developments in the scale-free Egyptian blogosphere and the innovations in
network theory explored in Chapter 2, the events make much more sense.
The state itself certainly recognized the power of these social tools and the threat
that they represent to the state’s control of information. Shortly after the strike, the
regime undertook a campaign of delegitimization against Facebook and other Internet
sites deemed a threat to regime authority (Darabni 2008). Esraa, who was arrested the day
after the strike and imprisoned for more than two weeks, became a kind of celebrity
within the country, and a cause célèbre for international NGOs. And on a personal level
the state’s intimidation worked, since she emerged from prison telling reporters she
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would not be getting involved in any more online organizing (El-Ghitany 2008). But the
state’s demonization of the strike’s organizers did not seem to succeed in convincing the
political class or prominent media voices that Facebook is illegitimate, that the day’s
events were a failure, or that everything is fine in Egypt. No less a heavyweight than alDustur and Al-Ahram columnist Fahmy Howaidy declared the Facebook organizers
“hope for the future in Egypt.”
Why wasn’t the action on April 6th coordinated through blogs, long the darling of
Egyptian opposition politics? First, a kind of a fatigue with Egyptian blogging has set in,
which is driving the organizing and activity in opposition politics to other places. If you
ask many observers – journalists, bloggers themselves, ordinary people, what they think
of Egyptian blogs, they will tell you that their time has passed. As the anonymous
blogger Sandmonkey told me about blogs having a real-world impact, “It’s rare. We’re
talking three stories in three years.” He was referring to a handful of major stories that
were brought to the mainstream press by the bloggers, who he referred to as “pushers.” 87
And even if they are still sold on the relative importance of Egyptian blogging, they tend
to cite the same handful of bloggers – Hossam El-Hamlawy, Wael Abbas, and Nora
Younis, among a very small handful of others. El-Hamalawy himself calls them “power
bloggers.” Other bloggers link to these blogs, as do newspapers, online media,
international groups, and others. These hubs operate by “providing routing, coordinating,
and information functions that increase the ease and efficiency of navigating the
network” (Matthew and Shambaugh 2005).While these individuals do terrific work, their
importance has made it more difficult for new voices to be heard in the blogosphere. In
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the U.S., the network architecture of the Internet creates a small group of power bloggers
and excludes most other writers from the public sphere (Hindman 2008). There is no
reason to believe that architecture works any differently in Egypt.
This might explain why organizing has migrated from the Egyptian blogosphere,
governed by power laws, to the realms of Facebook and Twitter – the next generation,
while of course free to start and maintain blogs, might find the door to internet fame and
success closed to them in a way that it had never been previously. For an analogous
example in the U.S., consider the success of the left-wing site Daily Kos, which is so
popular that its traffic dwarfs that of even relatively well-read sites in that community,
like MyDD and Firedoglake (Karpf 2008). In other words, the reason we haven’t seen
another Araba3y or Misr Digital is that the previous two sites might be so much more
popular than their competitors that the properties of the network make it exceedingly
unlikely that anyone else will gain such popularity. And while those communities may
have great numbers of readers, there are several reasons why Esraa probably chose
Facebook over either starting her own blog or going through existing ones to organize the
general strike. First, the most popular Egyptian blogs are not participatory (if not
democratic) communities like Daily Kos. This is not to suggest that they don’t have
communities of active participants and commenters, but rather that most have no “diary”
function that allows individuals to generate unique content to contribute to the site. As
Karpf notes, “Community blogs are designed to enable collective action” (2008). So
unless the owner of the blog were to get enthusiastically behind the strike action, it would
be difficult to coordinate the action in that way. Second, while blogs do facilitate the
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formation of ad-hoc alliances around certain issues, they do not make social connections
transparent and easier to use, and they do not lend themselves easily to the formation of
groups. Finally, blogs start off with the tiny number of readers who are initially told
about the blog, whereas the audience on Facebook begins with the number (often in the
hundreds) of social connections you’ve already made on the site, and then multiplies
rapidly through network connections. For all of these reasons and more, while observers
have long been looking at blogs as the predominant medium of online action and protest
in Egypt, there are alternatives that might work better.
Facebook played an important role in transmitting the frames and calls to action
of the April 6th General Strike. It also demonstrated, not for the first time, the power of
SMS and Twitter in coordinating action and contesting the regime’s crackdown on the
activists. In fact, subsequent events in both Egypt and in other authoritarian contexts have
demonstrated that Twitter in particular and micro-blogging in general may play a more
important role in information dissemination and mobilization. Twitter is particularly
useful for short-term organizing and on-the-fly coordination and adjustment. As ElHamalawy argues,
Let’s say we had a demo scheduled in the square, the initial scouts show up, they
see they are detaining people already, they say, let’s move the demo to the press
syndicate, then we receive the updates, then we communicate it.
Not all activists and bloggers agree that all of the action is now on Twitter, though. The
blogger Mohamed Khalid (who blogs as “Demagh MAK” (the brain of MAK), argues
I’ve moved to Facebook because Facebook is easier to write and more popular.
Everybody’s on Facebook all the time. I started 6 months ago, I posted on my
blog and the same time I posted to FB, the comments and the feedback on the
Facebook more than the blog, but I still love my blog, it’s my main thing I do first
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every month. You can write a note in the Facebook, then you tag 30 people and
it’s like a message and this 30 people and open their Facebook in the morning. 88
The Egyptian press gave extensive coverage to both Facebook and the April 6th
movement after the day’s events. International press outlets also lavished attention on
what everyone seemed to regard as a successful strike. However, not everyone agreed
with the assessment that the 2008 strike was a success. Hossam El-Hamalawy, for
instance, who played a critical transmission role from his temporary perch in faraway
Berkeley, California, argues that in fact far from helping the main strike efforts in
Mahalla, the April 6th organizers in fact provided a distraction for the regime, and had the
effect of loading expectations and demands into the moment that were neither productive
nor called for. El-Hamalawy and others warned not to read too much into the strike, and
argued for the continued importance of grassroots organizing.
4.4 April 6th Redux and the Limits of Online Organizing
On the one-year anniversary of the April 6th 2008 general strike, the leaders of the
April 6th Movement, together with the most important factions of the opposition – the
Muslim Brotherhood, Kefaya, and many political parties, staged a follow-up
demonstration. The regime was not, however, caught off guard this time, waging a
weeks-long campaign in the press against the movement and the strike. When April 6th
2009 arrived, Egypt appeared to function normally, handing the April 6th Movement a
serious defeat from which it is unclear whether it can recover. Whereas there was
divergence in the coverage of the 2008 strike, with Al-Dustur calling it a success, AlMasry Al-Youm declaring it a qualified success, and the government dailies trumpeting its
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failure, there was no such disagreement in 2009. All the major news outlets and blogs,
even those who are generally sympathetic to the movement’s goals and practices, wrote
of the day’s events as a failure. However, the failure of the follow-up strike leaves us
with a puzzle: if the same tools were used to publicize and organize the strikes in 2008
and 2009, what are the variables that explain the divergent outcomes?
Observers sought explanations for the failure of the day’s events, and some
agreement can be found. As Mohamed Adel argued, the first strike was tied to concrete
wage demands of striking workers in Mahalla, and to the increase in prices for basic
goods in Egypt that had taken place during the months preceding the April 6th, 2009,
general strike. The absence of any such raison d’etre in 2009 is certainly one
unmistakable explanation for the failure of the strike organizers to galvanize public
opinion and mobilize participation in the strike. As Amr Shubaki put it,
If we remember last year’s General Strike, we will find that some of us forget that
it was called by textile workers in Mahalla, not political activists or party
members, to demand improved working conditions and to raise wages. 89
Shubaki argues that the organizers did not learn the lesson of their first follow-up strike
on May 4th, 2008, and in fact repeated all of that day’s mistakes. He argues that in
meeting the demands of workers for raises in wages, the government was able to defuse
the nascent political movement that had piggybacked onto those social demands.
Shubaki’s comments are consistent with the findings of collective action literature which
suggest that it is the presence of cogent demands that drive protest movements, rather
than new technologies themselves, with their capabilities. The technologies themselves,
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and the youthful, elite organizers of the April 6th Movement, cannot manufacture the
conditions which might lead to widespread protest in Egypt.
Sensing that Egypt’s diverse political oppositions had won at least a symbolic
victory on April 6th, 2008, the regime set about making sure that such a convergence of
technology, demands, and capabilities would be much more difficult to attain if
organizers attempted a similar action. Ironically, it may have been the very success of the
movement in drawing press attention to itself that provoked the state to crack down so
hard. As Hossam El-Hamalawy argues, “They scared the regime about what was going to
happen that day. The 6th of April guys came into the picture – around that time that had
70,000 plus members – and the newspapers dealt with it very sensationally.” 90
Hamalawy believes that it was this press attention that distracted activists from the actual
demands of the Mahalla workers and allowed the state to co-opt substantial portions of
the strike leadership. The test run for the regime’s strategy for the follow-up strike was
successfully executed on May 4th, 2008, when the April 6th movement tried to stage
another general strike on Mubarak’s birthday. The message, however, did not resonate,
and came on the heels of the repression of well-known members of the movement itself.
Between May 4th, 2008, and April 6th, 2009, the Mubarak regime employed three
distinct strategies to derail the April 6th movement – economic, repressive, and
technological.
The repressive end was most familiar, and easiest to execute. The leadership of
the group itself was hounded practically into submission, and many bloggers and activists
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affiliated with the group were arrested. 91 First there was the forced exit of Esraa Abd El
Fatah, one of the founders of the original Facebook group for the sixth of April, from
political life. Kidnapped from her home and held for two weeks, Abdel Fattah appeared
to apologize for her role in the strike when she was released. Her abrupt about-face from
online organizer to quiescent subject set the tone for what the regime hoped to
accomplish with Egyptian youth at large. The regime appeared so threatened by this
movement, and by the online organizers who formed its core, that they needed to crush it
completely. Leaders of the group, including Ahmed Maher and Mohamed Adel, also saw
prison time. The fear that the regime has so successfully instilled in most activists means
that many keep ready-made SMS messages in their phones, to send off to human rights
lawyers, friends and families when they are inevitably kidnapped and snatched off the
streets. And many more young people never bother to join such movements in the first
place, preferring to pursue instead the creature comforts of post-Infitah Egypt. The
strike’s failure was a shock to participants and observers enamored with the
transformational potential of social media. However, a closer look at the strike’s
dynamics, and the actual capabilities of the tools themselves tells us why this effort was
probably doomed to failure, and how activists might more successfully contest the state’s
hegemony in the future.
The regime also dealt capably with demands from labor organizations and civil
society organizations for better wages. The Mahalla workers, though were also brutally
repressed. As the blogger Sandmonkey argues, “As for the real heroes of April 6th, the
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poor underpaid and courageous workers who took a stand that day? Well, they were
never interviewed by the media, or the satellite news networks, never were invited to a
conference, or were the focus of a news piece. What they were the focus on, was the
government's vengeance.” 92 The scuffle in Mahalla is part of a long-running and
intensifying battle between the Egyptian state and the labor sector – with 650 workers’
protests between 2006 and 2007. 93 Egyptian labor is organized under the umbrella of the
Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), an organization that scholars consider to be
co-opted by the state and largely part of the official power structure. Some scholars argue
that even under such conditions, labor has been able to wring concessions from the
government, but overall the labor movement is repressed and suffers from a lack of
autonomy (Pripstein-Posusney 1997). At least some elements of the labor movement are
now seeking to construct trade federations outside the structure of the ETUF, most
recently the successful campaign of the tax collectors. However, while the movement has
seen its fair share of victories, the state has conceded just enough to forestall the kind of
national movement that the Mahalla strike seemingly threatened. Before the May 4th 2008
strike planned by the April 6th movement, the government announced a 30-percent wage
increase, and salary increases were due to kick in this July. 94 Targeted salary increases
have also been used with certain professions (like doctors) to defuse potentially serious
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labor disagreements. 95 So the regime capably executed control strategies on the economic
and repression fronts. But it also lucked into some limits of the Facebook platform itself.
4.5 The Limits of Facebook Activism
What social media technologies help to solve, or at least alleviate, are problems of
collective action and information dissemination (Shirky 2008). Facebook and other forms
of social media, including Twitter, blogs, and photo-sharing sites, lower the costs of
group-formation, group-joining, and information-sharing. In the build-up to the April 6th,
2008 strike, Facebook accelerated the transmission of the strike meme, because the site
connects people with similar interests. As Shirky argues, “Because information in the
system is passed along by friends and friends of friends (or at least contacts of contacts),
people tend to get information that is also of interest to their friends” (Shirky 2008, 221).
They furthermore have the effect of reducing the distance between networks of friends
and acquaintances, and in so doing they can also build shared meaning. What Facebook
did for the original strike group was first to construct, very easily, a symbolic call to
action that allowed a maximum number of people to join with the least amount of effort.
In so doing, the Egyptian state was confronted – almost overnight, since the group grew
from nothing to 70,000 members in a matter of weeks – with what it regarded as a serious
threat to its legitimacy. Whether Egyptians stayed home because they supported the strike
or because they feared going into the streets is an open question unlikely to be resolved
either way.
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But the reality is that at least some sectors of the regime, and many international
observers, regarded the strike as a success and gave a good share of the credit to the April
6th organizers and to the Facebook tools that made their efforts possible.
However, the problems of the April 6th movement in organizing follow-up actions
appeared to be unrelated to both the costs of collective action and the exigencies of
getting the word out. It appeared, simply, that the message of the movement simply did
not resonate with enough Egyptians to make a difference in the larger scheme of things,
and that not enough groundwork had been laid by actual, on-the-ground organizers. The
call to strike on the anniversary of…a strike ... did not seem to strike most potential
participants in collective action as worthy of the risks involved with either taking the
streets or staying home. Those risks are substantial, even if one is predisposed to suffer
for a cause. The action was also poorly-conceptualized. Anniversary actions probably
only might work if the anniversary is of something of much larger significance – which is
not to minimize what took place in 2008, but rather to emphasize the fact that the greatest
resistance took place in Mahalla and that ultimately the whole thing ended with the
regime more or less victorious. In other words, it wasn’t exactly clear what was being
commemorated. With the Mubarak regime having proven that the potential costs of
repression remain very high in Egypt, most young people in the country took the rational
approach and decided that they would let other people make a political statement for
them. And in classic prisoner’s dilemma form, that statement was never made because
the vast majority of people made precisely the same calculation. While SMNs enable
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actors with diffuse interests to come together around a common cause (Hindman 2008),
they cannot necessarily create the cause itself.
To understand the failure of the April 6th, 2009 message, we must first understand
what exactly it was about the message of the previous year that resonated with so many
people to begin with. At the time, Egypt was undergoing price increases for basic staples,
just as the global economy was beginning to take a turn for the worse. So even those
individuals who did not know anyone in Mahalla or particularly care about the fate of
striking textile workers had an access point to the movement’s message, about economic
justice. The increase in the price of bread, in particular, recalled the reason for Egypt’s
last large-scale street action, in 1977. Most importantly, the general strike call was yoked
to a concrete, on-the-ground action – the strike of Mahalla textile workers and their
demands for better wages and working conditions. Without the very real ferment in the
streets of that city, it is unlikely that anyone in Cairo or Alexandria would have known
what they were getting themselves into, or even cared enough to join a Facebook group to
begin with.
It was the absence of such a clear message that led to confusion about the purpose
of the follow-up strike. Individuals were asked to stay home and not to buy anything –
but if they had to leave the house, to wear black. All of this was allegedly to protest the
injustices perpetrated during and after the April 6th, 2008 strike, giving the whole
movement somewhat self-referential. Given that the message of the April 6th Movement
had not reached important sections of the Egyptian population to begin with, basing the
follow-up strike on the events following the 2008 strike was probably not a wise tactic.
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According to the movement itself, the April 6th, 2009 strike had four primary demands:
the institution of a national minimum wage, indexing prices to inflation, the election of a
constituent assembly to draft a new constitution, and the suspension of gas exports to
Israel. 96 The third demand in particular was unrealistic at best, and probably only served
to underline the regime's fears about the movement's true goals. The demand for a
national minimum wage was almost certainly undermined by the regime's success in
buying off sectors of the labor movement with wage increases, making the demand for a
national minimum wage less compelling than it might otherwise have been. While this
was less the fault of the movement than a success for the regime, it still points to the
difficulties of crafting an effective message. Finally, the involvement of demands about
Israel-Palestine probably only served to muddy the waters, even if anger about Israeli
policies is widespread.
There are also important limitations to the capabilities of Facebook organizing
itself. To begin with, Facebook groups seem to engender extraordinarily low levels of
commitment on the part of their members. This should have been understood after the
movement’s initial follow-up action, the May 4th strike, failed very publicly. The
technical capabilities of Facebook – such as the public nature of “status updates” and the
ability of users to change their profile picture to adopt a widespread frame – lend
themselves to the production and dissemination of ideas, but perhaps not as much to the
mobilization of individual actors. The April 6th movement itself understood this, and
boasted a Web presence to complement its Facebook profile, but even these three
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technologies in tandem can't mobilize people without concomitant movement on the
ground. So while the April 6th Facebook page still has [70,000] members, very few of
them are active, either on the group’s message board, or in real-life. While Facebook
offers a work-around for the problem of a small number of famous and important
bloggers controlling the discourse in the Egyptian blogosphere, it is not clear how much
real-world mobilizational potential the site really offers in the long run. A focus on
Facebook appears also to have missed the widespread shift of online dissent from blogs
to Twitter. As Hossam El-Hamalawy puts it, “the migration is not happening to Facebook,
it’s happening to the microblogs.” 97 He adds, “Facebook is one of the outlets I have, but
the heavyweights are not using Facebook.” The heavyweight bloggers that El-Hamalawy
refers to were skeptical of the April 6th movement and its possibilities. As the blogger
Demagh MAK puts it, “The thing is that its just easier to use Twitter than a blog. You are
in the middle of a demonstration and someone is killed or arrested, you can’t leave the
demonstration and write a blog. One is killed two arrested, you can just send it by Twitter
and everybody now knows.” 98 What happens to the information after that depends on the
work organizers have done on the ground, and whether or not local or global elites write
about it.
It is not just commitment levels, but some features of the interface itself that make
it of limited utility under certain circumstance. Particularly at the height of any given
crisis, the “wall” of a group and the main Facebook status update page can be inundated
with messages. “In that flood of data, it’s possible to lose key messages,” wrote Ethan
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Zuckerman before the first April 6th strike in Egypt. 99 Zuckerman also points to the
problem of “serial activists,” who jump from cause to cause – Gaza, April 6th, freeing
Ayman Nour – without ever making any real investment of time or energy in any of them.
However, the day’s failure was due to more than mistakes and oversights by the
organizers – the regime’s newfound savvy disrupting the functioning of SMNs must also
be credited.
4.6 Regime interference with mobile activism
The Mubarak regime has grown much savvier over the past year with respect to
interfering with the efforts of mobile activists, making it much more difficult for
individuals to conduct activism via the traditional tools of mobile phones. For starters, a
sophisticated registration-and-tracing system is in place, making it easy for the
government to track users, interfere with their signals, and to shut down large-scale
attempts to text-message. Another part of the problem is simple financial logistics –
Egyptian telecoms offer no unlimited texting services like those available in other
countries, including the United States. In the U.S. for instance, one can purchase, for only
a few dollars a month, a plan by which users are not financially penalized for the number
of text-messages they can send. This makes it substantially easier to send large numbers
of text-messages, to coordinate far-flung and wide-ranging action, and to adjust plans on
the go. In both the 2008 and 2009 strikes, the Egyptian government successfully blocked
the routes of Egyptian text-messagers. As Mohamed Adel, one of the primary organizers
and leaders of the April 6th movement, says, “In 2008, we used SMS, we used mobile
Zuckerman, Ethan. “Pros and Cons of Facebook Activism.” ...My Heart's in Accra. February 8th, 2008.
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technology to contact all the people.” 100 In 2009, though, the government was able to
block SMS messaging on April 6th.
The blocking of the text-messaging service vastly complicated the efforts of the
organizers, who were already cash-strapped. According to Adel, the movement even tried
to buy text-messages in bulk from India, which cost only $.01 per message, but the
regime successfully blocked these messages as well. Unfortunately, this meant that the
only coordinating mechanism on the ground that day was the micro-blogging service
Twitter, which had previously shut down its text-messaging component anyway. Those
activists who can afford the cost of the mobile web, either through USB internet
connections, or through their cell phones, were still able to communicate and send manyto-many communications through Twitter, but unfortunately, many fewer individuals
have or can afford to do this. Because the regime so successfully anticipated the day’s
events, which had been telegraphed and publicized by opposition forces months in
advance, this left the activists essentially with no capability to execute or alter their plans
after it became clear that the state was ready for them.
Technological problems were not the only thing hampering the efforts of the April
6th organizers. There are only roughly 2,000 full-time members of the movement,
according to one of its founders, Ahmed Maher. 101 The movement also was riven,
according both to its founders and other observers, with a factional split, between Maher
and Adel and between Hizb al-Amal and other forces who sought to take control of the
movement. Part of this disagreement can be traced to decisions made about funding the
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movement- Maher himself is alleged to have sought $20,000 in cash from Freedom
House, an organization believed in Egypt to have ties to the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency. Rumors of CIA involvement in the April 6th Movement crippled the activists’
credibility at a critical juncture. One activist told me that while opposition forces are
happy to accept technical assistance from democracy-promoters, particularly with regard
to new technologies, the acceptance of cash from organizations with known agendas can
be deadly for the public credibility of organizers. 102
In tandem with the clampdown on cafes, Egyptian telecoms now offer mobile
Internet access through your laptop via a USB modem. 103 This is in many ways a unique
and useful service, enabling individuals to bypass the unwieldy process of having an
Internet connection turned on in their homes, an expensive and time-consuming endeavor.
Activists tell me that this connection is quite good, works most anywhere, and is very fast.
However, the process of obtaining one of these devices also falls under state surveillance,
as applicants are required to submit identity papers, as well as addresses and phone
numbers. This of course makes it possible for users to be tracked by the service providers,
and hence by state authorities. Like all attempts at interfering with Internet access, onthe-ground realities offer any number of workarounds, as sympathetic merchants are
sometimes willing to sell them using fake or falsified information. However, as with
many attempts to step between the user and the Web, this step is not necessarily about
perfecting enforcement or stopping the truly dedicated and savvy user from accessing
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content, but rather about placing roadblocks between ordinary users and the information
and communication capabilities of the Internet, the same way that slowing down the load
time of a Web page will deter many users from loading that site at all. The cumulative
effect of a series of small roadblocks or deterrent devices can add up to frustrated users
who might simply accept that there are things they can’t or shouldn’t be doing online. In
other words, the regime may be successfully raising the entry barriers and hence the costs
of digital activism. Removing these individual nodes from a large network can slow
down the information transmission capability of SMNs and render them much less useful,
pace Metcalfe’s law about the usefulness of communications networks growing as the
number of users rises. The Egyptian regime, again, intends not to shut down networks
(though that of course remains a possibility, particularly during short-term crises) but
rather about creating uncertainty and difficulties for individuals who are also persecuted
in much more straightforward and old-fashioned ways. 104 The number of activists willing
to put up both with state harassment and technical interference is surely not as high as the
number of activists willing to engage in this activity absent such efforts.
The regime has also instituted changes in the structure of internet cafes, vital sites
of access to the Internet for ordinary people, which had been critical in both the building
of online public spheres in general, and in the execution of the April 6th Movement in
particular. For years, individuals were able to enter cafes and get online with minimal
interference or surveillance either from café owners or the state. However, café owners
are now required to collect vital information about the individuals using their computers
(whether they actually do so is another question altogether). There can be little doubt
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about the intent of these regulations, and while their effect might be limited in practice,
symbolically the attempt to regulate access so closely could only have a chilling effect on
the kind of writing, dissent, and activism individuals are willing to engage in.While of
course sympathetic café owners still provide access to activists without collecting this
information, it does present an additional hurdle to spreading information freely in an
environment free of the threat of coercion, surveillance, and arrest. The reduction in the
number of sites where free and unfettered Internet access is available at low cost can only
reduce the network transmission capabilities of SMNs and interfere with the ability of
organizers to communicate and execute plans.
Activists also have to contend with the reality of de facto non-generative
technologies. Zittrain defines generativity as “a system’s capacity to produce
unanticipated change through unfiltered contributions from broad and varied
audiences.” 105 In other words, while many internet technologies were designed to be
“open boxes,” amenable to alteration by their owners, non-generative technologies are
more like closed boxes, tied to their manufacturers, and vulnerable to alteration, tracking,
and destruction remotely. Non-generative devices include the Ipod and TiVo. Zittrain
argues that you can think of this as the difference between “contributors or participants
rather than mere consumers.” In the U.S., non-generativity is related to issues of profits
and corporate interest, but in Egypt these questions are more closely related to
surveillance and control than they are to money. Non-generativity is clearly the model
being pursued by Egyptian telecoms and the regime. Organizers from the April 6th
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Movement described what this change means for them in practice – while it is easy to
change your mobile phone’s “simcard”, and hence your mobile number, the phones
themselves contain a chip that can’t be removed or altered, making it possible for your
initial service provider to track that phone indefinitely. In practice, this means that the
capabilities of the mobile phone itself are bifurcated – as we saw with the events of June
2009 in Iran, individuals are still able to access the Internet, either directly or by sharing
proxy servers. However, the shutdown that occurred at a critical moment during the
Iranian events destroyed the capability of individuals and organizers to use their mobile
phones as coordinating and frame-building devices. Individuals with mobile Internet
access can of course still access the Web directly, updating blogs, Twitter feeds, and
other forms of social media communication. However, when coupled with the
surveillance practices instituted by cybercafés and mobile service providers, such
shutdowns add up to a crippling of the Internet’s capacity to serve as an accelerant during
moments of crisis – precisely the moment when they would otherwise be most useful.
4.7 Mobilizing and Coordinating during the Gaza Campaign
On December 27th, 2008, Israel launched an invasion and bombardment of the
Gaza Strip. The Israelis had removed its civilian settler force in 2005, as well as its
military forces. However, tensions remained high, particularly after the victory of the
Islamist movement Hamas in the 2006 parliamentary elections. As a result of the
organization’s position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and because of accelerate
rocket fire from the Gaza Strip into Israel, a blockade of the Strip was enforced by the
Israelis and the Egyptians since June 2007. This blockade was controversial from the
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outset, and engendered widespread resentment in Egypt as well. It was in this
environment that the incursion took place, 11 days after the expiration of a 6-month
cease-fire between Hamas and Israel that had been brokered by Egypt. 106 The war
generated substantial criticism in the Egyptian and global press, and led to the
mobilization of protests against the Israeli incursion and the perceived complicity of the
Mubarak regime. Such mobilization to reflects the same kind of widespread anger that
led to mobilizations against the Lebanon War in 2006, or against the Israeli-Egyptian
blockade of Gaza in 2008. But the battle between protestors and the state also in many
cases reflects the success of the state in shutting down protest against the regimes policies,
which had been causing resentment ever since the government agreed to help the Israeli
government conduct a blockade of the Gaza Strip.
SMNs also became important tools in the building of shared meaning. One of the
most prominent activities on Facebook was the changing of both profile names and
pictures to a first name of “Gaza.” Doing so was a simple and powerful gesture of
solidarity, that in many cases reached out into a social network of friends with mixed or
hostile feelings about the cause of the Palestinians. Blogs and video-sharing websites also
remained important sites of documentation and functioned as work-arounds for a press
reluctant to write about the protests. Youtube, for instance, provides powerful
documentation of protests in Alexandria on December 28th, 2008, in which engineering
students organized against the Israeli incursion. Thousands of protestors can be seen. 107
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The government, however, was loathe to admit to this unpopular policy. The
Egyptian official press cleverly disguised the prohibition against street demonstrations
against Operation Cast Lead. Al-Ahram, on December 31st, 2008, printed a story with the
headline “Angry responses sweep the streets of Arab capitals.” 108 The story detailed the
protests taking place across the Arab world in response to the Israeli incursion. It’s Egypt
section came first, but instead of details about street protests and mobilizations, the story
talked about an announcement from the Lawyer’s Syndicate, hardly evidence of an angry
response sweeping the streets of Cairo. The Muslim Brotherhood was able to mobilize
some protests across Egypt, including Mounifiya, Dimyat , and Fayoum 109 , but overall
the security prohibition against protests was effective in Cairo. Even when protestors did
manage to take to the streets, such as after Friday prayers on January 2nd, 2009 110 , their
success was short-lived in the face of sustained repression from the regime. Outside of
Cairo, though, protestors saw more success. In Alexandria, a demonstration on January
9th included as many as 50,000 people. 111 Reports indicated that security forces backed
off the demonstrators because of the numbers involved. As a direct result of this protest,
the regime arrested 21 members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Alexandria and charged
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them with organizing the protests. 112 Dozens of Brotherhood members were arrested
across Egypt during Operation Cast Lead, as the regime sent an unmistakable signal that
the protests had crossed the line.
Even these limited protests mobilized against the Israeli incursion into Gaza
cannot be said to have taken place because of SMNs. It is impossible, in fact, to evaluate
the actual contribution of these media to the mobilization itself, except by comparison to
similar mobilizations that took place in the past. While SMNs have been used to mobilize
protest against Israeli policies on many occasions in the past, including the invasion of
the West Bank in 2002, the war in Lebanon in 2006, and the ongoing blockade of the
Gaza Strip, it remains unclear whether those who attended the protests did so because of
SMNs or for some other reason. Large protests against Israeli policies have also been
organized by, for instance, the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that has been quite
prominent in its opposition to the Mubarak regimes perceived complicity with Israeli
policies. Most media reports of Gaza protests during Operation Cast Lead credit the
Brotherhood with their organization, and the group was also behind the January 2008
protests against the Gaza Blockade. While SMNs certainly contribute to these protests –
Brotherhood members are active bloggers, Twitterers, and emailers – the group remains a
grassroots organization whose strength is derived from on-the-ground organizing and
face-to-face contact. Another large protest was organized in Mahalla Al-Kubra, the site
of the labor unrest that led to the April 6th, 2008 general strike.
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The evidence from the Gaza episode tells us two important things about the
mobilizational potential of SMNs in authoritarian regimes: first, while SMNs lower
certain collective action costs, it is not at all clear that they lower the most important
costs in Egypt and in places like Egypt. While communication, frame-building, and
coordination carry substantial costs for any organizer, they are much smaller
impediments to large-scale organizing than heavy repression. The precise conditions
under which oppositions might be most successful is a subject which will receive greater
scrutiny in Chapter 6. This leads directly to the second point, which is that the state
makes a determination that there will no public protests about something, they appear to
be willing and able to execute this strategy with a great deal of ruthlessness. While
sympathy for the plight of the Palestinians is de rigeur in most Egyptian circles, the
Egyptian government’s success in keeping protests quiet in Cairo succeeded in hiding
protests elsewhere from most international journalists. And since the government is
sensitive to international opinion and pressure, this can only be seen as a victory for the
state’s control strategy. Elsewhere in Egypt, the large protests successfully executed by
opposition activists provide an answer to the question of whether even a determined state
can entirely prevent motivated citizens from expressing themselves. Even a determined
state, however, cannot stop activists from transmitting information, frames, and calls for
solidarity to international audiences, where they may create pressure on the Egyptian
regime.
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4.8 Internationalizing but not Mobilizing
This mobilization and activation of international networks of human rights activists
can pressure the governments of authoritarian regimes like Egypt and to lend solidarity to
strikers, protestors, and prisoners of conscience. Many of Egypt’s top bloggers travel
frequently to Europe, have contacts in IFEX and the global human rights community, and
either work for or are otherwise active in local Egyptian rights organizations like The
Arab Network For Human Rights Information (ANHRI), the Egyptian Center For
Women’s Rights (ECWR), the Egyptian Organization For Human Rights (EOHR), and
the Hisham Mubarak Center. The networked contacts developed by this relatively small
cadre of SMN activists reaches far beyond Egypt and into the West, in ways that are
sometimes productive and sometimes unproductive (as we will see later with the April 6th
Youth Movement). The blogger and rights activist Mohamed Khaled, who was the first
major blogger to post and disseminate the Emad El-Kabir video to a wider audience, is
also the program coordinator for AHNRI. He claims:
We have connections with all the NGOs about specially freedom of expression,
we are a member of IFEX this is the biggest network in the world concerning
freedom of expression, we have a lot of contacts with other NGOs inside of Egypt
and outside of Egypt, we can make a statement and send to the NGOs friends and
sign it and campaign with us, we campaign with them, it makes a big media
pressure on the government that the government doesn’t listen to us anymore, so
you get some international pressure on the government that would be more
useful. 113
The Internet thus becomes a crucial piece of local and international NGO activism, since
the regime either does not have the capacity or the will to engage in sustained filtering or
blocking of NGO Web sites themselves. This means that the sites themselves have
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become accumulated stores of knowledge and communication between activists and the
international community, available to Egyptians with an Internet connection and to
anyone in the world interested in what’s happening in Egypt. As Mohamed Khaled
argued, “it’s opened the door for us, like if you wanted to speak or talk to the people
through the newspaper, this can be cut from the newspaper from the government, but
there is no censorship on the Internet, we can write about whatever we want.” These
organizations now, as standard practice, compile yearly reports and documentation of
rights abuses, some only in Arabic (the Hisham Mubarak Center for instance) and some
of which are produced and translated into English as well (ANHRI provides some of its
reports in both English and Arabic, like it’s yearly report on Freedom of Expression in
Egypt 114 .
Scholars have noticed this increased internationalization of Egyptian public life.
Ghobashy defines it as:
…the bargaining and interaction between Egyptian political actors and two
specific sets of international actors: foreign governments and transnational
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and advocacy networks encompassing
the international press and media (2008, 10).
Activists on the ground echo this scholarly appraisal. Nora Younis argues:
I realized there was a gap between the activism and the media. Most of the
activists don’t speak English in a way or another there is a communication link
that’s broken somehow, so I started, I had already some of the numbers of the
reporters, and I was SMSing news of who was being released and suddenly it was
this list of 800 reporters and human rights activists, cameraman, lawyers and other
activists and I was sending mass SMS’s. The cell phone and the charger became
the most important thing.
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This is true whether the goal is labor reform or freedom of expression. SMNs
facilitated the transmission of information to global labor networks during the campaign
for an independent union of tax collectors, for instance. Ties between networked activists
like Hossam El-Hamalawy and the global labor movement produced statements of
solidarity and individual letters 115 , like the one sent by a branch of the Northern Ireland
Fire Brigades Union: “We totally support the efforts of the Higher Committee for Strike
( RETA) in trying to establish a free, independent and democratic trade union structure,
to properly represent the rights and interests of ordinary workers and will do all we can to
help make your voice heard.” While the tangible benefit of such displays might be
limited, anything that globalizes the campaign of internationally marginal workers in
Egypt has the potential to raise the profile of the labor movement, which appears to be
happening: Time magazine’s August 2009 story on Egyptian labor unrest details the
struggle for an independent labor federation and features an interview with El-Hamalawy
himself. 116 Support from abroad may also galvanize workers and organizers struggling to
maintain the morale of campaigns.
4.9 Conclusions
In evaluating the evidence from all of these cases, one thing becomes very clear:
There is a substantial methodological difficulty in attempting to explain the impact of
SMNs on protest and collective action in a single-case study of Egypt. There is simply no
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way to isolate the influence of blog and Twitter posts or Facebook groups, on any
individual protest that took place in Egypt between 2005 and 2009. These difficulties are
why the comparison between April 6th 2008 and April 6th 2009 is so important. It is,
methodologically, as close to a natural experiment as you might find in qualitative social
science. In each case, the demonstrations, in addition to being publicized, written about,
documented, and coordinated online, were also organized by existing political forces on
the ground in Egypt, most notably Kefaya and the Muslim Brotherhood. It is clear that
the Muslim Brotherhood has consistently put together much larger demonstrations with
little help from the toolbox of Web 2.0. Organizations with deeper social ties to local
communities and an interest in the issue at hand will continue to have a mobilizational
and organizational advantage over SMNs organized principally around “issue adhocracies” in the sense that the elite, blog-driven protest movement centered around the
issues in question co-existed with a much more organic and well-organized protest drive
by either the Brotherhood or by the labor movement, which possess organizing capacity
far beyond the capabilities of even the most well-connected bloggers or SMN activists.
This is because, during the period in question, the demands of Egyptian SMN core were
quite diffuse and dependent on day-to-day developments in Egyptian politics and society,
whereas MB organizing does not depend principally on daily developments, but rather
around its core of enthusiastic and risk-taking supporters, which it developed through
painstaking organizing over the course of decades.
The data presented in this chapter support the contention that SMNs can mobilize
short-term protest activity and build linkages between groups and individuals seeking to
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contest extant issues in Egyptian politics. Data and interview work also support the
hypothesis that certain SMN technologies – particularly Twitter posts and SMS messages
– have great tactical utility for activists seeking to plan and execute demonstrations, as
well as to contest and avoid arrests. This is true even in collective actions organized
primarily without SMNs. SMNs reduce certain costs of collective action, including
communication and tactical coordination. In rare instances, they may spread information
and frames rapidly enough to instigate an informational cascade, but this possibility
remains to be demonstrated on a scale which would indicate the clear support of ordinary
citizens beyond the educated, urban, Internet-savvy elite. SMNs also facilitate linkages to
international groups and organizations who can lend their voices to public discourse and
agitate for governments and NGOs to contest arrests, human rights violations, and
structural economic and political policies.
However, the potential of SMNs to ignite large-scale opposition activity in Egypt
(and in places like Egypt) appears to be quite low. There are a number of primary reasons
for this difficulty. First, the Egyptian state, while avoiding the high-profile censorship of
the Internet that brings condemnation from outside groups and might lead to interference
with the state’s economic goals, it has successfully made it difficult even to do the kind
of on-the-spot organizing with mobile phones that has received so much press attention.
The difficulties described by organizers in the April 6th movement are indicative of
greater savvy on the part of the regime than many previously believed. In fact, the tools
available to authoritarian regimes give governments great leverage to interfere with
mobile-web-based activity such as Twitter and SMS. The formative cases of SMS146

organized people power movements took place in states which either lacked the capacity
or the will to engage in widespread interference with telecommunications networks. In
Egypt this is not the case – the major telecoms are all subject to state interference and
clearly cooperate with the regime to a certain extent. Making text messages
extraordinarily expensive, for instance, or blocking mobile accounts, can make it very
difficult to use these tools to organize, especially since any individual in Egypt must
connect to the network through one of the major providers, all of which are subject to
state licensure and pressure.
The final conclusion drawn from the data presented in this chapter is that SMNmediated protest and opposition movements must be based on grassroots organizing that
takes place offline. The contrast between the two April 6th strikes suggests that the former
had substantial support and sympathy, because of popular identification with the causes
of the Mahalla strike in 2008, and because of the lack of any such defining characteristic
in 2009. Successful micro-level mobilizations, such as those that took place around the
constitutional amendments (2005), the Lebanon War (2006) the sexual harassment
problem (2006) and the Gaza war (2007) demonstrate that is possible to mobilize elite
support and contention around issue ad-hocracies, and that the tools of SMNs are critical
in raising both domestic and international awareness for these causes, as well as for the
coordination of the demonstrations and dissent themselves. However, there is no avoiding
the conclusion that such movements tend to be ephemeral and are eclipsed by the
structural exigencies of Egyptian politics. Despite the openings in the media environment
detailed in chapter 2, and notwithstanding the very real challenge presented to regime
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autonomy by the judiciary, other openings in the Egyptian political system have been
quite limited. This is partly because the best-organized and most credible opposition
force, the Muslim Brotherhood, is both systematically persecuted by the regime and
prevented from forming a political party domestically, and isolated internationally
because of its stances on women’s rights, minority rights, and most importantly, the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
These structural limitations of Egyptian politics are real and substantially
circumscribe what can be accomplished with digital activism. The material presented in
this chapter supports the theory that both the mobilizing and political potential of SMNs
are context-dependent. However, it is possible that SMNs can have additional impact on
Egyptian politics and the Egyptian public sphere by creating and sustaining public
spheres or “counter-publics” for marginalized groups like women, religious minorities,
and sexual minorities. This chapter argues that the context for the April 6th Movement
was generated by political struggles which took place earlier in the decade. Chapter 5 will
argue that by creating virtual counter-publics for marginal groups, SMNs can potentially
lead to successful mobilizations. It is to those issues that this dissertation now turns.
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Chapter 5
(Amplified) Voices for the Voiceless:
Social Media Networks, Minorities, and Virtual Counterpublics

“Still, it cannot be denied, based on the observation of recent processes of sociopolitical
change, that access to and use of wireless communication technology adds a fundamental
tool to the arsenal of those who seek to influence politics and the political process
without being constrained by the powers that be.”
- Castells et. al.
5.0 Introduction
Chapter 4 explained both the possibilities and limitations of digital mobilization
through Social Media Networks. While they diffuse information quickly and more
efficiently than traditional modes of organization and communication, and while they
lower certain costs and barriers to collective action, Social Media Networks themselves
cannot bring about the revolution. If Chapter 3 explained the impact on the media
environment, and Chapter 4 explained the impact on mobilization, Chapter 5 will explain
how both the collective action and media effects of SMNs can combine to impact public
discourse. The chapter will explain how, even taking the limitations outlined in previous
chapters into consideration, Social Media Networks can impact public discourse and
serve as channels for mobilization for marginalized groups in Egyptian society. These
effects are realized, as in Chapters 3 and 4, through digitally-enhanced networks of
journalists, elite bloggers, and the properties of information diffusion explained in
Chapter 2. Again though, as in Chapters 3 and 4, changes in discourse or even
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mobilization do not necessarily lead to changes in policy. This chapter is crucial for
building theory about SMNs, since Chapters 3 and 4 largely detailed the efforts of
individuals who can be considered elites (i.e. bilingual international journalists, and
educated, Cairo-based student activists). Arriving at a theoretically-informed explanation
of the impact of SMNs on marginalized groups and individuals will help construct a
generalizable theory of Social Media Networks under authoritarianism.
In Egypt, public discourse is still dominated by government-owned or controlled
media, like the newspaper giant Al-Ahram and the TV station Nile Television.
Independent newspapers, discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, have changed this equation, but
the circulation figures still favor the government-owned and aligned media outlets. As
one might expect in such an authoritarian regime, many groups and individuals have
difficulty accessing the public sphere. This exclusion might be due to social factors, as in
the case of religious minorities like Coptic Christians and Baha’is, or it might be due to
the political exclusion as in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood. Whatever the source of
exclusion, such groups have had great difficulty having their voices heard as part of a
robust public sphere. Since the growth of the Internet in the mid-90s, scholars have
looked for signs that the digital world might provide a haven for the growth of alternative
public spheres for such groups, conceptualized as “electronic public spheres,” explicitly
borrowing the concept of the public sphere from Habermas and applying it to the Internet.
They do so in recognition that, as Palczewski argues, “Social movement and
counterpublic sphere theories have recognized the importance of identity creation and
self-expression to the disempowered” (2001, 165). Blogs themselves have long been
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posited as “the voice of the voiceless,” a way to democratize public life and add the
voices of ordinary people to those of the elites. While this may be true, earlier chapters
suggest that those voices are only heard or amplified through critical nodes of elite
journalists and bloggers.
The findings of Chapter 4 indicate that while Social Media Networks can be
important tools of coordination and mobilization, they cannot mobilize in the absence of
grassroots organizing, and they cannot challenge established institutions of
authoritarianism. What they can do, however, as noted in Chapter 2, is connect diffuse
actors with common interests. To test whether these dynamics hold in authoritarian
systems, this chapter will evaluate and explain the impact of Social Media Network
activity on two minorities in Egypt through the exploration of two case studies: the case
of ID cards for Baha’is; and the growth of web sites and blogs dedicated to Muslim
Brothers. The case studies will seek to answer two questions: 1) Are social media
creating electronic public spheres or counterpublics for these groups; and 2) What is the
actual political or social impact of these efforts? In other words, while existing studies
have usually merely documented the electronic activity of subordinated groups, this study
treats such activity as sui generis and seeks to build theories about the conditions under
which social media might alter the material political conditions for subordinated
minorities. Such a recognition does not preclude an appropriate recognition of the
importance of self-expression and identity for subordinated minorities, but argues that in
addition to these important functions, Social Media Networks are the critical missing
variable in explaining the impact of the Internet on minorities. The null hypothesis is that
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whatever their contributions to deliberation and building democratic values (and even
these hypotheses are suspect given recent research by Sunstein (2008) and Hindman
(2008), Egyptian social media practitioners are doing little to nothing to change the
political environment for subordinated minorities like women, Baha’is and Muslim
Brothers. The alternative hypothesis advanced here, is that SMNs transmit information
from electronic public spheres into larger spheres, either national or global, and thereby
impact perceptions of subordinated minorities and under certain circumstances, lead to
mobilizations. They do so, once again, through critical “nodes” of elite blogger-activists
and their connections to the mainstream Egyptian media. The competing hypotheses will
be evaluated against the evidence presented below in the hopes of arriving at an
explanation and building theory.

5.1 Politics in the Online Public Sphere
Since the rise of Internet advocacy in the 1990s, scholars have sought to
categorize and explain the impact of electronic communities on politics and society, in
the U.S. and abroad. One of the most popular subjects of scholarly inquiry has been the
use of the Internet by marginalized groups – diasporas, ethnic, religious and political
minorities, and revolutionary groups. These inquiries are usually couched in language
borrowed from Jurgen Habermas, in The Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere. Habermas defined the public sphere as “A domain of our social life in which
such a thing as public opinion can be formed. ” (1989, cited in Al Saggaf 2006). The
public sphere as it developed in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries was imagined as a
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place where previously excluded groups and individuals could have their voices heard,
through conversations in cafes, salons, and newspapers (Poor 2005). It is this latter aspect
that makes it so difficult to theorize online public spheres as Habermasian public spheres,
especially in authoritarian or impoverished contexts. However, Habermas’s third element,
that “ideas presented in the public sphere were considered on the basis of their merits,
and not on the social standing of the speaker” (Poor 2005, 1) does appear to apply to the
Internet. Theorists of online public spheres are particularly apt to seize on this last point,
since in theory blogs, chat rooms, and community Web sites are open to anyone – both
for formation and participation.
Dahlberg (2001), however, offers a full set of reasons that online public spheres
fail to meet the standards delineated by Habermas. Such reasons include the increasing
commercialization of the digital world, the lack of civility and deliberation online, the
difficulty of ascertaining the veracity of information, and the exclusion of certain groups
and individuals because of unequal access to digital communications. One might add
Hindman’s (2008) finding that the American blogosphere has merely crowned a new elite,
since many prominent bloggers and activists are the graduates of Ivy League universities,
are well-known journalists, or can be thought of in other ways as elites. As chapter 3
demonstrated, however, such elites, through the dynamics of networks and power laws,
can be the critical nodes in the dissemination of information into the wider public sphere.
Therefore this chapter will not be investigating whether Habermasian public spheres exist
as such, but rather whether and how Social Media Networks successfully introduce
Baha’is and Muslim Brothers into the public discourse.
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Other scholars have characterized the use of the Internet by subordinated groups
as “virtual counterpublics” or “cyber-movements” (Palczewski 2001, 165). Counterpublic
theory may be a particularly appropriate way to analyze the use of Social Media
Networks in Egypt. Fraser (1992), defines counterpublics as “parallel discursive arenas
where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to
formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs.”
Counterpublics are theorized as operating in distinction from, and opposition to, the
borgouise public sphere of Habermasian theory, inasmuch as the public sphere itself can
be exclusionary. Asen and Brouwer note that counterpublics have a dual nature – on the
one hand they operate as sites of debate, identity-formation, and refuge from the public
sphere, while on the other, they serve as sites of training and resistance for activism in the
broader public sphere (2001, 7). Ideas of exclusion, oppression, and resistance are key for
counterpublic theory. Thus in Egypt, the study of Muslim Brothers, Baha’is, and women,
can usefully be characterized as the study of multiple public spheres, or counterpublics.
Each group is struggling to constitute identities in the face of powerful state and
corporate interests that seek to impose conceptions of identity and action upon them. And
for all, the digital world of Social Media Networks offers the possibility of, at minimum,
a discursive arena where ideas and practices of resistance can be developed, and senses of
community fostered. As states like China have proven, however, that arena can be
delimited by determined state authorities, and made to be substantially unfree.
Blogs also might offer a kind of updated literary public sphere. Habermas
outlined two kinds of public spheres – the literary and the political. The former emerged
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through the development of novels out of letter-writing, and led to the development of
interiority. Habermas argued that the development of novels in 18th-century Europe
restructured “the intimacy of the private realm,” which came to be seen as “the authentic
space of human existence” (Edgar 36). The public nature of the novel meant that no one
with the means to purchase them could be excluded from reading them. As will be seen
later with the blogging of Baha’is and Muslim Brothers, one of the animating goals of
bloggers from subordinated minorities is precisely to humanize the Other, to allow access
to the interiority of demonized groups, and to give them “an authentic space of human
existence.” At the same time, those blogs offer not only a glimpse into the inner lives of
the Other, but they also provide their authors with the ability to critically comment on the
affairs of the state. As Edgar notes,
…the truth of the public sphere, is realized in the critical examination to which
the public sphere subjects government policy and law” (37).
It was not always thus. Until developments in the 17th century in Britain and
France, it was unheard of for ordinary citizens to have a say in the affairs of the state
(Edgar 37). In Britain, the repeal of censorship laws led to the development of journals
and reviews which featured prominent commentary by noted authors like Daniel Defoe.
Together with the provision of access to parliamentary proceedings in 1803, these
developments led to the creation of the fourth estate – a class of individuals whose
profession was to watch over the affairs of the state and to engage the public, in much the
same way that European legal reform proceeded from “the separation of the private realm
of the family and civil society….from state interference,” (38).
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Today, the public spheres of bloggers become both literary, in their provision of
access to the interiority of subordinated groups, and political, in lending the individuals in
those groups the ability to critically comment on the affairs of the day, to contest the
passage of laws and the injustice of existing laws, and to agitate for better conditions and
treatment. At the same time, the development of mobile networking technologies means
that there are multiple channels of access to the Web itself, making it more difficult for
authoritarian states to interfere with the development of these public spheres. These
technologies “bypass political or business control of communication” and create
“autonomous process of social and political mobilization that do not rely on formal
politics….” (Castells et. al. 2007, 209). This is particularly important in places like Egypt,
where formal politics offer limited or non-existent channels of participation in public life.
Thus conceptualized as virtual counterpublics, electronic communities in
authoritarian regimes in Egypt and places like Egypt can be categorized, studied and
better understood. Such studies can be valuable contributions to our store of knowledge
about democracy, deliberation, and citizenship, among many other important topics. They
do not, however, go very far toward answering the research question of this study,
namely “What is the impact of the use of social media?” To answer this question,
researchers must go beyond reading and parsing the material on these sites, and engage
with the larger context in which the sites exist. Doing that requires tracing debates around
issue-areas, examining the larger media context for signs that Social Media Networks are
generating press attention and mobilization
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A way of framing the impact of SMNs on Egyptian public life would be through
Maratea's concept of "carrying capacity" for public debate. Maratea argues that "the
emergence of social problems results from a competitive process in which claims-makers
vie for public attention by promoting problem claims in public arenas" (2008, 140).
However, traditional avenues of leveling claims in society have traditionally been limited
- newspaper op-ed pages, demonstrations, and the mainstream media. The blogosphere,
however, has been able to introduce new claims-makers into the public arena (what
others might call the public sphere), by offering citizens publishing tools at very low cost
(Maratea 2008, 142). The introduction of new claims-makers often takes the form of
blogs providing journalists with "a trove of available claims" (2008, 147). While Maratea
was writing strictly about the blogosphere, the rise in importance of other Social Media
Networks since 2008 only serves to provide elite journalists with more potential "troves"
of claims and claims-makers. And in authoritarian contexts like Egypt, the carrying
capacity of traditional public arenas is even lower, due to repression, censorship, and selfcensorship. So SMNs might play a particularly important role in such societies,
transmitting claims from groups like Baha'is and Muslim Brothers to elite journalists,
where they reach the public sphere. This study argues, again, that it is the links between
elite journalists and SMN activists in Egypt that explains a great deal of the impact of
these technologies on Egyptian public life.
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5.3 Bahai’s and virtual identity-formation
The position of small religious minorities in Egypt has long been precarious.
While Christians and, theoretically, Jews, enjoy some protections under the law, other
groups – non Ahl al-Kitab (people of the book) enjoy neither protection nor respect in
Egyptian society. One such group is the tiny religious minority of Baha’is. Founded in
Iran in the 1860s by the man now known as Baha’ullah, the Baha’is believe that all
persecuted not just in Egypt, but in other parts of the Middle East as well, particularly
Iran. The growth of the Baha’i community in Egypt appears to date to around 1895, when
a Persian scholar named Mirza Abu'l-Fadl Gulpaygani arrived to lecture at Al-Azhar. A
small community quickly converted to the faith. 117 Over the next few decades, the
community, while still tiny, grew enough to see the National Spiritual Assembly of the
Baha’is founded in Egypt in 1924. Always seen by Muslims as a heretical offshoot of
Islam, Baha'is exist in a more vulnerable position than protected Ahl al-Kitab (This is not
in any way to suggest that the position of Egypt’s sizable Coptic minority or its miniscule
Jewish population is secure). Combined with their exceptionally small numbers in Egypt,
this renders Baha'is quite vulnerable to official repression, unofficial persecution, and all
manner of legal and illegal discrimination. For instance, married Baha'i couples may not
rent hotel rooms, since the state does not recognize their marriages, and unwed couples
are disallowed from renting rooms together (Westerners are often exempt from this
prohibition unless they are traveling with an Egyptian). Baha'is received some
recognition of their status in Egypt until 1960, when they were made to identify as
117

“Baha’i Faith: Early Days in Egypt.” Baha’i Faith in Egypt. June 6th, 2006. http://www.bahaiegypt.org/2006/06/bahai-faith-early-days-in-egypt.html

158

Muslim, Christian, or Jew. They were also prevented from practicing their religion in
public, a serious violation of their religious freedom.
One of the controversies surrounding the Bahai’s involves the issuing of national
identity cards, which for all Egyptians includes a listing for faith. In March 2009, Baha’is
won a long-running legal battle to have their entry for religious faith removed from those
ID cards, arguing that listing the Baha’i faith on the ID card opened the card-holder to a
host of discriminatory work and housing practices. The state on principle refused to grant
the Baha’is an exception, arguing that since all other Egyptian citizens were required to
list their religious orientation on their ID cards, there should be no exceptions for anyone,
since granting an exception would then constitute a form of special treatment. A lower
court ruling in 2006 in favor of the Baha’is was immediately appealed by the government,
and in a rare show of unity between the NDP and the opposition in parliament, the
Muslim Brotherhood and the ruling party agreed that the rules should not be changed for
Baha’is. As Religious Endowments Minister Mahmoud Zakzouk told the Daily News
Egypt, Baha’ism is “not a revealed religion” for Muslims and thus not subject to special
protection in Egypt. 118 In the parliamentary debate that followed the ruling, at least one
member of parliament argued that Baha’is should be killed as apostates. This long legal
battle, begun in 2006, with a number of reversals for Baha’is, including a negative ruling
in December 2006, finally ended in victory in March of 2009, when the administrative
court ruled that they could leave the religion line blank on their identification cards. The
first recipient of one of these new cards declared the Baha’is right to leave that line blank
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“a victory for the citizen and the civilization of Egypt.” 119 It is almost certainly more of a
moral than a strategic victory, since a blank “religious affiliation” line can now mean
only one thing: that the cardholder is in fact a Baha’i.
In the battle over ID cards, Baha’i blogs and electronic media outlets in Egypt and
abroad played a role in writing about, publicizing, and articulating the needs of the Baha’i
community in Egypt. One element of that role was and remains the presentation of Baha’i
identity to Egyptian and global publics, what Asen and Brouwer called the “outward”
manifestation of the counterpublic. One Baha’i blogger described the intent of his work
as follows:
And since then, I didn’t want it to be a blog about the Baha’i Faith, I wanted it to
be a blog about a Baha’i person, what does it mean to be a Baha’i in Egypt. I tried
so much to keep it personal, I tried to comment on the news from my point of
view, not just report the news, and not to go into issues of the Faith itself, it was
not my intention to you spread the religion or tell people about the Baha’i faith,
just about me and setting the facts straight and answering any misinformation in
the media. 120
Shady offers a refrain familiar to scholars who have sought to understand the
motives of popular bloggers – a desire to correct the public record in some way, to alter
popular representations of one’s identity group, and to create a virtual counterpublic that
leaves space for discussion and dissent while hoping to reach a larger audience and to
change attitudes. Individuals who are part of subordinated groups often express deep
frustration at being misunderstood by larger segments of society. So whereas Muslim
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Brothers often express exasperation with being treated in popular culture as fanatical,
ascetic terrorists, Baha’is resent popular misrepresentations of their beliefs in the
dominant culture. As Samir Shady, the author of Egyptian Baha’i, wrote in a 2008 post:
From the beginning of the blog, I was determined not to write anything far from
the basic goal: to present my personal thoughts, as an Egyptian Baha’i…I focused
on correcting mistaken thinking seen on blogs and the traditional media. 121
To that end, Shady frequently comments on media items and statements by
leading figures in Egyptian public life, like the Sheikh of Al-Azhar. Typical posts on such
topics might garner in excess of 70 comments, such as when the author deconstructed an
interview by the Sheikh with Al-Masry Al-Youm in 2008. 122 While the comments reflect
the perils of pseudonymity that make the Internet a frequently uncivil medium, they also
reflect, on occasion, genuine back-and-forth discussion about the nature of Baha’ism, the
position of Islam on non-recognized religions, and other issues. Likewise, the Baha’i blog
“Wijhat Nazhar Ukhra (Another Viewpoint), argued in its very first post in 2006 that it
wanted to offer “another viewpoint to what is published in the Arab media and the
Western media.” 123
The distribution of participation and viewership is not necessarily between many
comments versus zero, as some blogs in the middle often post 10 to 15 comments on
certain entries, suggesting a small, if stable readership. Wijhat Nazhar Ukhra, for instance,
is one of these blogs (although it should be noted that her blog is composed from Chicago,
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Illinois). Shabab Baha’i occasionally gets in excess of 10 comments, though the majority
of the posts on the site receive zero comments. This might be because Shebab Baha’i,
like many personal blogs in the Arab world, intersperses political discussion with other
topics and ideas, including poetry. This lack of posting stability can make it hard to
attract and maintain readership in an information-rich environment. The Englishlanguage blog “Baha’I Faith in Egypt,” for instance, despite quite literate and informative
posts, rarely garners more than a handful of comments. In fact, frequently the site gets the
dreaded “zero comments” identified by Lovink (2008). The posts of Egyptian Baha’i are
thus a kind of focal point for the global community of Baha’i writers and activists
interested in the plight of the Baha’i community in Egypt. Network theory would have us
believe that this is largely due to the advantage of first-movership, but the profiles in this
dissertation also suggest that one overarching reason for the power of certain bloggeractivists is their position in the larger community of Egyptian journalists and international
human rights networks. A small number of individuals appear able to move freely
between these worlds, accepting jobs as journalists while still maintaining blogs and
profiles in the international rights community
Their blogs are therefore a way of forming their identities – both for themselves,
and against the predominant culture that refuses to allow them space for their private
selves. It is also the case that virtual selves sometimes have more power and cache than
their actual selves. Individuals who have no particular power in public discourse in the
real world, or no particularly influential social or economic power, can become leading
bloggers and opinion-makers, at least within their own communities, if not in the culture
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at large. Blogs can also be seen as a way of articulating history for subordinated groups,
which had no official guardian since the National Spiritual Assembly was abolished in
1960. Baha’is in Egypt have therefore been deprived, for decades, of their place in the
Egyptian national narrative. As one blogger wrote, the younger generation knows very
little about the community’s history, and his only knowledge comes from “stories told to
me by adults since I was young.” 124 To be able to blog about their histories, to post
photos and videos, and have those links be shared among a community of interested coreligionists, is of substantial importance in understanding how a community as small as
the Baha’is might come together to articulate their interests against a powerful state and a
hostile society.
The growth of Baha’i blogging in Egypt coincided with the battle over national
ID cards in 2006. In fact it would appear that some were started explicitly to take part in
the debate over that issue. The English-language blog Baha’i Faith in Egypt devoted its
second post to a recap of the controversy. As the author noted,
Because of this recently instituted computerized national ID system in Egypt,
followers of the Baha'i Faith are deprived of their basic human rights, including
admission to universities, obtaining birth and death certificates, marriage
certificates, driver's licenses, purchasing property, obtaining public health care,
employment, obtaining social services, pension and inheritance, travel documents,
etc.... 125
However, as valuable as these web spheres may be to Baha'is in Egypt and abroad in and
of themselves, it is only when claims-makers are able to transmit their claims to national
124

“The Radwan Holiday in Egypt.” Egyptian Baha’i. April 28th,
2008. http://egyptianbahai.wordpress.com/2008/04/28/ridwan_in_egyp/ Author’s translation.
125
“Egyptian Bah’ais and ID cards.” Baha’i Faith in Egypt. June 2nd, 2006. http://www.bahaiegypt.org/search?updated-max=2006-07-09T19%3A01%3A00-05%3A00&max-results=50

163

and international audiences that popular attention is turned to their plight. It is also true,
as Maratea (2008) argues, that high-profile public events can focus attention on claimsmakers. It appears that this was the case with the April 2009 home-burnings in Upper
Egypt, an event that brought international condemnation and re-focused attention on the
somewhat obscure and difficult to transmit effort on behalf of the Baha'is to allow them
to leave their ID cards blank for religious affiliation.

5.4 Power Law Dynamics and Baha’i Blogging
Consistent with the expectations of network theory outlined in Chapter 2, there
are a handful of influential and well-known Baha’i blogs, as well as a small number of
activist-bloggers known to be supportive of Baha’i causes in Egypt. The blogger-activists
include “Living in Egypt Without ID; Egyptian Baha’i, Wijhat Nazhar Ukhra, the Baha’i
blog ring, and others. It is primarily material drawn from these sources that will be used
to develop theory about the place of subordinated minority bloggers in Egypt.
In Chapter 3, I argued that the small elite of Egyptian power bloggers has an
outsized influence in Egyptian politics due to their access to traditional journalist elites. It
does not appear as though the Baha’i bloggers have this same kind of influence, because
of their much more marginal position in Egyptian society than even the most secular and
pro-Western bloggers. But what does seem clear is that the Baha’i bloggers have
influence in, or at least the ears of, the Egyptian power bloggers, and thus second-order
access to the Egyptian journalist elite. Unquestionably the most important of those
supporters is Nora Younis, who has appeared in this project in every chapter. As if to
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underscore the importance of these elite bloggers to the Baha’i cause, when Younis was
awarded the 2008 Human Rights Award by Human Rights First, which specifically
mentioned her advocacy for the Baha’is in the award. The blog Egyptian Baha’i made
special mention of Younis and her efforts on their behalf. 126 Her work for Baha’is has not
been lost on traditional media practitioners, either. Al-Masry Al-Youm Deputy Editor
Ehab El-Zalaky told me,
there is no coverage or negative coverage for this case in the traditional
media…some independent TV stations, but no one knows exactly what this thing
is about, no one knows exactly what the Baha’i people are, some Bahaii blogs
appeared on the Internet, wrote about their religion their faith and their right to
choose their religion, this is the first time you can find this kind of expression of
views in the Egyptian media at all, and on the other hand, many many of the
bloggers are making a campaign to support the Bahaii demands, and they have
designed logos to put on the blogs and they are in some cases they are attending
some proceedings….like publishing a photographs of the stands to support the
Bahaiis and was led by the bloggers, and was led by a very famous blogger Nora
Younis…. 127
Younis and El-Zelaky know each other personally, and that El-Zelaky’s
newspaper, Al-Masry Al-Youm, has provided some of the most extensive coverage of the
Baha’i issue in the Egyptian press, notably sending a reporter to Washington, D.C. to
interview American Baha’is, who were at the time exerting pressure on the Egyptian
government to implement an administrative court ruling that the Baha’is had the right not
to register as Muslim on their ID cards. The article reported an interview with one of
those leaders:
Kit Bigelow, director of external affairs, National Spiritual Assembly of the
Baha’is of the United States, said that Baha’is only demand the government to
126
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Interview with Ehab El-Zalaky, Cairo, Egypt, April 11th, 2008.
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allow them to have ID’s as other Egyptian citizens. She hoped that the
government will execute the verdict so that they can practice their life affairs
normally.
She added that no Baha’i so far was able to get an ID, unless he pretends to
embrace either Islam or Christianity. She stressed that Baha’is will be grateful if
the government would strike through the field of religion, leave it vacant, register
their real faith, or write ‘others’ in that field. 128
Nora Younis was not the only Egyptian “power blogger” to take up the cause of
the Baha’is – nearly the entire core of the early blogging movement that drew so much
international attention – The Sandmonkey, Manal and Alaa, Amr Gharbeia, all posted
sympathetic pieces at one point or another about the Baha’is, with many clustered around
the court decision in 2006. On December 17th, 2006, the Sandmonkey related the story of
a Baha’i man who had to go through a terrible ordeal to get his recently-deceased wife
buried. He lamented, “Stories like this one are not the exception when it comes to what
the Baha'is go through on day to day basis, and things will only get worse for them as
time goes by.” 129 Manal and Alaa posted a link to the protest event including the image
below. 130 They also posted a lament in 2008 entitled “Yes, they will f—k your sister”
which linked a negative ruling on the Baha’i ID file with the imprisonment of Kareem
Amr and the general atmosphere of oppression in Egypt at the time. 131 (It should be noted
Alaa later posted a lament about the focus on minority rights in the blogging community
when the majority was suffering so much as well. As he asked, “Why defend the
128

Izz Ed-Din, Ahmed. “Leaders of American Baha’is demand the implementation of administrative court
ruling on ID cards…and estimate the number of Baha’is in Egypt at 2000.” Al-Masry Al-Youm, August 21st,
2008. Author’s translation.
129
“Today’s Baha’i Protest.” Rantings of a Sandmonkey. December 17th, 2006.
http://www.sandmonkey.org/2006/12/17/todays-bahai-protest/
130
“Waqfa tadamuniyya min al-baha'iyin al-masriyin min ajli haqqihim fi ithbat diyanatihim aw kitaba
(ukhra) fi khanat al-diyanah fi-l-awraq al-rasmiyya” http://www.manalaa.net/node/84324
131
“Ba‘d al-hukm ‘ala ‘Abd al-Karim wa-l-baha’iyin al-kuffar hayniku
ukhtak” http://www.manalaa.net/the_heathen_and_your_sister.

166

minorities if we can’t defend the majority?” 132 ). Amr Gharbeia posted a poll asking
readers “What should we do after the court prevented the Baha’is from providing their
religion on ID cards?” 133 Issandr El-Amrani also added a post about the ruling, on
December 17th, 2006, arguing wearily, “It’s sad to see such a confluence of bigotry and
Gestapo mentality: the Sheikhs cling onto some abstract idea of what’s a religion or not,
while the security types are too attached to their system and too obsessed with religion to
change the system.” 134 Hossam El-Hamalawy also devoted countless posts to their battle
over the ID cards. Before a pivotal court decision in December 2006, El-Hamalawy
posted a call to action in front of the courthouse. El-Hamalawy’s call to action included
the visual frame posted below, which appeared on a number of blogs and electronic Web
sites:

Figure 5.1: Call to action prior to court decision, December 2006.
132
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In one particularly well-known incident, El-Hamalawy, together with Younis and
fellow blogger and Ibn Abdel-Aziz, attended the court ruling, expecting bad news, and
held a silent protest outside the building after the court ruled against the Baha’is (they
would later win on appeal). Abdel-Aziz, in a lengthy blog post on the day’s events,
corrected a number of errors in Al-Masry Al-Youm’s coverage of the event. 135 The
newspaper falsely identified the protestors as Baha’is themselves (none of the four
bloggers demonstrating in sympathy was Baha’i) and specifically argued that Nora
Younis herself was a Baha’i. Such mistakes lent credence to the view that no one outside
the Baha’i community particularly cared one way or the other about the outcome of that
court case itself. El-Hamalawy and Abdel-Aziz both noted wryly the presence of
protestors for the other side, who they presumed were Islamists, cheering when the
verdict was read and treating it as a victory for God. Much as in Younis’ account of the
Sudanese refugee massacre in December 2006 (just weeks away at the time of this
incident), the bloggers themselves offered equally caustic indictments of the behavior of
bystanders and passers-by as they did of the state itself. El-Hamalawy detailed what he
saw as one particularly egregious person’s behavior:
Another veiled woman, joined in the chanting. “God’s religion is Islam! Bahaai’s
are infidels! They are infidels! Allahu Akbar!” The woman then knelt and kissed
the floor. She then stood up, and continued her hysterical outcry outside the court
room in the corridor. “Bahaai’s are the cause of problems in Iraq! They also
destroyed Lebanon!!” she kept on screaming. I had no clue what the heck she was
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talking about, and did not know if I should laugh or cry. It was pure bigotry.
“They are germs in our society!” 136
While the solidarity actions of these four bloggers almost certainly represented a
tiny minority within mainstream Egyptian public opinion on the issue of Baha’is in Egypt,
their protest garnered press attention and helped introduce, as Maratea would argue, new
claims-makers into Egyptian politics, even if the immediate effect is to scorn those
claims-makers and their supporters as outside of the political and social consensus of
society. Maratea’s expectations about claims-makers, together with Drezner and Farrell’s
insights about the journalistic impact of powerful bloggers, seem to come together in this
particular instance – elite bloggers, many with heavy connections inside the world of
mainstream journalism, are able to help introduce the claims of minority bloggers to a
wider audience. International journalists have followed the Baha’is cause with interest,
and wrote positive articles when they finally won their court case in March of 2009. The
Guardian’s Brian Whitaker called the ruling “a small but important step toward freedom
of belief and equal rights.” 137 Liam Stack, writing for the Christian Science Monitor,
wrote a piece entitled “Egyptians win right to drop religion from ID cards.” (Stack, a
personal friend, lived in Egypt for years and has extensive ties with the Egyptian activist
network). 138 The New York Times’ Michael Slackman argued that the case represented
“hints of pluralism” in Egypt and quoted the lawyer who submitted the case for the
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Baha’is. 139 However, as Maratea notes, it may also take a particularly spectacular event,
such as the 2009 burning of Baha’i homes in Upper Egypt, to create a kind of “focal
point” that draws international attention to the plight of the Baha’is, in spite of the best
efforts of SMN activists inside and outside of the country. Therefore, the Baha’i case
appears to provide evidence for the hypothesis that SMNs can provide access to the
public sphere for marginalized groups in authoritarian countries.

Figure 5.2: Nora Younis and another blogger hold enlarged copies of a Baha’i ID
card in protest against an Administrative Court ruling upholding the government’s
right to deny cards to Baha’is who refuse to select Islam, Christianity or Judaism as
their religion. December 16th, 2006.
The reactions of observers in the courtroom, suggest that Bahai’s have not, in
Egyptian political and social discourse, achieved the kind “authentic space of human
existence” provided by the existence of a literary or political public sphere. Denied access
139
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to normal life in a political system whose channels for participation are already limited,
Baha’is are easily demonized and othered by accusations of heresy by Muslims. In Egypt,
Islamist researchers have charged that Baha’ism is a “Zionist movement aiming to spread
corruption and immorality.” 140 The use of the common trope that Baha’is serve Zionist
goals, from the pen of the Sheikh of Azhar, Dr. Mohamed Sayed Tantawi, is a staple of
anti-Baha’i discourse from Egypt to Iran, where the group is even more persecuted. By
lumping them together with Zionists, Baha’i detractors are able to dehumanize them. This
is not to say, of course, that Baha’is don’t have their defenders in the media. As Ahmed
Abd El-Maki wrote for Al-Masry Al-Youm about a draft law that would have essentially
criminalized Baha’ism, “an assault on the Constitution and an attack on Egypt’s
reputation.” 141
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Figure 5.3: An Egyptian national ID card with a “blank” for religion. Courtesty of
Egyptian Baha’i.
Whatever the cause, it is unquestionable that the cause of the Baha’is has become
part of serious public discourse in Egypt. Since little has changed in regards to the
position of Baha’is in public life since the 1952 revolution, causality must be attributed to
a combination of SMNs and the mid-decade political ferment in the country. This can be
seen simply from the chart below, which tracks the number of stories in the Egyptian
press about Baha’is. It can also be seen in the evolution of public discourse on the issue.
In 2005, for instance, one of the few mentions of the Baha’is was in Rose Al-Yusef, which
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derided opposition candidate Ayman Nour as “Ghazil al-Baha’iyin, al-Aqbat, , al-Sa‘idi”
(The Courter of Baha’is, Copts, and Saidis) 142 . :
2005: 7
2006: 87
2007: 45
2008: 84
2009*: 233
*As of October 23rd, 2009.
By 2009 the Baha’is had a number of supporters in the press, who wrote
frequently for liberal outlets like Al-Masry Al-Youm and El-Badeel. In 2009, indeed, two
of Egypt’s power bloggers were in fact working for Al-Masry Al-Youm, giving the
Baha’is two prominent voices inside the newsroom of the most powerful and influential
opposition newspaper in Egypt. Such independent media outlets are of particular
importance, since government press outlets still frequently feature attacks on Baha’is.
The most frequent argument is that Baha’is are “enemies of Islam” and that focusing on
their plight distracts from other, more important tasks for the Egyptian state. 143 Other
state outlets frequently lump Baha’is in with “apostates of Islam” during attacks on the
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West or Zionism. 144 And advocacy groups, in the form of either diasporas (i.e. Coptic
Christians in the U.S.) or co-religionists. While there are at most a few thousand Baha’is
in Egypt, there are many more in the U.S., with their own lobbying arm in Washington
D.C. Other religious NGOs have appealed to U.S. President Barack Obama to raise the
issue of human rights for Baha’is and Coptic Christians 145 . The work of such groups
serves to amplify the domestic claims of local actors, and to increase the carrying
capacity of the Egyptian public sphere.

5.5 SMNs and The Muslim Brothers
As one of the most popular political and social organizations in Egypt, the
Muslim Brothers occupy a radically different position in Egyptian public life than the
Baha'is. However, the decades-long political persecution of the Muslim Brothers is quite
well-documented, punctuated by a pattern of repression followed by periodic reintegration into public life that has been repeated several times even before the coup that
brought the Free Officers to power in 1952. The pattern has been repeated so many times,
in such a similar fashion, that the Brothers can not be conceptualized as part of normal
political life in the country; rather, the group has occupied a precarious perch in both civil
society and the public sphere, operating on the margins, its leadership hounded into
submission, and its young members expecting to serve prison time at some point. In LustOkar’s “divided structure” of political contestation (Lust-Okar 2007), the Brotherhood
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has found itself both on the inside and outside, but more often the latter. This repression
has taken place in spite of widespread scholarly agreement that both the leadership and
membership of the Muslim Brotherhood adheres to democratic values and expresses
adherence to the norms of electoral participation (Harnisch and Mecham 2009;
Aclimandos 2007; Leiken and Brooke 2007; Shehata and Stacher, 2006).
Lust-Okar provides one possible explanation for the Brotherhood’s moderation,
and the moderation of more radical groups in general. Her theory extends the typical
typology of inclusion/exclusion to encompass relations between opposition groups in
authoritarian societies. Societies in which all opposition groups are either excluded or
included in the political system are termed “unified” structures of contestation, whereas
regimes which include some (typically moderate) opposition forces and exclude other
(typically more radical) groups feature “divided structures of contestation.” The included
groups therefore have incentives to preserve their own prerogatives and perquisites
within the system. (In important ways this formulation seems quite similar to Brownlee’s
argument that dominant parties unite fractious oppositions and create a cohesive “in
group” that can withstand outside challenges). In situations of prolonged economic crisis,
included moderates will side with the regime against excluded radicals, and neither
opposition group will be able to press its demands with the state. With some variations
depending on the situation, this is how the Mubarak regime has been able to so
successfully exclude the Brotherhood – by including other opposition groups in the
formal political system, and by refusing to distinguish, rhetorically, between the
Brotherhood and the more violent, anti-system groups like the Islamic Group.
175

The Brotherhood has surely sensed that it is a group on the outside looking in,
despite its popularity, and that to win inclusion in the system, it would have to moderate
its platform and core beliefs, granting leadership to reformist moderates like Khairat elShater. This is the advice the group has been getting from Western scholars and
strategists for years, and it is behind the group’s willingness, even eagerness to meet with
anyone visiting the country – scholars, journalists, graduate students, undergraduates.
This strategy, however successful it has been in convincing scholars that the group’s
behavior has been altered, has not been successful in winning a change in the long-term
stance of the regime vis-à-vis the organization, indicating that the regime was never
interested in the ideological makeup of the Brotherhood per se, but rather that it has
always seen it as the most threatening competitor for executive power in the system. The
regime, therefore, will likely adapt to seek ways to exclude the Brotherhood no matter
what ideological stance it strikes – just as moderate secular groups like Ghad Party are
persecuted even though, or perhaps because, they are clearly committed to the rules of
electoral democracy.
As part of its campaign of normalization both inside and outside of Egypt, the
Muslim Brotherhood, an organization with a well-developed grassroots presence, also
features a diverse network of Social Media sites, including comprehensive Web sites in
English and Arabic, Ikwhanweb3 and Ikhwanonline4. While the Brotherhood was a late
entrant into the medium of blogging, which was dominated in the early days by secular
bloggers writing in English, the organization’s bloggers soon became influential both
inside and outside the organization (Lynch 2007), with the young, networked blogging
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corps having a substantial effect on internal debates in the organization. As Lynch argues,
“In each of the major political controversies surrounding the Brotherhood in recent years,
the bloggers have taken an active role" (2007). Lynch argues that the young brothers
were particularly influential in the debate surrounding the release of the Muslim
Brotherhood’s party platform in the fall of 2007. This platform was released in the
context of renewed confrontation between the regime and the organization, as the MB
appeared to be making great efforts toward becoming a normalized political party
(Hamzawy 2007). However, to the disappointment of the organization’s young Cairobased youth (as opposed to the more conservative youth elsewhere), the draft party
platform contained a number of provisions that set off alarm bells for democratic
observers. Notably, the platform called for the implementation of Islamic law, prohibited
women and Copts from assuming the presidency, and refused to contemplate a separation
between a MB political party and the organization itself (Hamzawy 2007). The element
of the platform that was most at odds with the spirit of democratic practice was the idea
that senior scholars in the organization might have the power to veto legislation that was
deemed to be at odds with Islamic Law. Taken together, these elements pointed to a
Muslim Brotherhood in turmoil, which refused to take the necessary steps to mollify
observers within the regime or potential external patrons. The document appeared to
please precisely no one, particularly the young bloggers, who attacked it and debated one
another about the direction the organization should take. However, Lynch notes that even
in this internal debate, it is not at all clear that the young bloggers were victorious (Lynch
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2007), inasmuch as the platform itself was not received well by more important and
powerful forces in Egyptian society and international observers.
The bloggers, which are tolerated and even encouraged by the senior leadership,
do not appear to take direct orders from the organization. Mohamed Habib was
circumspect on this point in an interview, refusing to say whether the organization’s
bloggers were or were not under control:
Of course bloggers have a role, first they convey the ideas and actions of the
brotherhood to others, which gives us a better image, second they analyze
anything bad said against the brotherhood, and they say it from their own point of
view and in their own way. 146
Or as one young MB activist told me, “The bloggers can’t be brought under control.” 147
However, despite this enthusiasm, it isn’t clear that the more liberal bloggers in the MB
are positioned to take control of the organization. The leadership structure of the
organization remains opaque. Bloggers finding their voices within the organization may
yet turn out to be an important element of internal reform, but as of yet its impact has yet
to be demonstrated. More important still are the organizations two substantive Web sites,
which provide commentary, news articles, and hypermedia content for interested
observers. The English-language Web site is a particularly important resource for
international observers, and the organization goes to great lengths to develop journalists
for these sites as well as to provide its editors with the resources to maintain them. It is
also worth noting that a number of bloggers affiliated with the Brotherhood also double
as journalists for the site. As Ikhwan Web editor Khaled Hamza says, “Around 10
146
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bloggers work with us, such as Abdel Rahman Monsour…they are much more flexible
than other journalists.” 148 Even these activities, however, are unsafe for members of the
organization. Hamza was sent to prison in 2008 for nearly two months 149 for his
stewardship of the site, and the site’s offices have been repeatedly raided by security
forces. However, there is evidence that other electronic activities undertaken by members
of the organization have had a more concrete impact.
One of the most important roles of both blogs, the Web sites, and other SMNs,
according to the practitioners themselves, is to reach international audiences with word of
oppression against the Muslim Brotherhood. While domestic press outlets now routinely
write about the state’s treatment of the Brotherhood and its leaders, it can still be difficult
to change deeply entrenched beliefs about the goals and intentions of the group. As
Abdul-Rahman Monsour argues, “The government in Egypt doesn’t want any
government in Europe, western or anything to know what’s going on in Egypt, and
we….explain what we are doing in Egypt.” 150

5.6 Muslim Brothers, Power Bloggers, and Social Networks
Importantly, the most prominent Brotherhood bloggers and SMN activists are
either current or former journalists themselves, giving them critical social network
connections into the world of elite Egyptian journalism. One of the most notable of these
journalists is Abdel Monam Mahmoud, who has been profiled a number of times.
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Mahmoud began his blog in 2006, and called it Ana Ikhwan, which translates as “I am a
Muslim Brother.” Monam told me that he began his blog because he wanted people to
understand more about ordinary members of the Muslim Brotherhood – that they weren’t
book-banning, movie-hating fanatics, but largely ordinary people who went to the cinema,
worked normal jobs, and had the same dreams, fears, and hopes as other Egyptians. 151
His rationale for beginning a blog was remarkably similar to Samir Shady’s reasons for
blogging about Baha’is: at heart, theirs is a project of political and social normalization,
and of counteracting what they see as popular stereotypes about their respective groups.
The Brotherhood bloggers have drawn a great deal of attention, but SMN activists
have also played an important role in transmitting information about the trials of Muslim
Brotherhood leaders in 2007-2008. Family members began blogs dedicated to their
imprisoned loved ones, which became sites of contestation and dissent, as well as online
platforms to coordinate action for release. One particular clearinghouse of information
was the blog Ensaa!, which translates as “Forget!”. Ensaa published accounts of all
sessions of the military tribunals, by various authors including Abdel Monam Mahmoud
and other activists. These pages-long diaries included blow-by-blow accounts of the
day’s goings on, as well as analysis and commentary. The blog itself typically featured
text accounts and occasionally embedded photographs, as well as sidebars reproducing
popular slogans and frames 152 and the main Ikhwan site, both of which published
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accounts of the trial by Ahmed Abdel Fattouh and others. Fattouh described how he was
able to gain access to the trials, even though journalists were banned from entering:
In the military court, only one journalist can enter, that journalist is me. And I
enter like I am one of the family of these people and if they knew I was a
journalist I would be under arrest. 153

Figure 5.4: The link on Ensaa! to a recap of the 29th session of the
military trials of 40 senior members of the Muslim Brotherhood. The
site features links to all 66 sessions.
Fattouh claims that journalists from international news organizations frequently
relied on his accounts of the trials for their reporting. As he told me, “all the journalists in
every newspaper take from us to publish, because you don’t have any….not newspapers
only, like Reuters, BBC, etc., they call me after the session.” 154 International news
coverage of the trials appeared sympathetic to the imprisoned leaders of the group; while
news reports often hedged about the goals of the organization, they seemed to be careful
to note extraconstitutionality of the trials themselves, and to seek out family members and
others for comment 155 . Even briefer items tended to note that observers believed the trials
to be unfair. 156 Fattouh’s presence inside the courtroom surely had something to do with
the positive coverage, and at the least prevented the regime from running the trials
without any journalists having firsthand access. International reporters have continued,
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since the trials, to publish sympathetic articles about the Brotherhood, and to note
repression of its activists and even bloggers – in fact the arrest of bloggers gets greater
press attention than other forms of arrest, even when the bloggers appear to have been
arrested for reasons other than their electronic activism. This was the case in April 2009,
when the blogger Abdel Rahman Fares was arrested for distributing materials in support
of the April 6th General Strike. 157
In 2007, the government commenced trials for 40 prominent members of the
Brotherhood on charges of corruption. The trials took place in military courts, part of the
state of emergency that has remained in force in Egypt since the assassination of Sadat in
1981. While the state has certainly faced threats from terrorism, particularly during the
bloody confrontations between the state and armed Islamists in the 1990s, it is clear that
the use of the law, and the relegation of MB trials to military courts is for “political as
opposed to security reasons” (Kassem 2004, 38). Members of the Brotherhood
themselves believe they were targeted at this time because high-ranking officials were
beginning to sound more plausible to Western states – with the organization rhetorically
emphasizing its commitment to democracy. As Zahra el-Shater told a reporter in 2008,
“My father was taken because he was moderate and liked to open dialogue with Western
people, with American people.” 158
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Figure 5.5: Electronic banner supporting the release of Khairat el-Shater.
The government’s strategy rests on convincing the international community that
the consequences of handing power over to the Brotherhood could be dire (Kassem 2004,
188). This became particularly true in the aftermath of 9/11, and even more so after the
election of Hamas in Palestine, when the Bush Administration appeared to substantially
back away from its democracy-promotion activities due to fears that the scenario could
be repeated in Egypt. As one of the lynchpins of the geopolitical status quo between the
Arab world and Israel, there has been very little pressure from the U.S. and its allies to
give the Muslim Brotherhood a bigger political role in the region. The government also
appeared threatened due to the strong showing of the Brotherhood in the 2005
parliamentary elections and the well-regarded performance of Brotherhood MP’s in
parliament, who became well-known for their stances against corruption and human
rights violations within Egypt (Shehata and Stacher, 2006). While the group’s stance on
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (which calls for the abrogation of the 1978 Camp David
accord between Egypt and Israel) would likely still prevent the group from being
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embraced by the international community, the regime was unwilling to take that chance,
especially since the reformist leadership, including el-Shater himself, had made
statements in the past indicating a more accommodationist stance toward the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. If the MB were to adopt a more moderate tone on the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, it would remove the Mubarak regime’s rationale for continued
repression, at least as far as Washington is concerned. A change in administrations in
Washington D.C. appears to have done little to change the calculus that the status quo is
more important than risking a transference of power to the Muslim Brotherhood, and
democracy promotion in the region in general, and Egypt in particular, has suffered.
Ultimately, the efforts of activists and bloggers were not enough to offset the
regime’s goal of punishing the Muslim Brotherhood in advance of elections, and of reestablishing hegemony over the group in the wake of its strong 2005 parliamentary
showing. While 15 of the 40 defendants were acquitted, many more received significant
prison time, including 7 years for Khairat el-Shater, the group’s deputy chairman, 5 years
for five defendants, and 3 years in prison for 13 others. Others were sentenced in
absentia. 159 Despite some mild protestation from the Bush Administration, relations with
the United States were never at stake over these trials. Had they been, as Brownlee and
others argue, it is possible that the regime might have been more careful with the
extraconstitutional element of the trials. Even in defeat, however, SMNs transmitted
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frames of dissent and served as outlets for dissatisfaction with the heavy sentences given
to the group’s leadership.

Figure 5.6: Electronic frame posted to the Ensaa! website as well as many other
Brotherhood blogs decrying the sentences handed out to Muslim Brotherhood
leaders after the April 2008 verdicts.
The English-language site, as noted earlier, is of particular importance to international
audiences. As Khaled Hamza put it in an interview, “Interaction from inside Egypt is
very small, but we had a lot interaction from American readers and western websites like
CNN and BBC and Washington Post.” 160 The site is probably the best existing resource
for reporters not based directly in Cairo, or for reporters in Cairo with limited Arabic
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capabilities. It also appears that Brotherhood SMN activists have had a great deal of
influence on the writing of international human rights reports detailing regime violations
of rights, particularly of members of the Brotherhood. As Abdel Rahman Monsour told
me, “The torture issue, you would find out that the reports that came up on Ikhwan web
were used by international organizations like amnesty and human rights watch…to come
up with reports talking about human rights in Egypt. 161 The state has taken particular
notice of this, seeking to prevent the transmission of human rights violations to
international actors by using both traditional brute-force repression (Monsour himself
was arrested for recording the activities of security forces in his hometown 162 ) and more
sophisticated measures, like tracking mobile users through their cell phones. As alShammi argued, the mobile phone and its information-transmission capability is “kind of
their own nightmare.” Or as Mohamed Habib put it,
It definitely makes it harder for the state to impose a blockade on us….Of course,
they try to confine them and to prevent them from communicating with others and
to reach the world, and we use these technologies to prevent this and to help the
group reach the world and to reach the media. 163
Electronic activists also play a role in humanizing members of the Brotherhood,
allowing access to their interiority, in the terms of Habermas. Social Media websites like
Facebook are one locale for this kind of activity. The imprisoned MB leader Khairat elShater maintains a Facebook page with 655 “fans” (individuals who identify as followers
of el-Shater by clicking a link on Facebook). The page includes information about elShater and a link to his Web site, maintained by his son Saad El-Shater. The younger el161
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Shater posted frequent pieces of poetry, reminscenses of his father, and calls to action on
the site. In so doing, for the readers, el-Shater became neither the caricature presented by
the state media, nor the revered leader of the organization, but rather an ordinary man and
father being subjected to extraordinary repression for his political and social beliefs. Still,
el-Shater’s plight never garnered as much attention in the elite Egyptian blogosphere as
did the jailings of other Muslim Brothers.

Figure 5.7: Early photo of Khairat el-Shater posted by his son on the latter’s
birthday.
In other cases, SMNs helped create focal points and frame alignments for
agitating around imprisoned Brotherhood leaders or activists. When Khaled Hamza, the
editor of Ikhwanweb, was arrested in 2008, bloggers came to his defense across the
political spectrum, including the radical socialist El-Hamalawy. Bloggers posted these
pictures in posts and sidebars:
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Figure 5.8: Electronic banners calling for the release of Ikhwan Web editor Khaled
Hamza.
These focal points effectively solved the coordination problem inherent in trying
to arrive at agreed-upon frames without leadership. They also posted information and
accounts of his arrest. Nearly all of the A-list bloggers – Demagh, The Arabist,
3Arabawy, Egypt Watchman (who played a critical role in the Al-Qursaya case), and
others, posted calls for Hamza’s release, and reposted one of the above pictures
(depending on primary language). These posts served to unite the Egyptian blogosphere
around the essential injustice of Hamza’s arrest. As Snow et. al., would argue, this is a
process of frame alignment, wherein discrete actors with diffuse interests unite around a
common cause.
Hamza’s arrest subsequently became not the arrest of another Brotherhood leader,
but of someone who the community of bloggers explicitly identified with, and his
188

freedom was linked to the general practices of Egyptian authoritarianism, or as ElHamalawy frequently puts it, “Mubarak’s Gulag.” 164 But before we grant the
technologies themselves with the frame-making power, we should return to an
understanding and appreciation of the importance of social networks. Hamza was, on ElHamalawy’s admission, a “friend.” He is personally friendly with the Cairo journalist
elite, since many of Hamza’s writers were young, college-educated, and traveled between
the MB world and the world of other media outlets. Hamza’s case and the agitation
around it seems remarkably similar to the campaign to free Abdel Monam Mahmoud,
Ana Ikhwan, who was jailed, either for blogging or for his political activities. As The
Sandmonkey revealed in an otherwise acerbic post, Mahmoud was friends with the power
bloggers, and not surprisingly, his arrest launched a movement “Free Monam,” replete
with a Website, elite blog support, and international coverage. The campaign reached the
Global Voices platform, and was cross-posted on the Free Kareem site, dedicated to the
secular blogger Kareem Amer. Unfortunately, the Free Monem site is no longer
operational and all that remains are the links and banners on other sites. What is clear
though, is that the social network connections of the arrested matter when analyzing
whether a campaign for their freedom takes place – particular attention seems to be paid,
both in the Egyptian blogosphere and internationally, for journalists and bloggers,
whereas ordinary members of the MB receive much less attention for their plight, in spite
of electronic presence like el-Shater’s family Web site. The point is that social network
connections appear to play a determinative role in coverage by elite bloggers – in other
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words networks don’t just change the diffusion dynamics of information, but help
determine which information travels along those networks to begin with.

5.7 Conclusions
The preceding evidence can be divided into two types: evidence of communitybuilding, frame-alignment and identity-formation at the group level, and evidence of
SMN-led information transmission. The former process fits well with existing
understanding in the literature about the way the Internet is used as a discursive arena for
groups seeking to contest hegemonies. Generally we might theorize this process in the
following way:
Frame-alignment Æ Claim-making Æ SMN activist Æ National/Global public sphere
In nearly every case, it is ultimately the networked access to the Egyptian and
international public spheres that explains any impact by the electronic public spheres of
subordinated Egyptian minorities. This project does not seek to contest arguments about
the importance of identity-creation in virtual counterpublics, nor about the value of
discursive spaces free of oppression by majority groups or state or corporate entities.
Such spaces, should they be accessible to more individuals, could be crucial sites of
dissent. It does, however, make an argument about the relative importance of discursive
arenas versus networked access to the broader public sphere. In other words, as Chapter 2
argued, information does not diffuse in a vacuum – the socially well-connected are more
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likely both to diffuse politically relevant information, and to have an effect on their
listeners.
The observations in this chapter also lend further credence to the ideas of network
theorists like Watts and Shirky, who argue that the Internet is organized according to
power laws, and that a small number of Web sites (and thus the owners of those Web
sites and their content) acquire an enormous amount of power and prestige. This is true
not just for Egypt’s “power bloggers,” whose migration to new sites and platforms can
cause hundreds or even thousands of others to do the same (on their telling), but on a
smaller level as well. The site Egyptian Baha’i, for instance, tends to accumulate dozens
or even more than 100 comments on a single blog post – commenting that rivals even the
most well-read and commented-upon blogs in the U.S. – while most other Baha’i
bloggers are lucky to get a comment or two every time they publish new work. This is
not just a matter of confirming theory – knowing that only a small number of blogs gets
read – and who reads them – allows us to better understand the impact of those
individuals on public discourse.
However, the participation of Egyptian power bloggers in the Baha’i cause should
give further support to their critical role in the Egyptian blogosphere in general, and in
the promotion of human rights and rule-of-law issues in particular. The Baha’i bloggers,
while they recognize the importance of their virtual counterpublics in and of themselves,
also see the importance that the power bloggers and their SMNs played in the ID cards
case. As Wijhat Nazhar Ukhra wrote, “I believe that simply calling for this support was
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an important event in the crystallization of the role played by Egyptian bloggers in the
electronic expression of opinions.” 165 She also explicitly mentioned reports published by
the Arab Network For Human Rights Information and the Egyptian Initiative for Personal
Rights (which helped bring the initial Baha’i ID case), which underscores the importance
of information transmission and networking between Cairo-based human rights
organizations and individual bloggers.
In some ways, the evidence lends credence to the “fire alarm” theory advanced by
Hindman (2008). Hindman argues that blogs (and one can imagine the argument
extended to Social Media Networks) facilitate the creation of ad hoc coalitions when
something in the public sphere goes wrong – when public officials or respected members
of the public sphere violate the public trust in some grave way, or when it appears as
though the legitimate interests of the public at large or a small public will be violated. In
both the cases of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Baha’is, coalitions were mobilized not
around the ordinary abuse of power, but around what appeared to be extraordinary
violations of rights and a breach of the day-to-day power configurations of Egyptian
authoritarianism. In both cases, bloggers and electronic media sites were crucial
information gathering and sharing hubs for both local and international journalists. This
is what is so remarkable about the legal victory of the Baha’is – there is almost no
organized constituency for Baha’i rights in Egypt, nor would one expect the interests of
one tiny minority to be adequately represented in such a repressive state. Nevertheless,
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the sustained SMN attention the plight of Baha’is appears to have led directly to the kind
of local and global press attention that made it difficult for the Egyptian regime to
countenance the continued violation of Baha’i rights.
Again though, we run into problems of establishing cause and effect. It is
impossible to ascertain whether elite blogger agitation led to the releases of Khaled
Hamza or Abdel Monam Mahmoud from prison. And there is no way to quantify the
effect of Baha’i blogging on the way the ID card court case wound its way through the
court system. Even if we see an uptick in attention to these issues in the Egyptian or
international press, we cannot say for sure that it is due to the efforts of Baha’i or Muslim
Brotherhood bloggers, or to the effects of elite blogger agitation through SMNs. What
this project can do, however, is build on theorizing in places with better available data on
social networking, like the U.S., and build on the data that has been presented – the fact
that Egyptian journalists do appear to read blogs, that they report stories that first appear
on the blogs, and that the same small handful of bloggers is cited again and again in
interviews for this project, and in national and international stories about blogs. In so
doing, we can estimate more precisely the kinds of authoritarian contexts that are likely
to see an impact from blogging, and what contexts are likely to see bloggers writing in
vain, or having their activities restricted to identity-building and counter-public-forming.
Chapter 6 now seeks to apply this theory to other authoritarian contexts.
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Chapter 6
Cascades, Colors, and Contingencies:
Social Media Networks and Authoritarianism in Global Perspective

6.0 Introduction
Thus far this project has theorized and confirmed limited but substantive changes
in Egyptian politics as a result of Social Media Networks. Chapter 2 established the
mechanisms by which Social Media Networks reduce the amount of private information
about the preferences and behavior of other individuals in extended social networks in
authoritarian environments, thereby triggering informational cascades that meet
individuals’ revolutionary thresholds. Chapter 3 argued that Social Media Networks, with
the aid of independent journalists and global rights activists, created informational
cascades that led to media events inside Egypt, restructuring discourses on sexual
harassment, torture, and refugees. Chapter 4 demonstrated the utility of Social Media
Networks for short-term collaboration, cooperation and coordination under conditions of
severe repression, but also explained why large-scale mobilization required either an
external shock or ties to popular grassroots organizing, even in the event of informational
cascades. And Chapter 5 demonstrated the discursive potentialities of Social Media
Networks for groups without stable access to the public sphere in authoritarian societies.
In Chapter 6, I seek to apply the theories outlined in the preceding chapters to the broader
universe of authoritarian societies, engaging the very limited literature on the subject, and
offering some preliminary expectations.
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The most pertinent variables when gauging the impact of Social Media Networks
appear to be the: 1) the capacity and will of repressive forces; 2) the presence or absence
of independent media practitioners in the authoritarian public sphere who can transmit the
claims of elite bloggers and SMN activists (i.e. the open or closed nature of
mediaspheres) ; 3) the mobilizing capacity of SMN activists and 4) the relative level of
connectivity to the Internet in a given society. For our purposes, I will define “high
connectivity” as 25% or more of the population having access to the Internet – anything
below that will be defined “low connectivity.” For Egypt, those forces are as follows:
extremely capable and willful repressive apparatus, a robust if constantly harassed
independent mediasphere, mixed mobilizing capacity for SMN activists, and low
connectivity to the Internet.
For definitional purposes, open mediaspheres are ranked as “free” by Freedom
House, contested mediaspheres are “partly free” and closed mediaspheres are “not free.”
Highly repressive security apparatuses are “not free” in the FH “freedom rankings, while
moderately repressive regimes are “partly free” and non-repressive apparatuses are
“free.” Pertinent rankings for the project are presented in the table below:
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Egypt 2008

Ukraine 2004

Moldova 2009

Iran

2009

Political

6

4

4

6

4

Freedom

(Not Free)

(Partly Free)

(Partly Free)

(Not Free)

(Partly Free)

Media

59

68

66

85

60

Freedom

(Partly Free)

(Not Free)

(Not Free)

(Not Free)

(Partly Free)

Internet

15.4%

<5%

19.7%

48.5 %

8.5%

Access 166

Figure 6.1: Relevant rankings
This chapter will use the measures compiled by Freedom House to categorize
states on media freedom and political freedom. And to best test this confluence of
variables, I will apply the theory to the following out-of-Egypt cases: the mobilization
against the 2009 presidential election results in Iran; the change of government in
Ukraine in 2004, the mobilization around contested election results in Kenya in 2008, and
the so-called 2009 “Twitter Revolution” in Moldova. These cases were selected for the
following reasons: first, they include two cases in which mobilization succeeded in
changing governments, and two in which those efforts failed. These cases have been
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Kenya

2007

extensively detailed through case studies by journalists and area specialists and offer rich
data in the form of first-hand and second-hand accounts of the events in question.
This chapter should also provide a framework for evaluating competing theories
of the durability of authoritarianism. Lust-Okar argues that divided structures of
contestation (SoC), whereby certain groups are included, and certain groups excluded,
from the political sphere, provide more stable means to withstand economic crises. As
she argues, “where incumbent elites have fostered a division between legal moderates
and illegal radicals, moderates become less likely to mobilize the masses and demand
reforms as the crises continue” (2005, 172). While Lust-Okar’s theory was geared toward
economic crises, there is no reason it cannot be evaluated against the political crises to be
explored in this chapter. Brownlee, meanwhile, argues that the presence of a robust ruling
party serves as a channel to satisfy elite demands and leads to regime stability during
crisis situations. Brownlee challenges the idea that “strong opposition movements can
simply push elites out of power” (2007, 206). These two theories overlap partially, but
not fully. Both theories would anticipate Egypt being perhaps the most durable
authoritarian regime under consideration here. They would also anticipate Ukraine, and
Kenya, neither of which had robust institutional ruling parties, as the most susceptible to
unrest. However, Lust-Okar would likely argue that Iran’s divided structure of
contestation would successfully pit Iran’s included and excluded elites against one
another, whereas Brownlee explicitly expected Iran to be susceptible to elite divisions
during moments of crisis. This chapter will seek to provide evidence for and against these
competing theories.
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Unified Structure of

Contestation

Contestation

Robust Ruling Party

Egypt

Moldova

No Ruling Party

Iran

Ukraine, Kenya

Figure 6.2 Party and contestation arrangements in the cases
The theory advanced by this project posits the idea that SMNs are most useful in
short-run coordination and communication during times of strife. It also argues that such
moments are most likely to arise in competitive authoritarian regimes, centered around
elections. This can be formulated in hypothesis form as
H1: Social Media Networks can trigger informational cascades even the tightlycontrolled media environments of authoritarian regimes
They are able to do so because, as Mary Joyce argues, “the networked nature of
the digital world allows for people to communicate and take action outside of – and
sometimes in opposition to – traditional hierarchical power structures (Joyce 2010).My
theory indicates that the networked structure of SMNs – whether on Facebook or on cell
phones – vastly increased the speed of diffusing information, particularly across social
clusters, and also decreases the costs of creating and sharing that information. SMNs
shrink the already-small worlds of human social networks, and reduce the barriers erected
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by authoritarian regimes to open information sharing. they can trigger informational
cascades, as outlined in Chapter 2. Those informational cascades can take many forms –
in Egypt on April 6th, 2008, it meant the swift diffusion of information about and support
for a sympathy strike on Facebook, and then subsequently through the public sphere. This
chapter will evaluate the ability of SMNs to trigger informational cascades in other
settings – primarily during the course of power struggles following contested elections in
competitive authoritarian regimes. I also argue that the technologies themselves will be
unable to ensure the desired change in power, or to affect serious change in the face of
sustained institutional resistance to activist demands. In other words, SMNs are likely to
generate substantial press coverage, and to facilitate protest and organization. Such
linkages are likely to be not just between individual activists within authoritarian regimes
but also between activists and international journalists and elites. This generates the
second hypothesis:
H2: Competitive authoritarian regimes with contested mediaspheres are more likely
to be the sites of SMN-mediated activism.
Where individual moments of mobilization go from there, however, depends on
domestic press environments and elite commitments to repression. Chapter 3 argued that
it was the presence of an independent mediasphere in Egypt that made it possible for
online informational cascades to generate press coverage and contestation in the real
world. Therefore I argue here that countries with independent media outlets are more
likely to be the sites of informational cascades triggered by SMNs. This leads to the third
hypothesis:
199

H3: SMN usage will have little effect on the ultimate outcomes of struggles in
authoritarian countries
If the expectations of this hypothesis are correct, SMNs have little to no effect at
all, we should expect SMNs to play marginal roles in the unfolding of events in
competitive authoritarian regimes. In the cases that follow, I will seek to disentangle the
role attributed to the technologies by popular press outlets from their actual effects on the
ground in authoritarian regimes. Overall these hypotheses are designed to lead to better
understandings of when and where Social Media Networks are likely to generate
successful activism, and to challenge technological deterministic understandings of new
media activism which assume positive outcomes for digital activism. They will also shed
light on ongoing debates in the study of authoritarian durability.
H4: SMN activism is likely to generate greater repression.
In a quantitative analysis, Whitten-Woodring (2009) argues that by providing
sources of information to regime elites, independent media outlets can actually lead to
greater levels of repression. If this is true, it must also be true that increased use of SMNs
for organizing and protest might also lead directly to repression. Therefore, I posit a
tradeoff between the openness of SMNs and regimes’ ability to use the information that’s
easily attainable from them for repressive purposes. We should thus expect repression to
increase in tandem with the success or perceived success of the activists themselves. The
null hypothesis would be that levels of repression are constant.
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6.1 SMNs and “The Green Revolution” in Iran
On June 12th, 2009, The Islamic Republic of Iran, held elections for the
presidency, which turned into what Abbas Milani calls “an electoral coup” (2009, 11).
Iran, an authoritarian regime which is considered “unfree” in the Freedom House political
and media variables identified above, holds regular, competitive elections for the
presidency. The Supreme Leader, and the Guardian Council, an unelected body of
religious leaders, nevertheless possess what amounts to veto power over the candidacies
of individuals, severely curtailing freedom of competition over the executive. The
elections themselves ultimately come down to different candidates approved by the
Guardian Council competing for control over an unusually weak presidency.
Nevertheless, Iranian elections are spirited affairs that engender heavy turnout by
regional and global standards, and which take on many of the trappings of fully
democratic executive elections. In past elections, reformist candidates have been
unexpectedly elected, ushering in periods of hope for greater reform. However, because
the Iranian president possesses quite limited power in the context of the regime itself
(Poulson 2009, 29), those hopes have been frequently dashed, particularly with the
election of Mohamed Khatami in 1997. Khatami was seen as a reformist, someone with
whom the international community, and particularly the United States, might work
(Poulson 2009, 29). While some détente occurred during the Clinton Administration, it is
widely felt within Iran that overtures made towards the United States after 9/11 were
rebuffed by the Bush Administration. The election of Mahmoud Ahmedinejad in 2004
was seen as both a rebuke to the reformers and a repudiation of the Bush
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Administration’s continued refusal to engage even reformist elements in Iran in dialogue.
In 2009, the sitting President, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, battled challenger Mir Hussein
Mousavi for the presidency, in what observers expected would be a close election that
nevertheless favored the incumbent. On election day, it became clear that the result was
bound to be contested, as allegations of fraud preceded the announcement of election
results that showed Ahmedinejad an overwhelming victor. Almost immediately, forces of
the opposition began to organize protests and send reports out of the country via blogs,
videos, and Twitter.
The scenes of protest, violence, and chaos inside Iran captivated global audiences
for weeks. Theatrical elements like the chanting of Allahu Akbar from rooftops (the same
cry that was heard after the 1979 revolution) 167 only served to make the events more
dramatic to international audiences, where sympathies were almost entirely with the
protestors. Millions of protestors took to the streets to demand new elections in the kind
of informational cascade theorized in Chapter 2 and in accordance with the first
hypothesis presented above. The two defeated candidates, Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi,
led the movement, which was dubbed “the Green Revolution,” since many protestors
wore or carried signs, garments or banners in that particular color. The United States
government, while refusing to intervene in the situation, condemned the Iranian regime’s
crackdown on the protestors. 70 individuals were killed in the ferment following the
events, according to movement leaders, but the protestors were unable to affect a re-vote.
Supreme Leader Ali Khameini certified the election in August, and Ahmedinejad
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assumed office for another term as President. However, while protests tapered off, they
continued to flare on and off during the months following the election, as the protest
movement, once awakened, seemingly would not die. With explicitly anti-regime protests
banned, the movement according to the BBC has “…adopted the tactic of using the
relative safety of officially-sanctioned demonstrations on important days in the religious
and political calendar to come out in big numbers and turn the official rallies into a show
of force of its own, with an entirely different and opposing set of slogans.” 168 Protestors
captured Quds Day – typically a demonstration of solidarity with the Palestinians – for
their own ends. Typical of this tactic were the protests that occurred on the day of
Ayatollah Ali Hossein Montazeri’s funeral. 169 Montazeri had been known as a critic of
the Iranian regime. This most recent flare-up took place in December.
What has been the contribution of SMNs like Twitter to these events? As the
Egyptian activist Ahmed Abdel Fattouh writes, one of Twitter’s great advantages is the
multiple channels of access it offers to its updates. Because you can receive Twitter
updates on your cell phone, and make Twitter updates through mobile telephony as well
as the Internet, regimes must eradicate multiple channels of communication at the same
time to put a stop to updates that take place via Twitter. 170 The Iranian regime even
threatened Twitter users with prison if they used the site to disseminate information about
the uprising; however, users continued to rather unapologetically use the site for this very
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purpose. One further advantage for Twitter users is the ability to update the site through
mobile telephones and to hide the users’ phone number. 171 Given the sheer number of
individuals posting Twitter updates at any given time, the regime’s task effectively
became impossible – it simply could not carry out the delicate task of maintaining order
while simultaneously repressing individual Twitter users who numbered in the tens of
thousands. This is how and why Iranian Twitter users became the primary source for onthe-ground updates during the events following the elections. But the multiplicity of
access points to the service is not the only reason it was so useful during the Iran events –
more useful than other tools like blogs and Facebook. Another substantial factor for
Twitter is the service’s filtering and crowdsourcing potential, achieved through what are
known as “hashtags.” By placing the symbol “#” before a subject tag, users can aggregate
posts around a particular subject area, and thus spread information out of network. So for
instance the tag “#greenrevolution” can be used to aggregate posts by users on that
subject – even users who do not know one another and are not connected as “friends” as
you must be for similar action on Facebook. 172 The particular hashtag adopted by the
Green Revolutionaries was #gr88. 173 Hashtags eliminate the need for interested observers
or participants to spend time and energy collating information.
The international press certainly noticed the prominence of Twitter during the
post-election tumult. Year-end press round-ups inevitably mentioned the Iranian election
protests and Twitter’s role therein, as one of the defining events of 2009. One paper even
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called 2009 “The Year of Twitter.” 174 With their own journalists barred from the country,
news organizations relied on the Twitter reporters and their interlocutors for information.
This is in spite of the fact that it was unclear how much Twitter was being used by Farsilanguage activists, since Twitter did not support Farsi at the time. 175 Some reports even
included a reference to the case of the imprisoned Egyptian journalist who Tweeted his
way out of prison, mentioned in Chapter 4. During the initial stages of the aborted
revolution, CNN’s correspondent Octavia Nasr was reading the Twitter posts of Iranian
live on the air. 176 In addition to Twitter, individuals seeking information about the day’s
events turned to Facebook, where groups sprouted and where Mousavi’s “fan” page soon
had more than 50,000 members. 177 International tech elites, some of them located as far
away as California, helped collaborate with Iranians to provide proxy servers, which
avoid the regime’s blocking of certain Web sites and ISPs. 178 As Jonathan Zittrain told
the New York Times, “The qualities that make Twitter seem inane and half-baked are
what make it so powerful.” Zittrain is referring to the very short messages that Twitter
allows users to send, which made it from the start easy to dismiss as a boutique service
that allows people to broadcast mundane updates about their daily activities.
The accelerant for all the press coverage of Iranian Twitter users, however, was
not the Iranians but rather their supporters in the elite global mediasphere, particularly the
British-born American blogger Andrew Sullivan. Sullivan’s blog became a “one-stop
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shop” for all updates out of the Iranian Twitter universe, and gave support to media
claims that Twitter was responsible for the protests themselves, or at least a critical
component of them (Morozov 2009, 9). Sullivan used his very well-trafficked Englishlanguage blog to post update after update from Iran, many simply cut-and-pasted or
translated directly from the source material. Of particular importance were the bilingual
bloggers and Twitterers, who could act as mediators between the Farsi-language
mediasphere and the English-speaking Western world eager to consume bytes of
information about what was happening in the streets of Tehran. In many cases, these
intermediaries were Iranian political exiles in the ever-growing diaspora who engaged in
“flooding the country's throttled Internet and heavily controlled airwaves with news,
videos and insight.” 179 One Washington-based Iranian exile, using Youtube, claims that
more than 500,000 Iranians had seen the daily videos he posted to the video-sharing Web
site. 180 The Iranian case appears to corroborate findings in Chapters 3-6 about the
importance of elite bloggers (domestic and foreign), particularly well-connected,
multilingual local bloggers.
Ultimately, however, the mobilizations against the elections were unsuccessful in
forcing the regime to relinquish power. International journalists and observers belatedly
took note of the inability of the tools themselves to affect actual change on the ground.
Mozorov has dubbed ineffective Facebook and Twitter campaigns as “slacktivism.” He
defines slacktivism as when “our digital effort make us feel very useful and important but

179

Daragahi, Barzou. “Exiled, but still insiders;
The latest wave in Iran's diaspora is tech-savvy and playing a key role in countering hard-liners at home.”
Los Angeles Times. December 10th, 2009. P.1.
180
Ibid.

206

have zero social impact. When the marginal cost of joining yet another Facebook group
are low, we click “yes” without even blinking, but the truth is that it may distract us from
helping the same cause in more productive ways” (Mozorov 2009). As The Daily
Telegraph’s Will Heaven noted in an acerbic December op-ed, “There has been no
revolution in Iran.” 181 Heaven went so far as to argue that the government’s sophisticated
cyber-security techniques were greater than the activists’ and the Internet might be a
boon to their repressive efforts as much as it is an aid to the activists. As if to underscore
this concern, Twitter was hacked in December by a group that may be affiliated with the
regime. And there is no question that the government used Twitter to monitor the
activities of protestors. 182 Indeed as time wore on, and more and more members of the
opposition were arrested, some for their activities online, it looked like the usefulness of
Twitter had bumped up against the tradeoff between openness and repression to which
SMNs are subject in such environments. With no independent media to speak of in Iran
(which receives the lowest FH ranking for press freedom), no one in the country was able
to contest this crackdown.
To explain the subsequent events, we must rely on the more familiar theories and
explanations from comparative democratization. With the executive unified and with
softliners unable to exert control over the armed forces, the Green Revolution has so far
petered out far short of its goal of a new election. This conclusion to the summer’s events
had nothing to do with the mobilizational capabilities of the technologies themselves and
everything to do with larger institutional arrangements in Iranian politics and society
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beyond the control of SMN activists or even Mousavi himself. Milani, for instance,
situates the ongoing protests within splits internal to the regime (2009, 11-15).
Boroumand, on the other hand, locates the success of the protests in organization
undertaken by civil society groups over a period of years (2009, 20). While the U.S. took
a number of steps to informally side itself with the opposition, Mousavi’s history also
suggests that the U.S. foreign policy elite was not convinced that his government would
be substantively all that different from the one that currently rules. But even had the U.S.
been convinced that Mousavi would have represented a break with the Iranian status quo,
it is unclear if anything concrete could have been done to support the opposition. The
regime’s dedicated security forces – particularly the Revolutionary Guards – seemed
unwilling to defect to the opposition. Absent such a defection, the means of violence
remain in the state’s hands, no matter the volume of Twitter posts at home and admiring
blog posts from the quarters of the international elite.
6.2 Tent Cities, Elections, and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine
In the winter of 2004, shortly after the bitterly contested U.S. elections narrowly
won by George W. Bush, the world was transfixed by what appeared to be a similarly
bitter and narrowly-won contest in Ukraine. The election, which broke down along ethnic
lines as well as political ones, featured Party of Regions candidate Viktor Yanukovych,
the successor to post-communist dictator Leonard Kuchma and the favorite of both
Russia and the ethnically Russian Eastern Ukraine, in a very close election against the
opposition candidate, the independent Victor Yuschenko. Yuschenko was aligned with
the US and the EU, and favored NATO membership for Ukraine, while Yanukovych was
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supported by Russia and favored a more Eastward orientation (Lane 2008, 527). Ukraine
at the time was considered “partly free” by Freedom House. The period following
independence from the USSR was marked by continued autocracy under Kuchma, as
well as intense economic dislocation during the transition to a more market-oriented
economy. By 2005, the economy, measured by GDP, was still far below the level of 1989,
creating widespread dissatisfaction with the government, and resentment against
economic elites (Lane 2008, 525).
In addition to its bitter ethnic features and high-stakes democratization
implications, the election featured a sinister plot against Yuschenko that seemed straight
out of a Hollywood thriller. Only months before the election, Yuschenko fell gravely ill
after a dinner, and it was later determined that he had been poisoned, probably by forces
of the regime. 183 Yuschenko, who had been a handsome, dashing young reformer, was
transformed seemingly overnight into a brittle older man, and it was said that he was in
so much pain that he traveled during the campaign with a spinal painkiller IV. Of course,
there are still dissenting voices who suggest that Yuschenko was not poisoned, and that it
was part of a stunt by opposition forces. The truth of the matter is difficult to determine,
but there is no doubt that the poisoning allegations added an element of theatricality to
the proceedings, and generated widespread sympathy for Mr. Yuschenko. On election
day, official returns gave Yanukovych a narrow, 54% to 46% victory, which was
immediately charged as suspect by neutral observers. Opposition forces rallied and set up
camp in downtown Kiev, in Independence Square. And there they stayed, in the
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unforgiving Ukraine winter weather, for 11 days and nights, the crowd growing to as
many as 500,000, camped out in tents, surrounded by uneasy security forces of the
regime. They demanded not an immediate revolution, but merely a re-vote, since by that
time the actual results of the original election were greatly in doubt. Still, it was clear that
simply giving the election to either candidate at this point would have caused a massive
crisis of leadership legitimacy, since both camps would have regarded the election as
stolen.
A re-vote was eventually granted, and Yuschenko emerged victorious. Observers
dubbed the events in the Ukraine The Orange Revolution, and the tactics of the Ukraine
protestors would be mimicked and adopted in places as far away as Lebanon and Iran –
the coordinated color campaign, the non-violent street protests, and the demands for new
votes after crooked elections. (These tactics, and the scholarship they have inspired, are
far from uncontroversial. As David Lane argues, “The literature on these phenomena,
however, is often journalistic in approach, partisan in orientation and normative rather
than objective in content” (2008, 526).) Bunce and Wolchik call this “the electoral
model,” which they define as “a distinctive and unprecedented set of activities that are
consciously designed to maximize the prospects for an opposition victory at the polls….”
(2009, 70).
What was the role of SMNs in the election contest? Michael McFaul’s oft-cited
argument that the Orange Revolution “may have been the first in history to be organized
mostly online” (McFaul 2005; also quoted in Goldstein 2007) is bold but so far largely
unsubstantiated in precisely the same way that Iran’s “Twitter Revolution” is a finding in
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search of empirics. Goldstein argues that Ukraine, while a competitive authoritarian
regime, nevertheless featured a mainstream media environment that was almost entirely
controlled, directly or indirectly by the regime. One prominent method of control was
self-censorship, punctuated by occasional acts of violence by the regime against the
opposition. A climate of fear was reinforced by the 2000 murder of Georgiy Gongadze,
an opposition journalist who used the Internet as a platform for dissent. Gongadze’s
murder, almost certainly at the hands of Kuchma allies, sent an unmistakable signal to
opposition journalists that pursuing the truth could put their lives in danger. However, it
also spurred such journalists to continue using the Internet as a site of dissent, and in the
years between Gongadze’s murder and the 2004 elections, such online news sites (as
opposed to blogs in other locales) grew in importance, despite the tiny number of
Ukrainians using the Internet at this time (Goldstein 2007, 5).
Goldstein uses the Katz and Lazerfield Two Step Flow model of information – in
which the mass media influences a select few opinion leaders, who then influence their
friends – to come to essentially the same conclusion that this chapter arrived at in Chapter
3 – that bloggers and online journalists can still have immense importance in a society
even if very small numbers of people are online. This is due to the influence of “Online
Political Citizens,” people who consume blogs and online information sources and then
disseminate that information to mass publics. In Egypt this happened through the
independent media, whereas in the Ukraine the argument is that it happened through
existing social networks. Observers of the Ukraine revolution also believe that the
existence of independent media outlets played an important role in the events, with
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McFaul (2005) going so far as to generalize the existence of independent media as a
direct causal contributor to all of the so-called “color revolutions”.
Goldstein also argues that the protest group Pora made particularly good use of
the Internet before, during and after the elections, In particular, the well-developed
network of text-messages was activated early in the crisis and played a significant role in
organizing and coordinating the tent cities which played such a vital role in bringing
international attention to the plight of the Ukrainian protestors (7-8). Sites like the online
opposition site Pravda provided real-time updates as protestors across Ukraine (including
groups outside of the capital city of Kiev) set up their own tent cities and joined the
growing protest movement. This is similar to the role played by the 6th of April Web site
and the various opposition Twitter activists on April 6th, 2008 in Egypt. Goldstein ends
his research note with a question: “are these tools inherently conducive to the expansion
of civic engagement and democratization, or will authoritarian governments adapt the
technology to their own advantage?” The answer to this question, explored more fully in
the conclusion to this chapter, argues that the efficacy of SMN activism depends deeply
on institutional features of existing authoritarian regimes.
The technologies themselves cannot explain the defection of the Ukrainian
security services, nor the refusal of the Kuchma government to unleash violence on the
protestors. The regime could conceivably have chosen to break up the protests before
they reached the level of hundreds of thousands. It was the diffusion dynamics of SMNs
(which helped generate the initial gatherings), together with the fateful decision to allow
the protestors to camp out in Independence Square, gathering momentum and
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international press attention, that probably doomed the regime’s attempts to rig the
election. This lends substantial support to my first hypothesis, as well as to the second. It
may also have been Western support for the favored opposition which tipped the scales
against the regime, providing support for hypothesis 3 (that outcomes are independent of
mobilizations themselves). The apparent lack of repression of activists, though, appears
to contradict the fourth hypothesis – that levels of repression will increase with greater
use of SMNs.
6.3 The Twitter Revolution in Moldova
In April 2009, the communist party of Moldova (PCRM) appeared to sweep
parliamentary elections. Moldova was one of a handful of remaining post-Soviet
states that were still ruled by the vestiges of the ancien regime – vestiges which had
actually returned to power via what were considered free elections in 2001. But since that
time, Moldova’s democratic situation has deteriorated (Pippidi and Munteanu 2009, 139).
This backsliding, which accelerated after 2001, took place despite sustained democracybuilding efforts by European organizations (McDonagh 2008, 143). Similar to many
post-Soviet states, Moldova is divided by rivalry between a Russian-speaking minority
(in this case concentrated in the breakaway province of Transnistria) and an indigenous
majority. This conflict has been so potentially destabilizing that the EU has not promoted
membership for Moldova. There seems to be a consensus that offering incentives for EU
membership positively affects the level of political and civil rights in Eastern Europe
(McDonagh 2008, 159). This conflict has manifested itself in electoral politics via the
support by ethnic Russians for the PCRM and by younger Moldovans (ethnically
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Romanian) who support opposition parties. In practice, this split is almost identical to the
split between European-oriented Western Ukraine, and Russian-oriented Eastern Ukraine.
In the April 2009 parliamentary elections, a coalition of opposition parties also claimed
victory and accused the communists of rigging the elections, by fabricating votes by
people who had left the country (impoverished Moldova has a very high rate of outmigration, particularly to EU-member and neighbor Romania). The opposition parties
differed on many issues, including the relationship of Moldova to Romania (some parties
like the Liberal Democratic Party (PLDM) want to reunite with Romania) but they all
shared a fundamentally pro-EU outlook that clashed severely with the Eastward
orientation of the PCRM (Pippidi and Munteanu 2009, 142).
The capital of Chişinău was soon gripped by the kinds of organized people-power
demonstrations that took down regimes in Ukraine and Georgia. The woman credited
with organizing the protests claims not to have had any idea that her call to demonstrate
would resonate with so many people. As she told the Guardian, “we expected at the most
a couple of hundred friends, friends of friends, and colleagues", she said. "When we went
to the square, there were 20,000 people waiting there. It was unbelievable.” 184 Such a
swelling from initial, low expectations, to sudden, mass protest can only be characterized
as an informational cascade. The low barriers to the transmission of information on
SMNs meant that Natalie’s message reached a huge number of people instantaneously.
Aware of their friends’ preferences and intentions (the revelation of private information),
individuals were therefore more likely to act on their desire to contest the fraudulent
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elections. In other words, the diffusion of this information increased expectations of
turnout to protest, thereby meeting the revolutionary thresholds of individual protestors.
While the official media cloaked the events in a shroud of silence, word spread,
both within Moldova and outside the country, via the now-familiar pathways of Twitter,
Youtube, and text message. Observers estimate that as many as 30,000 people descended
on the capital’s center to express their dissatisfaction with the results. Like Georgia,
however, the demonstrations were not entirely peaceful, as demonstrators stormed and
then burned down the parliament building. Still, an OSCE report argued that the April
parliamentary elections had been fair, while members of the opposition denounced
Russian influence in the OSCE (Pippidi and Munteanu 2009, 139). In any case, the
communists remained in power, and commenced a massive crackdown on the opposition.
Activists and journalists were arrested. The regime tightened control over the media,
expelled foreign journalists, and blocked access to Romanian media sources (Pippidi and
Munteanu 2009, 140). However with only 60 of the 101 seats in parliament, the
communists were unable to secure the election of a new president as per Moldovan law.
The opposition managed to block the election of a new communist president, an
impasse which continued for months as then-President Vladimir Voronin continued to
rule. Because of that, new elections were scheduled for later in the summer, and in fact
took place. However the street presence of the opposition gradually waned, as the EU
appeared to throw its support behind the legitimacy of the elections. The crucial fulcrum
shifted then from the activists in the streets to the opposition members in parliament,
whose demands for a new election had to be met. In the meantime, however, the putative
215

organizer of the Flash Mob that led to the burning of the parliament, went into hiding.
Natalie Morar, who had been thrown out of Russia for making print allegations about the
murder of a prominent Russian central bank leader, apparently also feared retribution
from Russia, which sided with the regime. 185 While she later returned from hiding, a
cloud of legal uncertainty remained over her head.
Security forces appeared quite ineffectual overall, however. While the ruling party
held fast at first, over the course of the summer, as global attention was fixated on Iran, it
eventually relented and agreed to new elections. While still winning a plurality of votes,
the Communists were unable to maintain their grip on power, as a coalition of opposition
parties cobbled together enough victories to unseat the communists from power. While
the “Twitter Revolution” in Moldova hasn’t received nearly the level of attention as
similar events (perhaps because Moldova, an impoverished country of 5 million that is
both strategically and culturally marginal), the events of 2009 are no less instructive
about the effects of SMNs on political outcomes. The regime’s initially successful
attempt to retain power appears to corroborate hypothesis 3 presented above, that
informational cascades triggered by SMNs are not predictive of outcomes.
Indeed, the Moldova case highlights the enduring importance of authoritarian
institutions. While the state, on paper, still possessed the capability to deploy violence
against its own citizens, it lacked the will to do so, at least in the long run. Clearly SMN
activists in Moldova were no more clever or brave than their counterparts in Iran – their
success was not due to short-run contingencies or unique strategies like the burning of
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government buildings. As Schell argues, power comes not when violence is deployed, but
rather when individuals act together in concert (2008, 218) . The case thus confirms the
importance of SMNs for reducing the costs associated with the collective action problem.
Conversely, the success of non-violent action depends not on the characteristics of
the actors but rather on the unwillingness or inability of the state to defeat them violently
in the streets. While the state employed moderate violence (including a handful of fatal
casualties), it was certainly capable of greater harm. After the events, the Moldovan
president, Vladimir Voronin, expelled the leader of the National Democratic Institute, a
Washington-based NGO that was involved in many of the other “color revolutions”
(Pippidi and Munteanu 2009, 139). However, the degree to which the NDI was actually
involved in the Moldovan unrest is difficult to determine. If anything, in this geostrategic
backwater, the state could conceivably have cracked down violently with little to no
consequences from the international community. Certainly, even in the context of
wrangling with Russia (which may have influenced the case of Georgia and certainly had
influence in Ukraine), Moldova was of far less consequence than Ukraine. Therefore
international variables alone cannot explain the outcome here. In fact, because the
“revolution” appeared to fail at the outset, observers appear to have drawn all the wrong
conclusions from the events. Writing in July 2009, just months after the initial unrest,
Pippidi and Munteanu drew the unsurprising conclusion that “The Moldovan case
underlines the lesson that democratization cannot make progress in strongly unfavorable
external environments” (2009, 141). Because Russia was so invested in the success of the
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Communists, this line of thinking goes, activists were powerless to affect a non-violent
transfer of power to the opposition
However, if the PCRM remained in control of events and the security services,
why were new elections ordered? Why submit to opposition demands for new elections
when they could easily have simply foisted a new communist president on the opposition
by fiat? This is a question that Pippidi and Munteanu left unanswered. Clearly, though,
there are steps that even parties and factions allied with Russia are unwilling to take in
the light of international attention. In fact, subsequent events demonstrate that in fact
oppositions can make headway in spite of “strongly unfavorable external environments.”
Those events also underscore the reality that in such situations, SMNs can influence the
coordination and execution of protest, and can reach outside observers and media
organizations with their work, but that they cannot fundamentally control the shape of
subsequent decision-making processes. Those decisions depend on, among many other
things, contingent decisions of relevant actors, which can be explained within the elite
decision-making models of Schmitter, O’Donnell, Przeworski, and others. Again, as with
Iran, the attribution of the revolution to Twitter alone can lead to dangerous
misunderstandings of the actual capabilities of these technologies. What, for instance,
would have happened if Yanukovych had won his run-off with Yuschenko? Would the
Orange Revolutionaries have put another 500,000 people in the streets until they obtained
the desired result? Don’t both cases, in fact, demonstrate the same outcome? Perhaps the
Russians, nervous about the thousands of Moldovans in the streets, about the potential
involvement of Romania and the EU in its Transnistria problem, submitted to new
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elections, figuring that as long as they controlled the breakaway province, their interests
in Moldova were more or less assured. In other words, let us not reify our understandings
and preconceptions about the geopolitics of these transitions – three of which now, the
Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova , have taken place despite strong and vocal Russian
criticism.
6.4 Violence and Narrative-control in the Kenya Election Crisis
To disentangle some of these factors highlighted by events in post-Soviet
countries, it would be useful to step out-of-area to Africa, where a violent electoral crisis
gripped Kenya, and where SMNs played a role, both positive and negative, in the
subsequent events. In stark contrast to the crises described above, the Kenya crisis led to
widespread violence and suffering, with more than 1,000 people killed and hundreds of
thousands turned into IDPs (Goldstein and Rotich 2008, 3). The situation was all the
more alarming and dismaying given Kenya’s international reputation as one of the more
successful post-colonial states in Africa (Kiai 2008, 162). This reputation existed in spite
of great corruption within Kenya, where the President is granted immense, superpresidential privileges, and in which legislators have enormous salaries that dwarf the
average per capita income in ways that have sparked outrage (Kiai 2007, 164). The
disputed election was grafted onto a longstanding ethnic rivalry between the Kikuyu, who
had been privileged during and after the period of British colonialism, and other groups.
On December 27th, 2007, the incumbent government of Mwai Kibaki won what
appeared to be a narrow victory over the opposition, led by Raila Odinga. Kibaki’s

219

victory was certified quickly by Kenya’s electoral commission 186 . Particularly
problematic was the apparent last-minute swing in the election totals, which took days.
As of December 29th, Odinga and his allies were cruising toward a huge victory, with an
18% lead in the count halfway through. 187 Kibaki was supported by the Kikuyu, and his
disputed victory ignited the tragic violence that followed the elections. It was largely
Kikuyu residents who were expelled from their homes in the Rift Valley (where the
violence was centralized).The valley is one of Kenya’s most troublesome areas – a
Presidential Task Force recommended, in 2004, the formation of a Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation panel to help resolve the region’s longstanding grievances, but the body
was never formed (Riai 2008, 165). Luo’s were also victims of violence in different parts
of the country. 188 SMS messaging was used to spread messages of hatred and violence,
much as radio was used in the Rwandan genocide to mobilize violence (Goldstein and
Rotich 2008, 5). However, government officials were persuaded to keep the mobile
network running, in the hopes that messages of peace sent by the provider Safaricom
might counteract the more predatory messages being spread by would-be genocidaires.
The opposition and its supporters also organized huge street protests, which were
brutally suppressed by the government, which had adopted a “zero tolerance” policy. 189
Clashes between police and protestors frequently turned deadly, as members of the
opposition, and in a move familiar from other cases, the government harassed foreign
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journalists, particularly those following Odinga. 190 Non-partisan observers, including
Kenyan civil society groups, Transparency International, and American diplomats,
declared the elections fraudulent. Ultimately the government refused to step down, and in
fact the human rights situation for members of the opposition continued to be quite
fragile, with human rights activists under protection, and several killings suspected of
being perpetrated by the state itself. 191
Goldstein and Rotich note the effectiveness of blogs for countering official
narratives in Kenya. While the official state media peddled the government’s line,
bloggers – and their connections abroad and in the Kenyan diaspora – helped decouple
the horrific violence taking place in the Rift Valley from what they saw as the
unanswered question of election-rigging. As in other cases, perhaps the most important
use of the technology was information dissemination. As the state media tried to
downplay the violence, citizen journalists wielding cell phone cameras posted videos and
first-hand accounts of what was actually happening in the streets. Again it was cell
phones rather than the Internet per se that had the greatest impact, since at the time only
3.2% of Kenyans had Internet access. 192 SMS messages transmitted from ordinary
Kenyans were posted both on prominent Kenyan online sites, as well as international
forums like BBC’s Have Your Say. 193 This information exchange boomeranged back into
the Kenyan press environment, leading one prominent Kenyan blogger to argue that “I’m
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getting more news from BBC than from anywhere else right now. “ 194 And the
prominence of English-language bloggers like Kenya Pundit highlights the importance,
noted in Chapter 3, of these bilingual bridge bloggers, who are able to translate events in
far-flung places for global audiences, giving them enormous power over the shape of the
debates that take place in the international public sphere. This is particularly true when
the state temporarily turns off the information spigot. On the other hand, it is also
instructive, and should serve as a further note of caution, that the state was successfully
able to disable the SMS network when it so desired. The state also maintained the
capacity to track individuals sending text messages, and threatened to prosecute anyone
caught sending inflammatory messages to others.
The Kenya case further underlines the reality that the effects of SMN activism are
contingent. In some circumstances, SMNs can help topple unsteady regimes (Ukraine,
Moldova) and in others they can put together the organizing that threatens more
entrenched authoritarian regimes (Iran). And in still others, they can both instigate and
mitigate violence, as well as document abuses and organize demonstrations against
crooked election results.
6.5 Conclusions
The case material presented above appears to lend at least qualified support to the
four hypotheses outlined at the beginning of the chapter. First, the cases lend support to
the hypothesis that Social Media Networks can trigger informational cascades in
authoritarian countries. Cascades appear to be the mechanism for each of the cases
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discussed above. I would further argue that electoral authoritarian regimes are likely to
have better chances post-transition than non-competitive regimes. This is because
parliaments, elections, and parties create routinized sites of contestation, debate, and
coalition-forming before democratic transitions. However, these sites do not actually
structure the opportunities for transitions themselves, which depend on factors beyond the
capabilities of opposition actors to put people in the streets. Still, that does not mean that
such competition is meaningless. Brownlee (2009) argues that competitive and
hegemonic authoritarian regimes have better chances of successfully consolidating
democracy after a transition from authoritarianism.
But what about the way that such institutional arrangements might structure the
ability of SMNs to structure contestation prior to transitions in authoritarian countries? It
also seems to be the case that those sites of contestation serve as ideal platforms for
opposition elites seeking to contest the hegemonic role of the state using Social Media
Networks. This may be why many of the most heavily-documented instance of SMN
mobilization have taken place in and around elections in competitive authoritarian
regimes, and why such mobilizations have been sporadic or non-existent in the many
authoritarian countries that do not undertake periodic exercises in controlled contestation.
The cases under examination here would seem to challenge both institutional
theories presented earlier. Brownlee’s expectations that the Iranian regime would be
vulnerable to elite divisions have not been borne out by the 2009-2010 electoral crisis (at
least not yet). Indeed, while the regime has witnessed substantial intra-elite division, it
has tenaciously clung to power, for reasons that are not yet clear to observers. And Lust223

Okar’s expectation that regimes unified structures of contestation are most vulnerable
during prolonged crises does not seem supported by the case of Kenya, which allowed all
groups to participate and yet also weathered its electoral crisis. The collapse of the
Moldovan regime and its ruling communist party also appears to challenge Brownlee,
whereas the survival of the Egyptian regime and the collapse of the Ukrainian regime
appear to lend support to both Brownlee and Lust-Okar’s theories. Overall, the set of
outcomes here leads me to conclude that neither the presence of political parties, nor
structures of contestation are determinative of outcomes during electoral crises in
authoritarian regimes.
Second, SMNs themselves appear to have no direct relationship to the success or
failure of activism in a given authoritarian context. The divergent outcomes of SMNdriven activism in Kenya, Ukraine, Moldova, and Iran demonstrate that scholars and
observers cannot simply assume the democratizing impact of SMNs. Indeed, in Kenya,
the technologies were put to much more nefarious uses, whereas in Iran SMNs were
turned on their users quite effectively
The third hypothesis, that independent media are critical variables for the
transmission of claims made through SMNs, is more challenging. I conclude that while
independent media systems make it possible for SMNs to transmit claims during ordinary
political times, those independent media outlets are not necessary variables during the
kinds of crises discussed here, where tactical tools like Twitter and text-messaging can
circumvent media blackouts and facilitate informational cascades. The primary effect of
the independent media variable within authoritarian countries is to make newsworthy a
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whole host of issues and events that would normally be unintelligible or uninteresting to
global audiences. In other words, the routinized presence of opposition or independent
media practitioners in authoritarian public spheres makes possible daily contestations and
dissent, as opposed to the more sensational events – like elections and electoral fraud –
that tend to draw the attention of international media. Thus in Egypt, independent press
outlets were critical in the dissemination of news stories about sexual harassment,
refugees, torture, and other issues that are rarely of great interest to global media elites.
Rather, they are of interest to international NGOs and rights organizations with a vested
interest in a certain kind of activism. In Kenya and Ukraine, both partly-free states with
partly-free media systems, blogs and new media had for years served as alternative
sources of news and information to state-run media agencies and as workaround to selfcensorship.
However, in Moldova, bloggers and Twitter users appeared on the scene as new
actors in state politics. Little attention was paid prior to April 2009 to bloggers, Twitter
activists, or other individuals deploying these tools. This might be because in 2008,
Moldova’s media system was considered “not free” by the Freedom House ranking. 195
Once the crisis arrived, however, networks of text-messagers, Twitters, and Youtubers
were able to circumvent the regime’s media blackout and reach critical external
audiences (even if those external audiences were not, ultimately, ready to make sacrifices
for them). And in Iran, another media environment considered not free, the change in the
SMN age is that the state was unable to control the information environment during these
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critical junctures. The state no longer has the capability to close its doors and promote its
own alternative (one might say fictional) account of what actually took place in its streets.
With citizens aware at all times of the protests, accessing international media outlets via
proxy servers, and sending information to international journalists, authoritarian regimes,
even in the most closed societies which have gone to great length to control the Internet
have been unable to control emerging media narratives around discrete events in the
political system.
The difficulties of transmitting claims in the absence of independent media is also
why Syria, whose citizens are also on Facebook and Twitter, has not seen the kind of
online-driven mobilizations witnessed in other contexts. Partly this is because Syria’s
brand of authoritarianism is much more severe than other cases here, partly because of
the absence of independent press outlets to transmit claims, and partly because there are
no competitive elections around which to organize in that country. Syria’s rate of Internet
penetration is also quite low (Pavel 2009). So while Syria has seen some coordinated
dissent online –with one case seemingly successful in changing government policy on
personal status law— crucially that dissent has not moved offline into the realm of reallife politics. Syria can also persecute its online citizens, which it does ruthlessly (Pavel
2009). So while SMNs might “constitute a direct challenge to highly centralized
authoritarian regimes such as Syria,”as Pavel argues, they have yet to demonstrate their
utility in combating the policies of noncompetitive authoritarian regimes. There appears
to be very little material on the web documenting Syrian police abuses, for instance, the
kind of videos and pictures that appear in the thousands about Egypt. This is also clear
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when the case of China is introduced, where citizens have repeatedly organized ad-hoc
events and demonstrations using new media, but where a concerted effort by the state,
and a total absence of independent media, has resulted in a near-perfect filtration and
surveillance system.
Finally, the substantial repression of activists generated in Kenya, Moldova, and
Iran suggests that at the least we cannot reject the hypothesis that increased SMN
activism leads to increased repression. Together with the evidence from the Egyptian
case, the Ukraine case (which saw little repression during and after the electoral crisis)
appears to be the outlier. The implications of this hypothesis are discussed below.
6.6 Coda
On December 16th, 2009, Wael Abbas was sentenced, in absentia, to six years in
prison, for sedition. Abbas, whose home was ransacked while he was at a conference in
Beirut, decided not to return to Egypt for fear of his personal safety. His “arrest” and
prosecution are chilling harbingers of things to come for online activists in Egypt, who
have long operated in a legal and institutional gray zone. Abbas has been Twittering and
Facebooking his ordeal ever since it began. The Abbas case suggests that the Egyptian
government may no longer be satisfied with piecemeal harassment and imprisonment of
its activists, but may rather be moving toward a more long-term strategy of ending online
politics as an avenue of dissent altogether, perhaps in anticipation of what could be a
tumultuous presidential election period in 2011. It also answers a puzzle that has only
grown more difficult since online activism took off in 2005 – why, since many SMN
activists operate so openly in Egypt, has the state not cracked down more brutally on
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them? Perhaps the state feared the mid-decade interest of the U.S. in regional democratic
development and feared a backlash, and perhaps now calculates that the US can’t spare
the diplomatic capital to make an international incident out of the plight of a single
blogger. But if Abbas is allowed to be driven from public Egyptian life, it will likely
discourage others of similar beliefs and intentions from taking part in citizen journalism,
and deprive the Egyptian public sphere of one of its most vibrant and courageous voices.
The fact that the regime has so far succeeded in this endeavor suggests once again that
institutional features of authoritarianism are every bit as important as the structural
features of digital activism in understanding the impact of these activities and predicting
their future trajectories.
The exile of Wael Abbas, and the increasingly dire outlook for Egyptian digital
media activists, points to an observation first made by Jenifer Whitten-Woodring. She
argues that far from being a panacea for authoritarianism, independent mediaspheres
might actually contribute to greater repression (Whitten-Woodring 2009). This counterintuitive observation rests on the durability of apparatuses of repression, and the kind of
open-source intelligence provided by SMNs and independent press outlets in
authoritarian regimes. By allowing a modicum of press freedom, the state might be
playing a double game – forcing (or tempting) activists to reveal themselves and their
networks, and simultaneously deploying the full force of state power against them. It
must also be the case that the information that diffuses through SMNs also reaches
authoritarian elites, by crossing social clusters via informational cascade. WhittenWoodring’s hypothesis squares with the idea advanced here, that there is a tradeoff
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between online openness and networking, and a regime’s ability to use that information
against individuals and activists. We should be careful, then, about making
recommendations to such practitioners, whose lives or personal safety are likely to be
placed accordingly in jeopardy. Egypt may yet play host to the kind of successful ferment
seen in places like Ukraine and Georgia, or even to unsuccessful mass mobilizations like
those in Kenya or Iran. However, the lesson of this study is that we should not take a
technologically deterministic approach to understanding the use of SMNs, in Egypt or
anywhere else. Outcomes still depend on political, social, economic, and even natural
forces, which can’t be predicted in advance, and which we will almost certainly struggle
to understand if and when they are unleashed.
This dissertation began with a story about a Facebook group, and asked how that
group might impact politics in Egypt. I believe the answers have been provided here. The
Mohamed ElBaradei Facebook group can do many things – alert individuals to the
preferences of their friends and acquaintances, build shared meaning about ElBaradei’s
presidential candidacy, even disseminate calls to action and facilitate debate. However,
we know that levels of commitment to this group are likely to be quite low, and that
without organizing on the ground by committed individuals with ties into the nonnetworked mass of poorer Egyptians, is unlikely to play a direct role in any succession
crisis. That crisis organizing, should it come, may be augmented by text-messaging,
Twitter, the independent media, and the blogosphere, but absent changes in Egyptian
political institutions, such mobilization is unlikely to be determinative. However, we
should not dismiss the importance of this activity either. We simply do not know the
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ultimately, long-term consequences of this kind of networked, public dissent, and can
only imagine its implications for compliance with authoritarianism. These media –
particularly those written and analyzed in Arabic, give us an important glimpse into the
everyday in Egyptian society, and give their users the means of expression and
organization which they have long been denied. Even as savvy a regime as Egypt cannot
fully shut down this discourse, nor can it predict the consequences of its flowering. In
short, there can be no revolutions without revolutionaries. But neither can there be
authoritarianism with no means to control information. The way that this struggle plays
out in the years ahead should be of continued interest to scholars and policymakers alike.

David M. Faris
April 19th, 2010.
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